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Psychiatry	 relies	 upon	 semantic	 and	 epistemological	 concepts	 in	 characterising	
psychopathology	as	meaningful	or	meaningless,	rational	or	irrational.	These	in	turn	are	used	
to	distinguish	between	the	normal	and	the	abnormal	as	definitions	of	mental	disorder	often	
invoke	meaninglessness	 as	 a	hallmark	of	dysfunction	or	neurological	 damage.	Despite	 this	
reliance	 the	 analysis	 of	 such	 concepts	 within	 psychiatry	 is	 minimal;	 clinicians	 and	 carers	
instead	relying	on	common	sense	intuitions.	Detailed	study	of	semantic	and	epistemological	
concepts	belongs	primarily	to	philosophy	with	Karl	Jaspers	descriptive	psychopathology	the	
major	 psychiatric	 contribution	 to	 the	 topic.	 Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 Twentieth	 Century	
theories	 of	 meaning	 have	 been	 developed	 within	 philosophy	 oftentimes	 utilising	 the	
psychopathological	as	boundary	cases.	Neuropsychiatric	phenomena,	alleged	to	straddle	the	
neurology/psychiatry	 divide,	 may	 represent	 boundary	 cases	 between	 the	meaningful	 and	
meaningless.	 The	 aim	 of	 the	 current	 study	 is	 to	 therefore	 to	 investigate	 whether	 the	
meaningfulness	of	neuropsychiatric	phenomena	does	falter	or	even	fail	and,	if	so,	to	explore	
some	of	the	 implications	for	psychiatry.	How	to	conduct	such	an	 investigation,	however,	 is	
unclear.	 Interpretative	Phenomenological	Analysis	 (IPA)	was	chosen	as	a	 robust	qualitative	
methodology	 to	 conduct	 and	 analyse	 interviews	 exploring	 what	 patients	 and	 their	 carers	
understood	of	neuropsychiatric	symptoms	(the	primary	analysis).	An	additional	attraction	of	
IPA	 is	 the	 ability	 to	 apply	 hypotheses	 formalised	 from	 other	 theoretical	 domains,	 such	 as	
philosophy,	 to	 the	 interview	 material	 (secondary	 analysis).	 Patients	 with	 classical	
neuropsychiatric	 (confabulation,	 visual	 hallucinations,	 misidentification	 syndrome)	
symptoms	were	 recruited	 from	 two	 London	 teaching	 hospitals.	 The	 interviews	 underwent	
primary	 analysis	 to	 discover	 relevant	 themes	 and	 issues	 with	 regards	 meaning	 of	 the	
symptoms.	There	was	then	a	secondary	analysis	utilising	the	theories	of	meaning	developed	
by	 Daniel	 Dennett,	 Donald	 Davidson,	 and	 Ludwig	 Wittgenstein.	 The	 outcomes	 of	 the	
analyses	are	presented	separately	as	 results	parts	A	&	B.	The	patient	and	carer	 interviews	
demonstrated	 that	 the	 meaning	 of	 symptoms	 becomes	 increasingly	 contested	 but	 is	 not	
revoked.	 For	 carers,	 neuropsychiatric	 symptoms	 simultaneously	 signify	 disease	 and	
symbolise	distress.	While	Dennett’s	intentional	stance	does	indeed	falter	when	interpreting	
the	 symptoms	 his	 reductive	 consequences	 fail	 to	 follow.	 Davidson’s	 and	 Wittgenstein’s	







A	 recurring	 problem	 in	 psychiatry	 is	 the	 meaningfulness,	 or	 otherwise,	 of	 psychiatric	
symptoms.	Critics	of	psychiatry	have	at	times	accused	the	discipline	of	misconstruing	mental	
phenomena	 and	 behaviour,	 including	 the	 verbal	 sort,	 as	 symptoms,	 in	 accord	 with	 other	
medical	 specialisms.	 This,	 the	 critics	 argue,	 strips	 the	 phenomena	 of	meaning,	 just	 as	 the	
brief	shock-like	involuntary	myoclonic	jerk	is	taken	by	neurologists	to	mean	nothing	beyond	
signalling	pathology	of	the	nervous	system.	If	symptoms	are	meaningless	then	content	can	
be	 ignored;	 the	 neuropsychiatrist	 German	 Berrios,	 for	 instance,	 infamously	 described	
delusions	 as	 “empty	 speech	 acts.”	1	This,	 however,	 entails	 a	 silencing	 of	 the	 patient	 and	
diminution	 of	 their	 agency,	 grave	 insinuations	 in	 an	 era	 that	 valorises	 autonomy	 and	
individuality.		
	
Neuropsychiatric	 symptoms	 are	 severe	 psychiatric	 phenomena	 closely	 associated	 with	
established	 neurological	 disease	 and	 so,	 one	 might	 suppose,	 resemble	 neurological	
symptoms	 proper,	 such	 as	 the	 myoclonic	 jerk.	 If,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 neuropsychiatric	
symptoms	 convey	meaning	 this	 is	 likely	 to	 generalise	 to	 other	 psychiatric	 symptoms.	 The	
aim	 of	 the	 current	 study	 is	 to	 investigate	 whether	 and	 how	 the	 meaningfulness	 of	
neuropsychiatric	 phenomena	 does	 falter	 or	 even	 fail	 and,	 if	 so,	 to	 explore	 some	 of	 the	




Meaning	 became	 a	 major	 philosophical	 topic	 in	 the	 20th	 Century	 and	 a	 number	 of	
philosophers	 offered	 more	 or	 less	 explicit	 accounts	 of	 it.	 Nevertheless,	 no	 philosophical	
theory	can	be	considered	gold	standard	given	they	tend	to	be	conceptual	and	rarely,	if	ever,	







we	 seek	 to	 investigate.	 The	 best	 that	 can	 be	 offered	 is	 to	 hold	 the	 neuropsychiatric	
phenomena	 alongside	 philosophical	 theories	 of	 meaning	 in	 order	 that	 each	 might	 throw	




The	 remainder	 of	 this	 introductory	 chapter	 describes	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 the	 study	
question.	First	we	revisit	Karl	Jaspers’	exemplary	discussion	of	meaning	and	meaninglessness	
and	 some	contemporary	 responses.	 This	provides	an	overview	of	 the	dispute	and	offers	a	
rationale	 for	 looking	 specifically	 at	 neuropsychiatric	 symptoms.	 The	 focus	 then	 shifts	 to	
instances	where	the	meaningfulness	of	these	has	been	debated.	Key	points	in	such	debates	
will	 be	made	apparent.	Next,	we	examine	 the	 issue	of	meaning	as	 a	boundary	 for	mental	
disorder.	This	 is	 important	because	psychiatry	has	difficulty	drawing	a	clear	border	around	
its	 domain.	 If	 some	 phenomena	 are	meaningless	 this	 could	 perhaps	 function	 as	 a	 limit,	 a	




The	 methodology	 chapter	 commences	 with	 a	 review	 of	 methods	 by	 which	 meaning	 has	
previously	 been	 explored	 in	 relation	 to	 psychopathology,	 culminating	 in	 a	 justification	 for	
and	 description	 of	 Interpretative	 Phenomenological	 Analysis	 (IPA)	 the	 method	 employed	
here.	This	involves	in-depth	semi-structured	interviews	with	patients	and	their	carers	about	
the	 significance	 for	 them	 of	 their	 prototypical	 neuropsychiatric	 symptoms.	 After	 the	
methods	 chapter	we	 sequentially	 examine	 the	 three	 philosophies	 of	meaning,	 concluding	
with	a	 section	 that	highlights	 key	hypotheses	 to	be	explored	 in	 the	 study.	 There	 is	 then	a	
discussion	of	meaning’s	role	in	existing	models	for	each	neuropsychiatric	symptom:	Capgras’	
delusion,	 visual	 hallucination,	 confabulation.	 The	 results	 are	 presented	 in	 two	 separate	
sections.	 The	 standard	 IPA	 analyses	 of	 the	 interviews	 are	 presented	 first,	 followed	by	 the	
secondary	 analyses,	 which	 integrate	 the	 theories	 of	 meaning	 with	 qualitative	 interview	
material.	It	is	important	to	bear	in	mind	throughout	the	thesis	that	contrary	to	standard	IPA	
practice	it	is	this	secondary	analysis	that	forms	the	most	significant	portion	of	the	research.	
This	 deviation	 from	 usual	 practice	 is	warranted	 because	 the	 examination	 of	meaning	 and	









the	 philosopher	 psychiatrist	 Karl	 Jaspers	 explained	 that	 many	 mental	 symptoms	 are	
understandable,	through	the	empathic	method,	which	he	described	in	some	detail.	First,	he	
divided	 symptoms	 into	 objective	 and	 subjective	 types.	 The	 former	 are	 comprised	 of	 “all	
concrete	events	that	can	be	perceived	by	the	senses,	e.g.	reflexes,”4	and	the	like.	Myoclonic	
jerks	 would	 fit	 in	 well	 here.	 More	 idiosyncratically,	 also	 considered	 objective	 were	 “the	
rational	 contents	 of	 what	 the	 patient	 tells	 us.” 5 	Specifically,	 “thoughts	 may	 be	
understandable	 because	 they	 emerge	 from	 each	 other	 according	 to	 the	 rules	 of	 logic.”6	
Rationality	 was	 for	 Jaspers	 so	 undisputed	 that	 he	 neglected	 to	 specify	 it	 further.	 Yet	 it	
enables	one	 to	“understand	what	 is	 said,”7	which	contrasts	with	empathic	understanding,8	
the	mode	of	access	for	the	phenomenological	characterisation	of	mental	states,	that	is:	“the	
representation,	 description,	 definition,	 differentiation,	 and	 classification	 of	 individual	
psychic	 experience.”9	This	 is	 gained	 via	 the	 patient’s	 self-descriptions.	 Crucially,	 however,	
the	 genetic	 understanding	 of	 non-rational	 connections	 between	 mental	 states	 is	 also	




living	with	 them	 in	 the	context	of	events,	actions	and	personal	destinies….	 [The	psychiatrist]	
can	share	the	patient's	experiences	–	always	provided	this	happens	spontaneously	without	his	
having	to	take	thought	over	it.	In	this	way	he	can	gain	an	essentially	personal,	indefinable	and	
direct	 understanding,	which,	 however,	 remains	 for	 him	 a	matter	 of	 pure	 experience,	 not	 of	
explicit	knowledge.10	
	
Genetic	 understanding	 is	 self-evident	 but	 this	 does	 not	 confer	 validity.	 Its	 veracity	 rests	
instead,	“on	the	tangible	facts	(that	is,	on	the	verbal	contents,	cultural	factors,	people’s	acts,	




which	 provides	 the	 objective	 data.” 11 	As	 the	 objective	 data	 is	 rarely	 complete	 one’s	
empathic	 understanding	 must	 necessarily	 remain	 merely	 an	 interpretation,	 however.	
Jaspers’	 notion	 of	 empathy	 is	 ambiguous	 on	 whether	 one’s	 empathic	 understanding	 of	
another	is	achieved	directly,	as	intimated	in	the	long	quote	above,	or	indirectly	by	observing	
the	 physical	manifestations	 of	 the	mental	 state	 (e.g.	 the	 physical	 expressions	 of	 anger	 or	
fear.)	 Some12	see	 a	 tension	 here	 while	 others13	conceive	 them	 as	 inseparably	 bound	 –	
directly	perceived	actions	and	expressions	are	evidence	for	the	indirectly	understood	mental	
life.	Furthermore,	assertions	 that	empathy	 is	 spontaneous	and	effortless	are	belied	by	 the	
need	 for	 “transferring	 oneself,	 so	 to	 say,	 into	 the	 other	 individual’s	 psyche”	 and	 the	
requirement	 “to	 train	 ourselves	 in	 it	 and	 master	 it”	 while	 psychiatrists	 “unwilling	 or	
incapable	 of	 actualizing	 psychic	 events	 and	 representing	 them	 vividly”14	lack	 empathic	
understanding	of	their	charges.	It	seems	therefore	that	the	psychiatrist	actively	chooses	the	
empathic	 approach	 by	 engaging	 with	 the	 patient	 and	 having	 done	 so	 the	 understanding	
occurs	automatically	without	effort.	Empathic	understanding	is	not	driven	by	any	theory;	it	
is	 in	 fact	 opposed	 to	 theorising.	 For	 instance,	 Jaspers	 was	 critical	 of	 psychoanalysis	 for	
imposing	theory	on	all	mental	symptoms:	“They	have	thus	come	to	‘understand’	almost	all	
the	 contents	 of	 these	 psychoses	 by	 applying	 a	 procedure	which	 as	 the	 results	 show	 only	
leads	 on	 to	 endlessness.”15	Instead,	 he	 asserted	 that	 certain	 psychiatric	 phenomena	 are	
fundamentally	 un-understandable.	 For	 Jaspers	 there	 are	 three	 gradations	 of	
understanding.16	The	first	are	those	psychic	events	that	everyone	empathically	understands	
as	 emerging	 meaningfully,	 as	 described	 above.	 To	 the	 intermediate	 group	 belong	







understanding	 of	 them,	 but	 through	 the	 shock	 which	 the	 course	 of	 our	 comprehension	
receives	in	the	face	of	the	incomprehensible.17		
	





if	 from	 nowhere,	 rather	 than	 emerging	 understandably	 from	 personal	 context	 or	 cultural	
history.	Jaspers	speculated	that	here	purely	biological	causal	processes	were	at	work.	While	




are	of	 relatively	 little	 interest.	 In	 the	other	 it	 is	as	 if	 the	clockwork	keeps	going	wrong,	stops	
and	then	runs	again…	the	schizophrenic	life	is	peculiarly	productive.18	
	
Although	 neuropsychiatric	 phenomena	 would	 be	 expected	 to	 lie	 outside	 our	 empathic	
understanding	 Jaspers	 nevertheless	 counselled	 against	 an	 over-readiness	 to	 ascribe	 un-
understandability,	warning	that	the	fault	may	lie	with	the	clinician’s	ability	to	comprehend:	
“In	 the	 case	 of	 every	 investigator	 it	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 his	 human	 stature	 as	 to	 what	 he	
understands	and	how	far	his	understanding	reaches.”19	How	then	are	we	to	know	that	the	




in	 mental	 disorder.	 Richard	 Bentall,	 for	 example,	 takes	 Jaspers	 to	 task	 in	 Madness	
Explained20	for	 handing	 psychosis	 to	 the	 biologists	 and	 negating	 the	 need	 for	 clinicians	 to	
relate	 humanely	 to	 their	 patients.	 Delusions,	 he	 says,	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 arising	 by	
distortion	 of	 normal	 belief	 formation	 processes.	 They	 are	 not	 distinctive	 phenomena	 but	
instead	 lie	 on	 a	 continuum	with	 “normal”	belief.	 Jasperian	un-understandability	 is	 directly	
challenged	by	the	phenomenologically	orientated	psychologist	Louis	Sass	 in	The	Paradoxes	
of	Delusion.21	He	seeks	to	understand	the	bizarre	and	seemingly	incomprehensible	through	a	
close	 reading	of	Daniel	Paul	 Schreber’s	 fantastical	Memoirs	of	my	Mental	 Illness.	 Schreber	
was	 a	 high	 court	 judge	 diagnosed	with	 schizophrenia	 and	 detained	 involuntarily	 for	many	
years.	Freud	famously	attempted	an	analysis	of	this	text,	but	it	is	perhaps	worth	noting	that	













own	 thoughts,	 Sass	declares:	 “At	 this	point	a	person	can	be	 said	 to	experience	experience	
rather	than	the	world,	to	have	the	impression	of	seeing,	say,	not	an	actual	and	physical	stove	
but	 a	 ‘visual’	 stove,	 the	 stove-as-seen-by-me.”26		 The	 quasi-solipsistic	 delusional	 world	 is	
preferred	 over	 the	 real	world,	 for	 it	 evades	 the	 anxiety	 of	 experiencing	 the	 limitations	 of	
one’s	actual	knowledge	and	power,	although	 the	solipsistic	experience	does	 foster	anxiety	
due	 to	 its	 instability.	 By	 providing	 an	 account	 of	 Schreber’s	 reported	 experiences	 and	 the	
apparent	ambiguities	in	terms	of	a	seductive	but	ultimately	unstable	philosophical	position,	
Sass	feels	he	has,	contra	Jaspers,	understood	the	seemingly	incomprehensible.*	For	Sass,	the	
content	 of	 the	 delusions	 arise	 as	 a	means	 to	 explain	 the	 fundamentally	 changed	 form	 of	
experience.	 Sass	 claims	 there	 is	 a	 tendency	 “particularly	 among	 organic	 psychiatrists…	 to	
ignore	the	psychological	 interpretation	or	empathic	understanding	of	mental	symptoms.”27	
This	 tendency	 is,	 Sass	 says,	 nurtured	 by	 the	 development	 of	 neuroimaging	 and	 somatic	
markers	 of	 disease,	 but	 its	 roots	 predate	 them.	Psychiatrists	 and	neurologists,	 inspired	by	
such	 icons	 as	 J.	 Hughlings	 Jackson,	 view	mental	 symptoms	 as	mere	 defects	 or	 deficiency	
secondary	to	cerebral	disease.	Sass	thinks	though	that	psychiatrists	have	the	cart	before	the	
horse.	 Psychopathological	 phenomena	are	 regarded	as	meaningless	 because	 they	 are	 first	
assumed	to	be	symptoms	of	underlying	disease,	as	opposed	to	first	finding	no	reason	for	the	
person’s	 experiences	 and	 then	 attributing	 this	 finding	 to	 disorder.	 While	 his	 argument	 is	
primarily	addressed	to	schizophrenia,	 it	 is	equally	applicable	to	neuropsychiatric	symptoms	
																																								 																				
*	This	 is	 not	 Sass’s	 only	 attempt	 to	 understand	 Schreber’s	 lived	 experience	 from	 a	 philosophical	
perspective.	 He	 has	 also	 attempted	 a	 Foucaldian	 formulation	 whereby	 Schreber’s	 famously	
pedagogical	 father	 is	 accused	 of	 setting	 up	 an	 almost	 perfect	 system	 of	 continual	 observation	 to	







and	 disorders	 because	 the	 phenomenologist	 understands	 every	 insult,	 whether	
psychological	or	organic,	to	invoke	a	personally	meaningful	response.		
	
This	 brief	 overview	 of	 Jaspers’	 position	 and	 some	 influential	 responses	 to	 it	 brings	 out	 a	
number	 of	 points	 pertinent	 to	 the	 study.	 Despite	 Jaspers	 lengthy	 descriptions	 of	 his	





in	 the	 observer	 or	 a	 truly	 un-understandable	 mental	 phenomenon;	 or	 even	 how	 to	
distinguish	 between	 the	 two	 possibilities.	 As	 shall	 find	 later,	 Jaspers’	 conception	 of	
rationality	 as	 of	 only	marginal	 relevance	 to	 understanding	 is	 unusual.	 Implicit	 in	 Bentall’s	
argument	is	a	logic	similar	to	Jaspers;	if	delusions	are	really	beyond	understanding	then	they	
will	 correctly	 fall	 within	 the	 domain	 of	 biology	 and	 neurology.	 It	 is	 with	 regard	 to	 the	
interpretability	 of	 delusions	 that	 he	 rebukes	 Jaspers,	 not	 the	 soundness	 of	 the	
understandable/un-understandable	 distinction.	 Sass	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 retains	 a	 place	 for	
meaning	 in	 neuropsychiatric	 disease	 as	 a	 coherent	 and	 meaningful	 response	 to	 the	
neurological	 injury	 and	 worries	 that	 neuropsychiatrically	 inclined	 doctors	 systematically	









Freud’s	 account	 of	 Dostoyevsky’s	 “so-called	 epilepsy” 28 	points	 to	 the	 danger	 of	 over-





that	 occurred	 during	Dostoyevsky’s	 childhood	were	 said	 to	 symbolise	 an	 unacknowledged	
wish	for	his	father’s	death,	which	every	lad	must	navigate.	He	wished	to	kill	and	then	replace	
the	 father	 in	 his	mother’s	 affections,	 so	 experienced	himself	as	 the	 dead	 father.	After	 his	
father’s	 actual	 murder	 Dostoyevsky	 developed,	 in	 Freud’s	 words,	 “hystero-epilepsy.”	 This	
rendered	him	morose	and	guilt-ridden	after	 each	 seizure,	proving	 the	adage	 to	be	 careful	
what	you	wish	for.	Others	have	used	Dostoyevsky’s	own	written	accounts	of	his	seizures;29,	30	
the	 description	 of	 seizures	 afflicting	 some	 of	 his	 own	 characters; 31 ,	 32 	and	 third-party	
testimony 33 	to	 construct	 a	 profoundly	 different	 hypothesis.	 Most,	 though	 not	 all, 34 ,	 35	





or	 her	 has	 been	 replaced	 by	 an	 imposter,	 identical	 in	 appearance.	 Although	 there	 are	
occasional	cases	where	the	sufferer	goes	to	great	length	to	prove	the	veracity	of	his	claims	–	
for	example,	 the	 tragic	case	of	a	young	man	who	decapitated	his	 father	 in	order	 to	 locate	
the	batteries	powering	the	robotic	alius36	–	most	who	experience	this	delusion	continue	to	
co-exist	 quite	 peaceably	 with	 the	 supposed	 impersonator.37	The	 intimate	 nature	 of	 the	
double	 seems	 to	 cry	 out	 for	 psychological	 interpretation	 and	 very	 many	 have	 been	
proposed.38	A	favourite	of	the	psychodynamic	accounts	holds	that	the	delusion	is	a	solution	
to	 ambivalence	 towards	 the	 impersonated	 person;	 it	 allows	 the	 guilt-free	 expression	 of	
repressed	 hate	 by	 transferring	 it	 onto	 another	 ‘object’,	 while	 the	 good	 and	 real	 object	 is	
absent.	Thus,	there	is	splitting	and	projection	of	the	hateful	feelings	onto	the	imposter	that	
can	 now	 be	 overt.39	Following	 the	 observation	 that	 the	 Capgras	 delusion	 is	 particularly	
common	in	those	with	neurological	disorders40	and	it	 is	not	exclusive	for	 intimates	or	even	
animates41	an	 alternative	 neurobiological	 theory	 has	 gained	 traction	 over	 the	 last	 two	
decades.	Stone	and	Young	have	introduced	the	basic	methodological	principles	of	cognitive	
neuropsychology42	to	the	study	of	psychiatric	symptoms,	including	the	Capgras	delusion.43,	44	
First,	 they	 contrast	 the	 delusion	 with	 a	 symptom	 familiar	 in	 the	 neuropsychological	
literature,	 prosopagnosia.	 Those	 suffering	 with	 prosopagnosia	 have	 a	 specific	 deficit	 on	
recognition	 for	 faces.	 Prosopagnostics,	 however,	 continue	 to	 exhibit	 autonomic	 arousal	





alleged,	 is	 an	 affective	 component	 of	 recognition	 instantiated	 by	 the	 dorsal	 stream	 and	
distinct	from	the	ventral	streams	processing	of	visual	features.46	The	suggestion	is	that	those	
suffering	 the	 Capgras	 delusion	 recognize	 that	 the	 facial	 features	 are	 the	 same	 as	 their	
relative’s	 in	 the	absence	of	 the	customary	emotional	salience.	This	unexpected	experience	
requires	 some	 sort	 of	 explanation.	 It	 is	 alleged	 that	 the	 belief	 their	 relative	 is	 being	
impersonated	neatly	resolves	the	paradoxical	experience	of	recognition/non-recognition.	As	




in	 terms	 of	 their	meaningfulness.	 Time	 now	 to	 uncover	 some	 features	 of	 these	 disputes.	
Most	 glaring	 are	 the	 similarities	 on	 each	 side.	 Both	 psychological	 and	 neurobiological	
accounts	 agree	 that	 something	 requires	 explanation.	 That	 is,	 the	 phenomena	 are	 readily	
distinguished	 from	 other	 mental	 and	 behavioural	 states	 hence	 require	 a	 special	 story	 to	
explain	 their	 presence;	 and	 the	 special	 story	 involves	 extra-conscious	 entities,	 whether	
repression	of	desires	or	dysfunctional	dorsal	visual	stream	information	processing.	Each	type	
of	 account	 also	 recognises	 the	 same	 set	 of	 surface	 features	 and	 facts.	 It	 is	 their	
interpretation	 that	 is	 in	dispute	and	 the	act	of	 interpreting	necessarily	 implies	a	 theory	or	
prism	 through	which	 to	 interpret	 these	 features.	 There	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 theory-neutral	
interpretation,	contra	 Jaspers.	Both	 types	of	 account	 acknowledge	 the	 subjective	 sense	of	






In	 the	 next	 section	we	 consider	 two	 contemporary	 positions	 on	whether	meaning	 should	
function	 as	 a	 boundary	 between	 disorder	 and	 non-disorder	 to	 further	 emphasise	 the	










seeks	 to	 develop	 a	 robust	 conception	 of	 disorder47	for	 practical	 and	 theoretical	 use	 by	
psychiatry,	 arguing	 that	 any	 viable	 definition	 must	 include	 both	 a	 value	 and	 factual	
component.48	He	proposes	that	disorder,	when	properly	analysed,	is	a	harmful	evolutionary	
dysfunction.	 These	 two	 components	 provide	 individually	 necessary	 and	 jointly	 sufficient	
criteria	for	the	presence	of	disorder.	Dysfunction,	a	purely	factual	affair,	is	the	failure	of	an	
internal	 mechanism	 to	 perform	 its	 selected	 function.	 But	 dysfunctions	 are	 not	 disorders	
unless	they	additionally	cause	some	harm	to	befall	the	organism.	This	was	all	marginal	stuff,	
curious	 but	 not	 exactly	 crucial,	 until	 the	 publication	 of	The	 Loss	 of	 Sadness,49	co-authored	
with	 Allan	 Horwitz.	 They	 allege	 that	 psychiatry	 has	 vastly	 over-extended	 the	 concept	 of	
depression	to	include	what	previously	was	understood	by	all	to	be	unhappiness	in	response	
to	 the	 vagaries	 of	 life,	 which	 they	 consider	 normal	 sadness.	 The	 diagnosis	 of	 depression	
should	 be	 reserved	 only	 for	 those	 states	 that	 arise	 due	 to	 an	 evolutionary	 harmful	
dysfunction.	As	we	do	not	have	direct	knowledge	of	the	natural	functions	of	the	mind,	the	
distinction	between	normality	and	disorder	must	be	discerned	from	the	context	in	which	the	
symptoms	 arise.	 Normal	 sadness	 occurs	 “with	 experiences	 of	 loss	 or	 other	 painful	
circumstances,”	while:	
	
The	 other	 kind	 of	 condition,	 traditionally	 known	 as	 melancholia,	 or	 depression	 “without	
cause,”	 was	 a	 medical	 disorder	 distinguished	 from	 normal	 sadness	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	

















question	that	presses	on	several	 fronts:	 is	 it	possible	to	define	mental	disorder	 in	terms	of	
breakdown	 of	 meaningful	 connections?” 53 	If	 so,	 all	 mental	 disorder	 is	 necessarily	
meaningless	 and	 the	 detection	 of	 meaning	 in	 a	 particular	 syndrome	 thereby	 entails	 its	
removal	 from	 the	 diagnostic	manuals,	 which	would	 result	 in	 their	 being	 pruned	 radically.	
This	 seems	 to	be	precisely	what	Wakefield	advocates,	but	 the	psychologising	 trend	within	
psychiatry	over	the	past	century	would	then	be	utterly	undermined.	Bolton	wants	to	resist	





is	 relative	 to	 what	 we	 are	 used	 to.	 Sometimes	 a	 closer	 look	 reveals	 more	 meaning,	 more	
normality,	than	we	thought.	
The	key	point	 is	 that	 if	 the	behaviour	 is	maladaptive	enough,	 if	 it	 causes	enough	harm,	 then	





odds	 with	 one	 another;	 not	 an	 absence	 of	 meaning	 but	 a	 clash.	 So	 in	 Bolton’s	 work,	
meaninglessness	 is	 not	 a	 discriminator	 between	 disorder	 and	 non-disorder,	 but	 it	
acknowledges	 that	meaning	begins	 to	 falter	and,	 implicitly,	 that	 some	pathological	mental	
states	may	be	meaningless.	However,	Bolton	acknowledges,	like	Jaspers,	that	the	fault	may	
lie	with	 the	 interpreter	 so	 one	 should	 not	 be	over	 ready	 to	 ascribe	meaninglessness.	 This	
brief	 review	of	meaningfulness	as	a	boundary	 for	disorder	should	demonstrate	 its	ongoing	











Man	may	 tend	 towards	producing	coherent	and	psychologically	 satisfying	explanations	 for	
events	 even	 where	 these	 lay	 outside	 his	 ken.	 Consider	 the	 renowned	 experiments	 on	
callosotomy	 patients	 reported	 by	 Gazzaniga	 and	 colleagues	 over	 the	 years.56	Split-brain	
patients	 were	 presented	 with	 conceptually	 unrelated	 visual	 images	 to	 each	 hemisphere	
exclusively.	For	instance,	the	right	hemisphere	was	shown	a	snowy	landscape	while	the	left	
was	presented	with	a	hen’s	claw.	The	subject	was	shown	another	set	of	images,	available	to	






surprise,	 a	 plausible	 and	 coherent	 explanation	 is	 immediately	 provided.57	This	 suggests	 a	
curious	 propensity	 to	 create	meaning	where	 there	 is	 none.	 These	 subjects,	 however,	 can	
hardly	 be	 considered	 typical	 given	 intractable	 epilepsy	was	 the	 indication	 for	 their	 radical	
neurosurgery.	“Normal”	subjects	should	fare	better.	Alarmingly,	they	do	not.	Shoppers	in	a	
large	store	were	shown	four	 identical	pairs	of	 tights	and	offered	the	chance	 to	 take	home	
the	pair	they	thought	was	of	highest	quality.58	These	subjects	examined	each	of	the	tights	in	
turn	 and	 most	 frequently	 opted	 for	 the	 pair	 on	 the	 furthest	 right	 by	 a	 factor	 of	 4:1,	 in	
keeping	 with	 the	 well-recognised	 positional	 effect.	 When	 asked	 to	 explain	 their	 choice,	
subjects	generated	various	 reasons,	 such	as	 the	 item	being	softer,	better	made,	or	a	nicer	
shade	but	never	with	the	true	explanation,	the	position	of	their	choice	relative	to	the	others.	
When	the	positional	effect	was	suggested	as	a	possible	mechanism	subjects	scorned	it.	Thus,	
even	 “normal”	 subjects	 produce	 alternative	 explanations	 that	 are	 psychologically	
meaningful	and	coherent,	yet	erroneous.	In	a	similar	vein,	Daniel	Kahneman	asks	why	highly	
intelligent	 women	 tend	 to	 marry	 men	 less	 intelligent	 than	 themselves.59	Those	 foolhardy	
enough	 to	 volunteer	 an	 answer	 offer	 reasons	 that	 involve	 avoidance	 of	 competition,	 a	




theme.	 Even	 subjects	 with	 some	 statistical	 knowledge	 overlook	 the	 phenomenon	 of	
regression	 to	 the	 mean,	 which	 must	 account	 for	 a	 substantial	 proportion	 of	 the	 cases.	
Humans,	 Kahneman	 argues,	 are	 over-ready	 to	 construct	 psychologically	 meaningful	
explanations.	 Thus,	 the	 validity	 of	 meaningful	 explanations	 is	 thrown	 into	 doubt.	 Major	
figures	 in	 philosophy	 have	 likewise	 been	 suspicious	 about	 the	 cogency	 of	meaning.	WVO	






Sceptics	 about	 meaning	 within	 the	 experimental	 psychology	 literature	 argue	 that	 the	
speaker	 explains	 his	 or	 her	 own	 behaviour	 in	 terms	 fundamentally	 at	 odds	with	 the	 true	
cause.	 Claims	 to	 self-knowledge	 are	 thus	 intriguing	 but	 ignorable,	 analogous	 with	 how	
Berrios	views	a	patient’s	delusions.	The	philosophical	sceptics	are	concerned	that	the	words	
of	 one	 person	 cannot	 be	 deciphered	 by	 another	 with	 any	 degree	 of	 certainty.	 The	 true	
meaning	 of	 any	 assertion	 is	 forever	 open	 to	 dispute.	 If	meaning	 is	 so	 enigmatic	 then	 the	
patient	with	 psychiatric	 symptoms	 is	 in	 the	 same	 position	 as	 everyone	 else.	 Nonetheless,	
others	have	developed	 theories	of	meaning	 that	 seek	 to	explain	 successful	 interpretation.	
Donald	Davidson,	Daniel	Dennett,	and	Ludwig	Wittgenstein	have	each	been	concerned	with	








rationale	 for	a	 focus	upon	Davidson,	Dennett,	 and	Wittgenstein	 in	 the	present	 study?	The	






must	 therefore	 be	 in	 normative	 terms	 rather	 than	 appealing	 to	 underlying	 biological	 or	
psychophysical	processes.	An	explanation	on	reductive	terms	cannot	be	a	genuine	account	
of	meaning	 for	 it	 excludes	 that	which	 is	most	 important.64	Davidson’s	philosophy	of	mind,	
anomalous	 monism,	 similarly	 denies	 any	 simple	 reduction	 of	 the	 mental	 to	 the	 physical	
while	seeking	to	respect	the	materialist	basis	of	mind.	He	claimed	that	thought	and	action	
are	constrained	by	the	rules	of	rationality,	which	have	no	counterpart	in	the	physical	realm.	
Hence,	mind	 is	 autonomous	 from	 the	 physical.	 Dennett,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 allows	 three	
levels:	the	physical,	design,	and	intentional	stances.	Mental	states	such	as	beliefs	and	desires	
are	 discernable	 only	 through	 the	 intentional	 stance	 and	 are,	 we	 are	 told,	 real	 patterns	
demonstrable	in	human	behaviour.	While	thermostats	and	clocks	can	also	be	spoken	about	
as	 if	 they	 hold	 beliefs	 and	 desires,	 their	 “behaviour”	 can	 equally	 well	 be	 predicted	 and	
explained	 using	 non-intentional	 terms;	 therefore	 it	 is	 better	 to	 do	 so.	 True	 beliefs	 and	
desires	cannot	be	so	transformed,	however.	The	autonomy	of	mental	states	is	significant	for	





has	 origins	 in	 antiquity	when	 Aristotle	 defined	man	 as	 the	 rational	 animal.	 The	 argument	
runs	 that	 theoretical	 and	 practical	 rationality	 are	 conditions	 on	 thought	 and	 action	
respectively.	While	 humans	 fall	well	 short	 of	 perfect	 rationality	 they	 should,	 by-and-large,	
relinquish	 mutually	 inconsistent	 beliefs	 and	 try	 to	 satisfy	 their	 most	 cherished	 desires.	
Language	 thus	 presupposes	 rationality	 because	 only	 rational	 agents	 can	 express	 beliefs,	
preferences	 and	 intentions	 to	 act.	 Furthermore,	 interpretation	 of	 others	 is	 possible	 only	
because	we	 all	 share	 a	 basic	 rationality,	 through	which	 the	 coherent	 pattern	of	meanings	
and	actions	are	perceptible.	Distinct	from	Jaspers,	rationality	is	central	to	interpretation	and	
may	 be	 a	 more	 tractable	 quality	 than	 the	 rather	 vague	 “transferring	 oneself.”	 Relatedly,	
rationality	has	assumed	increasing	importance	in	contemporary	philosophical	discussions	of	
psychopathology	generally,	and	aberrant	beliefs	in	particular.	Lisa	Bortolotti’s	Delusions	and	
other	 Irrational	 Beliefs67	is	 a	 recent	 and	 especially	 notable	 example.	 She	 observes	 that	
criteria	 invoking	 rationality	 are	 replete	 throughout	 the	 diagnostic	 manuals	 (e.g.	 distorted	





Bortolotti	 in	 order	 to	 show	 that	 delusions	 are	 no	more	 irrational	 than	many	 other	 beliefs	
typically	 deemed	 non-pathological.	 Bortolotti’s	 work	 is	 the	 most	 systematic	 on	 the	
relationship	 between	 psychopathology	 and	 rationality,	 but	 it	 is	 a	 recurring	 theme	 in	 the	
philosophical	psychiatric	 literature,	as	the	remainder	of	this	thesis	will	demonstrate,	and	 it	
merits	 revisiting	 in	 the	 closing	 chapter.	 The	 convergence	 of	 interest	 on	 rationality	 from	
within	 the	 philosophy	 of	 language	 and	 psychopathology	 suggests	 that	 philosophers	
connected	to	that	tradition	will	have	particularly	valuable	contributions	to	the	current	study.	
	
The	 third	 reason	 for	 selecting	 Davidson,	 Dennett,	 and	 Wittgenstein	 concerns	 their	 own	














Davidson,	 Dennett,	 and	 Wittgenstein	 are	 each	 regarded	 to	 be	 exponents	 of	 analytic	
philosophy,	broadly	conceived.	Of	course,	a	separate	tradition	within	philosophy	also	exists	
that	has	taken	meaning	as	a	central	concern,	continental	phenomenology	and	hermeneutics.	
It	 could	 fairly	be	asked	why	philosophers	 from	 that	 tradition	 seem	to	have	been	 sidelined	
but	 as	 the	 methods	 chapter	 explains,	 the	 methodology	 selected	 comprises	 of	 a	 primary	
hermeneutic	 phenomenological	 analysis.	 The	 relationship	 between	 the	 primary	 and	
secondary,	 theory-driven,	 analyses	 will	 require	 discussion	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 thesis.	










Meaning	 is,	 as	Bolton	has	written,	an	 issue	 that	presses	on	many	 fronts	 in	 the	philosophy	
and	 practice	 of	 psychiatry.	 It	 impinges	 upon	 our	 views	 on	 agency,	 comprehensibility,	
rationality,	 and	 the	 limit	 of	 disorder.	 	 Jaspers	 articulated	 the	 problem	 but	 his	 method	 is	
ambiguous	 on	 where	 our	 understanding	 ends.	 The	 meaningfulness	 of	 neuropsychiatric	
symptoms	 is	contested,	but	 it	 is	suspected	that	they	resemble	neurological	symptoms	to	a	
greater	extent	 than	other	psychiatric	phenomena.	A	 study	exploring	 their	meaningfulness,	
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In	spite	of	 the	centrality	of	meaning	 in	psychiatric	 theory	and	practice,	 it	 is	 surprising	how	
sparse	is	the	literature	on	its	systematic	evaluation,	Karl	Jaspers’	General	Psychopathology1	
notwithstanding.	There	are,	however,	diverse	approaches	to	its	study	in	psychiatric	and	non-
psychiatric	 settings,	which	 it	will	be	helpful	 to	 review	prior	 to	 setting	out	 the	 rationale	 for	
and	details	of	Interpretative	Phenomenological	Analysis	(IPA),	the	approach	taken	here.	The	
review	 covers	 investigations	 of	 meaning	 in	 primate	 behaviour	 and	 calls;	 psychologists’	
attempts	to	quantify	meaning;	evaluation	of	 language	usage	in	patients	with	schizophrenia	




The	mark	of	 the	mental	 is,	 in	Brentano’s	 term	of	art,	 the	 intentional.2	The	word	 is	derived	
from	 the	metaphor	 intendere	 arcum	 in,	 which	means	 literally	 to	 take	 aim	 at	 some	 object	
with	 an	 arrow.3 	So	 intentional	 states	 are	 aimed	 at	 something	 other	 than	 themselves.	
Meaningful	 acts	 and	 utterances	 display	 intentionality,	 as	 they	 must	 be	 about	 (mean)	
something	 else.	 (The	 word	 “cat”	 refers	 to	 a	 real	 or	 imagined	 thing.)	 Intentionality	 is	 not	
thought	 to	 be	 restricted	 to	 homo	 sapiens	 as	 this	 “aboutness”	 is	 seemingly	 apparent	 in	
primates’	 gestures	 and	 vocalisations	 also.	 Vervet	 monkeys	 have	 a	 specific	 call	 to	 notify	







whereby	meaningful	 gestures	 are	 distinguished	 form	movements	 devoid	 of	 intentionality.	




considered	 potentially	 meaningful	 if	 both	 viewers	 judge	 it	 “motorically	 ineffective.” 5	
Additionally,	the	gesture	must	be	directed	towards	another	individual	in	the	group;	initiate	a	
response	 from	 that	 individual;	 appear	 goal-directed	 to	 the	 researchers;	 and	 achieve	 the	
supposed	goal.	 If	a	particular	gesture	achieved	the	goal	attributed	 it	by	the	researchers	on	
70%	 or	 more	 of	 occasions,	 then	 an	 intentional	 meaning	 is	 assigned	 that	 gesture.	 When	
Vervet	monkeys	were	 first	 observed	 to	 respond	 to	 calls	made	 by	 a	member	 of	 the	 group	
upon	seeing	a	predator,	it	was	argued	that	the	vocalisation	signified	nothing	more	than	fear	
and	alarm.	To	test	this	deflationary	theory	Cheney	and	Seyfarth6	embarked	upon	a	series	of	
ingenious	experiments;	 they	 recorded	different	Vervet	 calls	made	 in	 response	 to	different	
predators	then	played	these	back	to	the	group	when	no	predator	was	nearby.	Calls	originally	
made	 when	 a	 leopard	 approached	 caused	 the	 group	 to	 scurry	 into	 the	 trees,	 while	 the	
Vervets	 stood	 bipedally	 to	 inspect	 the	 immediate	 vicinity	 on	 hearing	 the	 characteristic	
“snake”	 call.	Such	 differential	 responses	 suggest	 at	 least	 that	 the	 calls	 do	mean	 different	
things,	 but	 leaves	 the	 actual	 referent	 obscure.	 (Does	 the	 “leopard”	 call	 mean,	 “leopard,”	
“leopard	nearby,”	 “predator,”	 “climb	 the	 tree,”	 “run	 for	 your	 lives”?)	 Following	Grice7	and	
Dennett, 8 	they	 sought	 to	 study	 the	 complexity	 (order	 of	 intentionality)	 of	 the	 beliefs	
attributed.	A	call	made	in	fear	exhibits	zero-order	intentionality,	it	being	made	purely	as	an	




Fascinating	 and	 ingenious	 as	 this	 work	 is,	 it	 is	 not	 a	 useful	 methodology	 for	 the	 present	
study.	In	the	first	place,	the	methods	are	so	time-consuming	and	elaborate	because	it	is	not	
possible	 simply	 to	 ask	 the	 Vervet	 what	 it	 means	 by	 “chutter”	 or	 “wrr”.	 It	 is	 therefore	
inappropriate	as	a	method	 to	 study	meaning	 in	human	speech	where	one	can	 just	 inquire	
about	what	 is	meant.	Second,	 the	evidence	accumulated	by	Cheney	and	Seyfarth	suggests	
that	Vervets	have	only	 first-order	 intentionality,	while	Chimpanzees	and	Orang-utans	have	
perhaps	 achieved	 a	 limited	 second-order	 intentionality. 9 	Humans	 manage	 fifth-order	










The	Measurement	 of	Meaning.10	However,	 the	 aspect	 of	meaning	 that	 appears	 to	 capture	
the	imagination	of	such	writers	is	the	quantification	of	meaning	and	relating	the	meaning	of	
one	word	to	semantically	related	ones.	Thus,	most	of	the	studies	examine	meaning	through	
quantifying	 the	 strength	 of	 associations;	 the	 similarity	 of	 semantically	 related	 words;	 the	
extent	 to	 which	 one	 can	 be	 substituted	 for	 another;	 and	 the	 classification	 of	 words	 into	
groups	 based	 on	 likeness. 11 	This	 method	 can	 be	 contrasted	 with	 Osgood’s	 Semantic	
Differential.	Here	subjects	are	asked	to	rate	what	particular	words	connote	on	various	scales	
that	aggregate	around	 three	 factors:	evaluation	 (good	vs.	bad),	potency	 (strong	vs.	weak),	
and	activity	(active	vs.	passive.)	Every	word	occupies	a	position	in	the	matrix,	which	indicates	
the	 word’s	 connotative	 meaning.	 Such	 an	 approach	 has	 been	 applied	 to	 the	
psychopathology	 of	 depression,	 finding	 that	 the	 depressed	 rated	 both	 self-referential	 and	
external	 concepts	 as	 less	 positive,	 less	 potent	 and	 more	 passive	 than	 non-depressed	









features	 in	 those	 with	 schizophrenia.	 In	 a	 review	 of	 the	 research	 to	 date,	 Kuperberg	
describes	how	healthy	controls	struggle	to	predict	words	omitted	from	patients’	transcripts;	
patients	 use	 weaker	 but	 more	 numerous	 associations	 than	 controls;	 and	 sentences	 are	
constructed	according	to	the	meaning	of	prior	words	rather	than	around	a	particular	topic	or	
theme.14	Similar	 investigation	 of	 semantic	 and	 syntactic	 properties	 of	 speech	 have	 been	
employed	 in	 Alzheimer’s	 disease,	most	 notably	 in	 Peter	 Garrard's	 studies	 of	 Iris	Murdoch	








life.	Garrard	et	al16	examined	 three	novels	produced	by	 Iris	Murdoch	at	different	 stages	 in	
her	life.	These	showed	that	her	lexicon	shrank	and	there	was	increased	repetition	in	her	last	








oppose	 Beck’s	 stipulation	 that	 psychopathology	must	 be	 a	 consequence	 of	 “perseverative	
faulty	 conceptualisations”18	of	 external	 events.	 Instead,	 they	 argue	 it	 is	 the	 nature	 and	
meaning	of	 severe	 life	events	 that	 causes	depression	without	anything	being	 faulty	within	
the	individual.	As	they	wished	to	avoid	the	circularity	of	classifying	an	event	according	to	the	
reaction	 it	 caused,	 they	 developed	 a	 method	 to	 measure	 the	 meaning	 of	 events.	 An	
interviewer	 informally	 asked	 numerous	 questions	 covering	 the	 period	 around	 each	 life-
event,	 exploring	 feelings	 and	 attitudes,	 to	 gain	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 event’s	 significance	 for	 the	
subject.	Interviews	were	tape-recorded	and	the	index	events	scored	on	twenty-eight	rating	
scales	measuring	characteristics	such	as	expectedness,	availability	of	support,	etc.,	including	
the	 subject’s	 self-report	 of	 the	 event's	 meaning.	 The	 material	 was	 used	 to,	 “make	 a	
judgement	 about	 the	 likely	 meaning	 of	 the	 event	 for	 the	 average	 person	 in	 such	
circumstances	 without	 considering	 her	 personal	 reaction.”19	This	 seminal	 work	 developed	
novel	 techniques	 to	 explore	meaning	 and	 its	 relation	 to	 psychopathology.	 But	 it	 was	 the	











neuropsychologist	 Aikaterini	 Fotopoulou, 20 ,	 21 	who	 attempts	 to	 provide	 an	 account	 of	
confabulatory	content.	She	argues	that	what	appears	meaningless	does	in	fact	betray	hidden	
motivations	 –	 to	 protect	 self-identity	 and	 coherence,	 for	 instance	 –	 and	 meanings.	
Interestingly	 though,	 repeated	 incoherent	 or	 obscure	 confabulations	 were	 excluded	 from	
the	 study.	 To	 investigate	 her	 hypothesis	 she	 devised	 a	 method	 to	 establish	 whether	 the	
emotional	 valence	 of	 confabulations	 is	 positive,	 negative	 or	 neutral.	 The	 confabulations	




on	whether	 a	mental	 state	 is	meaningful	 or	 not.	 How	would	 disagreements	 be	 resolved?	




Given	 Richard	 Gipps	 and	 John	 Rhodes	 have	 recently	 argued	 that	 delusions	 constitute	 a	
breakdown	 of	 the	 Wittgensteinian	 “bedrock,”22,	23	it	 is	 significant	 that	 Rhodes	 has,	 with	
Simon	 Jakes,	 investigated	 qualitatively	 the	 content	 of	 patients’	 delusions.	 Their	 original	
paper	 examines	 whether	 the	 content	 directly	 corresponds	 with	 current	 or	 long-standing	
problems	encountered	by	the	patient	in	his	or	her	everyday	life24	while	a	subsequent	study	
explores	whether	the	delusion	can	be	taken	as	a	metaphor	for	psychosocial	adversity.25	The	
results	 appear	 to	 confirm	 their	 hypothesis	 (and	 professional	 presuppositions)	 that	 the	
content	 of	 delusions	 is	 indeed	 meaningful	 if	 only	 one	 looks	 hard	 enough.	 However,	 this	
conclusion	may	be	 too	 strong	 as	 only	 eleven	of	 the	 25	patients	 interviewed	 for	 the	 latter	
paper	 expressed	 content	 that	 could	 be	 understood	 as	metaphorical	 in	 some	way.	 Clearly,	
therefore,	 the	 content	 of	 delusions	 cannot	 be	 accounted	 for	 through	 metaphor	 alone.	
Nevertheless,	the	Interpretative	Phenomenological	Analysis	(IPA)	methodology	employed	is	








possible.	 IPA	however	 facilitates	a	 further	 level	of	analysis;	 the	rich	 interview	data	enables	
secondary	 analyses	 grounded	 in	 a	 chosen	 theory	 or	 theories.	 This	 method	 seems	 exactly	
right	 therefore.	 The	 first	 theory-neutral	 level	 of	 analysis	 will	 derive	 themes	 related	 to	
patients’	and	carers’	attempts	to	understand	the	unusual	neuropsychiatric	symptoms,	while	










General	 Psychopathology,27	methods	 from	both	 the	Natural	 and	 the	Human	 sciences	must	
be	employed	where	Man	is	the	object	of	study.	IPA	is	rooted	in	the	turn-of-the-20th-Century	
German	 philosophy	 that	 sought	 to	 re-engage	 in	 lived	 experience	 rather	 than	 the	 abstract	
theorising	 into	 which	 it	 had	 fallen. 28 	Indeed,	 both	 phenomenology	 and	 hermeneutics	
invigorated	 philosophy	 with	 their	 claims	 to	 priority	 over	 the	 realm	 of	 science.	
Phenomenology	 studied	 only	 that	which	 is	 accessible	 in	 consciousness,	 and	 hermeneutics	
became	 the	 “science”	 of	 interpretation.	 Smith	et	 al	 cite	 a	 number	 of	 figures	within	 these	
traditions	as	influences	for	the	theoretical	underpinning	of	the	method29	(though	it	could	be	
argued	that	discontinuities	and	differences	between	these	figures	are	minimised	or	glossed.)	
Edmund	 Husserl	 is	 credited	 with	 beginning	 this	 reorientation	 of	 philosophy	 and	 for	
developing	 the	 phenomenological	 method	 by	 which	 the	 fundamental	 components	 of	
conscious	experience	could	be	examined.	In	order	to	intuit	the	essence	of	an	experience,	all	






Husserl,	 IPA	 takes	 the	 concern	 for	 individual	 experience	 and	 the	process	 of	 bracketing	off	
presuppositions,	 though	 this	 is	now	acknowledged	 to	be	only	partially	possible,	 as	we	will	
see	below.	Also,	Smith	argues,	Husserl	provided	an	 inadequate	account	of	 intersubjectivity	




To	 remedy	 these	 perceived	 deficiencies,	 Smith	 et	 al	 appropriated	 Heidegger’s	 so-called	
hermeneutic	 phenomenology,	 in	 which	 the	 emphasis	 in	 phenomenology	 shifted	 to	 the	
experience	 of	 being	 engaged	 in	 the	 world	 and	 with	 each	 other.	 In	 Being	 and	 Time,30	
Heidegger	 painstakingly	 described	 (in	 jargon	 of	 his	 own	 creation)	 the	 structure	 of	 this	
engagement.	When	one	perceives	a	hammer,	one	sees	 it	as	a	hammer,	which	can	be	used	
for	 its	 particular	 purpose.	 There	 is	 no	 raw	 sensory	 data	 out	 there	 that	 is	 then	
computationally	 analysed	 to	 generate	 a	 mental	 representation,	 “HAMMER.”	 Other	 minds	
cease	to	be	a	puzzle	in	Heidegger’s	phenomenology	because	the	distinction	between	a	mind	
“inside”	 and	 the	world	 “out	 there”	dissolved.	His	phenomenology	was	hermeneutical	 as	 a	
fundamental	 aspect	 of	 our	 Dasein	 (Heidegger’s	 term	 for	 human	 existence)	 is	 that	 we	
ceaselessly	 interpret	the	world	and	others	around	us.	As	with	the	hammer,	we	just	cannot	
see	and	hear	things	apart	from	their	interpretation.	One	always	hears	a	noise	as	the	sound	
of	 something.	 Interpretation,	 and	 hence	 meaning,	 is	 foundational.	 	 We	 are	 each	 of	 us	
enmeshed	 in	 a	 sphere	 of	 meaning,	 within	 which	 language	 operates.	 So,	 contra	 Husserl,	
bracketing	cannot	remove	all	presuppositions.	For	Heidegger,	 interpretation	 is	circular	and	
never	 complete.	 One	 takes	 one’s	 presuppositions	 to	 interpretation,	 and	 these	




is	 a	 continuous	 process	 that	 becomes	 even	 more	 vital	 during	 times	 of	 heightened	
significance,	such	as	 threat	and	sickness;	exactly	where	 IPA	 is	 recommended.	Hans-George	
Gadamer	 is	 another	 philosopher	 in	 the	phenomenological	 hermeneutic	 tradition	 to	whom	







interpretation	 and	 there	 is	 the	 potential	 for	 both	 to	walk	 away	 in	mutual	 understanding.	
Language	 is	coloured	by	 the	 traditions	and	culture	 in	which	 it	 resides,	 so	all	 interpretation	
brings	assumptions	and	prejudice,	which	must	be	acknowledged	 in	 the	 interpretation,	and	
these	 assumptions	 and	 prejudices	 should	 be	 open	 to	 amendment	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	
phenomenon	or	 dialogue.	 	 This	 is	 the	 hermeneutic	 circle,	where	 interpretation	 is	 endless.	
The	search	 for	common	agreement	was	criticised	by	Habermas	 for	conceding	too	much	to	
tradition,	 and	 by	 Foucault	 as	 concealing	 a	 will	 to	 dominate.	 This	 is,	 as	 Smith	 et	 al	
acknowledge,	 a	 tension	 within	 Gadamer’s	 work.	 Paul	 Ricoeur	 in	 his	 Freud	 &	 Philosophy32	
distinguished	between	a	hermeneutics	of	trust	and	a	hermeneutics	of	suspicion.	The	former	
seeks	 to	 restore	original	meaning	and	understand	 the	other	as	 they	 themselves	do.	Those	
schools	 that	 practice	 the	 latter,	 such	 as	 psychoanalysis	 and	Marxist	 theory,	 however,	 are	
united	in	their	“decision	to	look	upon	the	whole	of	consciousness	as	‘false’	consciousness.”33	
They	 offer	 interpretations	 couched	 in	 their	 own	 conceptual	 terms	 that	 he	 or	 she	 so	





of	 ‘analysing,	 illuminating,	and	making	sense	of	something.’”34	This	 is	achieved	through	the	
completion	of	deepening	levels	of	interpretation,	discussed	below.	
	
To	 summarise,	 IPA	 recalls	 a	 rich	 if	 abstruse	 seam	 of	 philosophy	 dating	 to	 the	 early	 20th	
Century	and	before.	But	 it	 is	the	concern	for	our	everyday	experiences,	 interpretation	as	a	











presented	 a	 clear	 instance	 of	 psychopathology	 in	 neurological	 disorder.	 Furthermore,	 the	




Both	 first-person	and	 third-person	perspectives	on	 the	meaningfulness	of	 symptoms	were	
sought,	so	a	carer	was	recruited	 for	each	case.	Unfortunately,	 this	was	not	possible	 for	Liz	
(Case	 2)	 who	 suffered	 visual	 hallucinations.	 Given	 the	 importance	 of	 language	 in	 eliciting	
these	 symptoms	 and	 conducting	 an	 IPA	 interview,	 all	 participants	were	 required	 to	 speak	
English	as	 their	 first	 language.	None	of	 the	patient	participants	had	a	 significant	degree	of	
cognitive	 impairment	 (considered	 as	 scoring	 69	 or	 less	 on	 Addenbrooke’s	 Cognitive	
Examination-III),	 or	 a	 comorbid	 primary	 psychiatric	 disorder,	 such	 as	 depression	 or	
schizophrenia.	 Participants	 were	 recruited	 through	 the	 Department	 of	 Psychological	
Medicine	at	the	Royal	London	Hospital	where	the	author	works	as	a	consultant	psychiatrist	
and	 via	 Professor	 Michael	 Kopelman’s	 neuropsychiatric	 out-patients’	 clinic	 at	 St	 Thomas’	
Hospital.	 Those	 recruited	 via	 the	 author’s	 clinical	 work	 had	 their	 clinical	 management	
handed	 to	 a	 consultant	 colleague	 in	 the	 team	 to	 avoid	 potential	 conflicts	 of	 interest.	
Professor	 Kopelman	 briefly	 informed	 his	 cases	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 research	 before	
forwarding	 their	 contact	 details.	 All	 participants	 received	 an	 explanation	 of	 the	 study	 and	
were	 provided	with	 a	written	 information	 leaflet	 for	 their	 consideration.	 Each	 participant	







participant	 as	 s/he	 roves	 around	 a	 topic.	 Accordingly,	 the	 author	 developed	 a	 semi-
structured	 questionnaire	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 gaining	 a	 detailed	 description	 of	 the	
participants’	 experience	 of	 making	 sense	 of	 neuropsychiatric	 phenomena.	 Smith	
recommends	 beginning	 with	 an	 open	 question	 that	 requires	 description	 of	 a	 particular	
event,	 with	 subsequent	 questions	 inviting	 progressively	 more	 self-reflection	 and	 analysis.	




suggested	 through	 consideration	 of	 the	 philosophers’	 theories	 of	 meaning.	 Draft	
questionnaires	 for	each	the	patients	and	carers	were	prepared,	discussed	with	supervisors	
and	modified	in	light	of	these	discussions.	The	final	draft	version	of	each	questionnaire	was	




how,	or	 in	what	way	 something	was	 intended	by	the	other	person.	As	the	question	aimed	
after	 the	 former,	 it	 was	 reformulated	 in	 subsequent	 versions	 to:	 “Do	 you	 have	 a	 way	 of	
understanding	 what	 is	 said?”	 The	 subsequently	 modified	 questionnaires	 were	 again	
discussed	with	 supervisors	 and	 final	 versions	 agreed	 (see	Appendix	 C	&	D	 for	 patient	 and	
carer	semi-structured	questionnaires,	respectively.)		
	
The	 interviews	were	 completed	 either	 in	 the	 author’s	 clinical	 rooms	 at	 the	 Royal	 London	
Hospital	or	the	research	interview	room	in	Professor	Kopelman’s	department	at	St	Thomas’	
Hospital.	Both	rooms	are	quiet,	warm,	clean,	and	reasonably	comfortable.	Interviews	lasted	
one	 hour	 and	 involved	 the	 participants	 being	 asked	 about	 their	 understanding	 of	 the	
neuropsychiatric	phenomena	experienced	by	himself	or	herself	or	the	person	for	whom	they	
care.	The	 interviews	were	recorded	on	a	digital	 recorder,	stored	on	the	author’s	password	
secured	 computer,	 and	 then	 transcribed	 for	 analysis.	 Given	 the	 intensive	 and	 onerous	
nature	 of	 IPA	 analysis	 the	 aim	 is	 high	 quality	 information	 from	 a	 small	 number	 of	
participants.	 Therefore,	 Smith	 et	 al29	 recommend	 that	 studies	 for	 professional	 doctorates	







approval	 letter	 for	 study	 13/LO/1735,	Meaning	 and	 Meaninglessness	 in	 Neuropsychiatry:	
Understanding	 Psychological	 Symptoms.)	 Approval	 for	 recruitment	 at	 each	 NHS	 site	 was	









personal	 perspective	 to	 an	 interpretation	 of	 those	 experiences	 at	 a	more	 theoretical	 and	
conceptual	 level:	 from	 a	 hermeneutics	 of	 trust	 towards	 one	 of	 suspicion.	 However,	 as	





from	 the	 standard	 IPA	analysis	 to	avoid	 confusion	and	 to	emphasise	 the	more	 speculative	
nature	 of	 the	 former.	 The	 analysis	 moves	 through	 a	 series	 of	 phases,	 though	 these	 are	
intended	as	rough	guides	rather	than	formal	axioms	or	instructions.	IPA	analysis	needs	time,	





the	 structure,	 pace	 and	 tone	 of	 the	 interview.	 Later,	 the	 participant’s	 voice	 is	 imagined	
rather	 than	 listened	 to.	 At	 this	 stage,	 the	 analyst	 notes	 any	 powerful	 recollections	 or	




Initial	 notes	 on	 the	 semantic	 content	 and	 use	 of	 language	 are	 made	 directly	 onto	 the	
transcription.	This	is	an	exploratory	phase	unbounded	by	rules	of	what	should	or	should	not	
be	noted.	However,	this	time-consuming	and	laborious	task	generates	extensive	notes	that	




categories:	 descriptive,	 linguistic	 and	 conceptual.	 Descriptive	 comments	make	 note	 of	 key	
objects,	experiences	and	events	in	the	participant’s	discourse.	These	are	often	highlighted	by	
the	use	of	descriptive	language,	sound	bites,	acronyms,	idiosyncratic	figures	of	speech,	and	





interview.	 Conceptual	 noting	 begins	 to	 draw	 on	 the	 analyst’s	 own	 experiential	 and	
professional	knowledge.	The	aim	is	to	begin	to	open	up	a	range	of	provisional	meanings.	All	
interpretations	are	considered	legitimate	so	long	as	they	remain	tied	to	and	grounded	in	the	




This	 phase	of	 the	 analysis	moves	 to	dealing	with	 the	notes	made	 rather	 than	 the	primary	
text.	 Emergent	 themes	 that	 speak	 to	 the	 psychological	 essence	 of	 the	 comments	 are	
captured	 in	pithy	phrases	that	reflect	not	only	the	participant’s	original	words	but	also	the	




In	 this	 phase	 the	 emergent	 themes	 are	 reviewed	 for	 possible	 connections.	 There	 are	 a	
number	 of	 ways	 in	 which	 emergent	 themes	 can	 be	 connected,	 so	 this	 process	 is	 not	
dogmatic	but	rather	creative	and	participatory.	For	example,	one	could	connect	themes	by	
abstraction	 –	 placing	 a	 number	 of	 conceptually	 linked	 themes	 under	 one	 superordinate	
category.	Similarly,	one	emergent	theme	could	become	a	superordinate	category	itself,	if	it	
organises	 other	 emergent	 themes.	 Polarisation	 involves	 an	 opposition	 between	 emergent	
themes	 (e.g.	 wanting	 to	 live	while	wanting	 to	 die.)	 Contextualisation	 organises	 themes	 in	
relation	to	the	temporal	context	 in	which	they	emerge,	while	function	organises	themes	in	
terms	of	the	role	played	in	the	discourse.	The	frequency	with	which	emergent	themes	arise	








Once	 the	 above	 has	 been	 completed	 for	 one	 case,	 the	 analyst	 can	move	 on	 to	 the	 next	
interview.	 Themes	 developed	 during	 the	 earlier	 analysis	 should	 be	 set	 aside	 as	 each	
interview	should	be	analysed	on	its	own	terms	and	the	themes	should	arise	principally	from	
the	 text.	As	 the	 current	 study	 involves	bringing	 in	 a	 range	of	 theoretical	 concepts	derived	
from	philosophical	theories	of	meaning	these	analyses	will	be	presented	 in	Results:	Part	B.	





falters	 of	 fails	 in	 psychiatric	 and	 neuropsychiatric	 phenomena.	While	meaning	 presses	 on	
several	 fronts,	 the	methods	 reviewed	 above	 demonstrate	 that	 no	 particular	methodology	
can	obviously	assist	 the	present	study.	Nevertheless,	 IPA	 is	attractive	 for	 it	enables	one	 to	
gather	 rich	 information	 about	 the	 participants’	 lived-experiences	 while	 also	 allowing	 a	
theory-driven	secondary	analysis.	Given	the	aim	is	for	mutual	illumination	of	the	theories	of	
meaning	alongside	an	exploration	of	participants’	experience	of	meaning	making,	IPA	seems	
an	 apposite	 approach,	 although	 success	 cannot	 be	 assured.	 The	 qualitative	 study	 of	
meaningfulness	in	psychiatry	is	without	precedence,	almost.	The	chosen	method,	however,	
bears	 similarity	 to	 Jonathan	 Glover’s	 study	 of	 the	 alleged	 amorality	 of	 psychopaths.37	
Eschewing	 a	 formal	 methodology	 like	 IPA,	 Glover	 instead	 brought	 his	 experience	 of	
elucidating	 students’	 moral	 reasoning	 through	 Socratic	 questions	 to	 the	 semi-structured	
interviews	 he	 conducted	 with	 Broadmoor	 patients.	 Like	 IPA	 however,	 he	 aimed	 for	 a	
conversation	 that	 followed	 leads	 and	 hunches	 in	 order	 to	 draw	 “the	 contours	 of	 a	moral	
landscape”	and	generate	themes	for	further	reflection.	Glover	found	the	psychopaths	to	be	
morally	 shallow,	self-interested,	and	preoccupied	with	 fairness	and	personal	 rights:	 “It	 is	a	





resembles	the	secondary	theory-driven	 level	of	analysis	 in	 IPA.	Similarly,	 the	present	study	
will	place	greater	emphasis	upon	the	secondary	analysis	than	is	standard	for	IPA	because	the	
primary	analysis	in	IPA	assumes	the	very	thing	that	is	here	in	question:	are	neuropsychiatric	
phenomena	meaningful?	 So	 the	 non-standard	 approach	 is	 legitimate.	 The	 following	 three	
chapters	 develop	 the	 philosophical	 conceptions	 of	 meaning	 to	 be	 utilised	 in	 the	 theory-
driven	 secondary	 analyses.	 Each	 philosophy	 of	 meaning	 will	 generate	 specific,	 at	 times	
overlapping,	 claims	 that	 can	 be	 interrogated	 against	 the	 data	 derived	 from	 participants’	






















																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													








15	Snowdon	 DA,	 Kemper	 SJ,	Mortimer	 JA	 et	 al.	 Linguistic	 ability	 in	 early	 life	 and	 cognitive	
function	 and	 Alzheimer’s	 disease	 in	 late	 life:	 findings	 from	 the	 Nun	 Study.	 JAMA,	 1996;	
275(7):	528-32.	
16	Garrard	P,	Maloney	 LM,	Hodges	 JR,	&	Patterson	K.	 The	effects	of	 very	early	Alzheimer’s	
disease	on	the	characteristics	of	writing	by	a	renowned	author.	Brain,	2005;	128:	250-60.	





20	Fotopoulou	 A.	 The	 affective	 neuropsychology	 of	 confabulation	 and	 delusion.	 Cognitive	
Neuropsychiatry,	2010;	15(1/2/3):	38-63.	
21	Fotopoulou	 A,	 Conway	MA,	 Tyrer	 S,	 et	 al.	 Is	 the	 content	 of	 confabulation	 positive?	 An	
experimental	study.	Cortex,	2008;	44:	764-72.	


















30	Heidegger	M.	Being	 and	 Time:	 A	 Translation	 of	 Sein	 und	 Zeit.	 (Trans.	 by	 J.	 Stambuagh)	
State	University	of	New	York	Press,	1996	[1953].		
31 Moran	 D.	 Hans-Georg	 Gadamer:	 Philosophical	 hermeneutics.	 In	 Introduction	 to	
Phenomenology,	Routledge,	2000,	pp.	248-86.	














Daniel	 Dennett,	 dubbed	 one	 of	 the	 horsemen	 of	 atheism	 following	 a	 sceptics’	 panel	
discussion	 called	 The	 Four	 Horsemen,	 disparages	 the	 shielding	 of	 fundamental	 problems	
behind	a	 “veil	 of	mystery.”1	This	 atheism	coheres	with	his	 primary	philosophical	 concerns:	
the	 naturalization	 of	 mental	 content,	 free	 will,	 and	 consciousness.	 With	 regards	 mental	
content,	Dennett	proposed	a	highly	influential	theory	that	sought	to	account	for	the	success	
of	 our	 third-person	 predictions	 of	 complex	 systems,	 such	 as	 chess-playing	 computers	 and	
human	 beings.	 His	 theory	 of	 content,	 called	 intentional	 stance	 theory,†	has	 been	 highly	
influential	 since	 it	 is	 compatible	 with	 two	 contemporary	 scientific	 programmes:	 evolution	
and	 artificial	 intelligence	 (AI).	 He	 demystified	 content	 by	 grounding	 it	 in	 evolution,	 giving	
succour	to	the	AI	project	of	creating	machines	that	comprehend	and	act.	He	first	articulated	














†	This	 is	 Dennett’s	 own	 term.	 It	 could	 easily	 be	 swapped	 for	 strategy,	 perspective,	 or	 view.	 Stance	





The	 performing	 of	 actions	 is	 the	 restricted	 privilege	 of	 rational	 beings,	 persons,	 conscious	
agents,	and	one	establishes	 that	 something	 is	an	action	not	by	examining	 its	causal	ancestry	




In	 cases	of	 even	 the	mildest	 and	most	 familiar	 cognitive	pathology	 –	where	people	 seem	 to	




The	 severity	 of	 mental	 disorder	 specified	 by	 Dennett	 as	 necessary	 to	 undermine	
interpretation	 seems	 to	 have	 varied	 from	 mild	 cognitive	 pathology	 through	 to	 “insanity”	
(undefined)	and	brain	damage.	Nevertheless,	it	 is	clear	that	he	considers	mental	disorder	a	
paradigmatic	 instance	of	when	 the	 intentional	 stance,	 viewing	 the	 sufferer’s	utterances	as	
meaningful	 and	 rational,	 should	 be	 abandoned.	 Indeed	 by	 Dennett’s	 reasoning,	 this	
undermines	 the	 very	 legitimacy	 of	 granting	 such	 individuals	 full	 personhood.8	He	 has	 also	
criticised	 psychoanalytic	 understanding	 of	 psychiatric	 symptoms	 as	 a	 “gratuitous	 and	
incautious”9	overextension	 of	 the	meaningful	 into	 the	 biological	 realm.	 Thus,	 for	 Dennett,	




to	 the	 underlying	 assumptions	 one	 must	 adopt	 when	 using	 the	 theory	 for	 third-person	
perspective	 interpretation	 and	 prediction	 of	 another	 agent.	 Specifically,	 the	 assumptions	
that	he	will	 believe	and	desire	what	he	ought	 and	 is	 also	optimally	 rational.	Next,	we	will	
examine	 two	 connected	aspects	of	Dennett’s	 theory	 that	bear	on	 the	question	of	 interest	
here.	These	aspects	are	i)	the	status	of	belief	within	the	intentional	stance	theory	and	ii)	the	
indeterminacy	of	meaning.	Dennett	holds	a	complex	and	contested	view	on	the	ontological	
status	 of	 belief	 that	 has	 certain	 implications	 for	 psychopathology,	 and	 his	 indeterminacy	
seems	to	allow	multiple	valid	interpretations	of	the	same	objective	behaviours.	The	chapter	






The	 intentional	 stance	 should	 first	 be	 contrasted	 with	 two	 other	 “stances”	 that	 can	 be	




future	 according	 to	 Kepler’s	 Laws.	 Dennett	 explicitly	 disregarded	 the	 indeterminacy	 of	
subatomic	 particles.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 predictability	 from	 the	 physical	 stance	 in	 principle	 that	
should	 be	 accepted.	 There	 are	 occasions	 when	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 physical	 stance	
necessitates	 over-lengthy	 and	 time-consuming	 calculations.	 Where	 a	 system	 has	 been	
designed	to	perform	a	particular	function	it	is	quicker	and	easier	to	adopt	the	design	stance	
to	predict	future	behaviour.	Basically,	one	predicts	behaviour	based	upon	knowledge	of	the	
design	 and	 the	 –	 somewhat	 risky	 –	 assumption	 that	 it	 is	 operating	 as	 designed.	 It	 is	
important	to	note	only	designed	behaviours	can	be	predicted	from	the	design	stance.		
	
To	take	the	clock	as	an	example,	 it	 is	possible	to	predict	 the	state	of	any	clock	59	minutes	
hence	from	either	the	physical	stance	or	the	design	stance.	To	adopt	the	physical	stance	may	
require	complex	maths	 involving	spring	torsion,	oscillators,	 impulse	actions	and	suchlike	 in	
the	case	of	a	mechanical	clock	or	completely	different	calculations	and	laws	for	a	digital	one.	
The	 design	 stance,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 allows	 simple	 and	 accurate	 prediction	 of	 its	 future	
state	whatever	the	clock’s	inner-workings,	provided	it	is	functioning	as	designed.	Should	the	
clock	 be	 malfunctioning	 or	 poorly	 designed	 the	 design	 stance	 is	 no	 help	 in	 predicting	
behaviour.	 To	 do	 so,	 one	must	 drop	 to	 the	 physical	 stance.	 The	 design	 stance	 is	 really	 a	
range	of	stances	from	the	concrete	through	to	the	abstract.	For	example,	a	computer	can	be	
predicted	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 source	 code	 (abstract	 level)	 down	 to	 the	 flip-flop	 switches	
(concrete	level)	that	instantiate	it.		
	
In	 the	 case	of	highly	 complex	 structures,	 such	animals	 and	humans,	 the	underlying	design	
remains	unknown	yet	still	we	are	able	 to	predict	 future	behaviour.	One	easily	predicts	 the	



















The	 first	 assumption	 is	 that	 an	 agent	 does	 indeed	 have	 the	 beliefs	 it	ought.	 For	 Dennett,	
humans	and	animals	 come	 to	believe	mostly	 true	and	 relevant	 facts	about	 the	world	 they	
inhabit.	 Some	 beliefs	 are	 false,	 but	 these	 require	 a	 special	 story	 to	 be	 told	 that	 involves	
predominately	 true	 beliefs.	 Likewise,	 we	 hold	 certain	 sophisticated	 beliefs	 unrelated	 to	
direct	experience	–	for	example,	the	belief	that	all	matter	is	composed	of	waves	–	that	may	
be	 true	or	 false	or	neither.	However,	 these	beliefs	 are	 grounded	 in	 true	beliefs	 related	 to	
direct	experience	of	 the	environment,	and	such	beliefs	are	a	minority	of	all	 the	beliefs	we	
hold	 (if	 beliefs	 could	 be	 individuated	 and	 counted,	 although	Dennett	 has	 assured	 us	 they	
cannot.12)	A	 related	assumption	 is	 that	 the	agent	desires	what	 it	ought;	 the	most	basic	of	
which	include	survival,	food,	procreation,	pleasure,	comfort,	and	absence	of	pain.	Belief	and	
desire	are	interdependent	upon	each	other	and	come	to	be	known	through	consideration	of	
the	agent’s	ecological	niche.	The	opportunities	and	 threats	 in	 the	environment	enable	 the	
identification	and	weighting	of	goals	 relative	to	 that	agent’s	needs	 for	survival,	 safety,	and	
nutrition.	 Its	 beliefs	 and	 desires	 will	 be	 evident	 in	 behaviour,	 as	 beliefs	 about	 the	
environment	 guide	 the	 agent	 towards	 the	 fulfilment	 of	 desires.	 Likewise	 for	 false-beliefs,	
destructive	or	misevaluated	desires	require	a	special	story	to	be	told	that	shows	they	derive,	
in	the	main,	from	salutary	ones.	What	permits	the	assumption	an	agent	has	the	beliefs	and	




adapted	 to	 its	 environment,	 for	 it	 is	 precisely	 those	 design	 features	 that	 increase	 the	
probability	of	propagation	and	survival	 that	are	 selected.	Thus,	 the	organism	must	believe	
most	of	what	it	ought	about	its	environment	to	maximise	its	survival	prospects	and	most,	if	
not	all,	those	beliefs	will	be	true.	Its	desires	will	also	be	commensurate	with	the	capacity	to	




can	 be	 inferred	 from	 behaviour	 only	 because	 the	 behaviour	 is	 rational	 in	 terms	 of	 those	
beliefs	 and	desires.	 If	 someone	wants	 a	 glass	 of	milk	 and	believes	 there	 to	be	milk	 in	 the	
fridge,	his	looking	under	the	bed	for	milk	would	appear	irrational.	Indeed,	the	belief	“milk	is	
in	the	fridge”	is	difficult	to	ascribe	based	upon	that	behaviour.	However,	Dennett	has	stated	
that	 intentional	systems,	 including	humans,	are	 less	than	perfectly	rational;	 the	 intentional	
stance	requires	merely	that	we	assume	a	myth	of	rationality	in	order	to	ascribe	beliefs	and	
desires.19	But	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 optimal	 design	 bestowed	 by	 natural	 selection	 is	 that	
organisms	approximate	ideal	rationality	well	enough	for	that	assumption	to	pay	off,	in	most	
instances.	 Evolution	 certainly	 produces	 shortcuts	 and	 cheats	 that	would	 fail	 to	 satisfy	 the	
canons	 of	 ideal	 rationality,	 but	 these	 are	 not	 so	 severe	 as	 to	 undermine	 the	 myth.	 If	 a	
systematic	 weakness	 in	 our	 reasoning	were	 to	 be	 discovered,	 Dennett	 suspects	 it	 will	 be	
there	 for	 good	 (evolutionary)	 reason	 and	 “its	 elimination	 would	 be	 more	 costly	 than	 we	




Dennett	 has	 been	 reluctant	 to	 specify	 in	 advance	 what	 constitutes	 rationality	 without	
conceding	that	this	undermines	his	project.	Rationality	 is	pre-theoretical,	a	general	term	of	
approval;	 it	 consists	 of	 shared	 understandings	 of	 what	 makes	 sense,	 which	 are,	 to	 some	
degree,	innate.		
	
What	 else,	 in	 the	 end,	 could	 one	 rely	 on?	 When	 considering	 what	 we	 ought	 to	 do,	 our	
reflections	lead	us	eventually	to	a	consideration	of	what	we	in	fact	do;	this	is	inescapable,	for	a	







We	 are,	 in	 other	 words,	 the	 gold	 standard	 by	 which	 to	 judge	 the	 rationality	 of	 other	
intentional	systems,	including	other	people.	This	is	not	swallowing	whole	a	mass	of	rules	but	
a	 generative	 capacity,	 like	 language,	 that	 enables	 us	 to	 interpret	 events	 –	 quotidian	 and	
novel	 alike.	 Formal	 systems	 of	 rationality,	 such	 as	 decision	 theory,	 game	 theory,	 and	 the	
rules	of	 inductive	and	deductive	 logic,	are	not	 followed	slavishly	but,	 like	a	dictionary,	 can	
usefully	be	consulted	when	considering	what	is	rational	in	the	circumstances.	Dennett	even	




In	 Intentional	Systems	Dennett	claimed	that	 the	 intentional	stance	was	merely	an	optional	
and	pragmatic	perspective	which	delivers	the	same	predictions	as	the	design	stance	but	with	
greater	 economy.	 Adopting	 the	 intentional	 stance	was	 a	 decision	 for	 the	 interpreter.	 This	
had	a	significant	bearing	on	the	ontological	status	of	beliefs	and	desires:	
	
For	 the	 definition	 of	 Intentional	 systems	 I	 have	 given	 does	 not	 say	 that	 Intentional	 systems	
really	 have	 beliefs	 and	 desires,	 but	 that	 one	 can	 explain	 and	 predict	 their	 behaviour	 by	
ascribing	beliefs	and	desires	to	them.23			
	
So,	 one	moment	 we	 adopt	 the	 intentional	 stance	 to	 the	 protozoon	 and	 attribute	 beliefs,	
next	 moment	 the	 design	 stance	 is	 adopted	 and	 the	 beliefs	 disappear.	 Beliefs	 are	
instrumentalistic.	 In	 this	 view	 beliefs	 “are	 not	 candidates	 for	 truth	 or	 reference,	 and	 the	
theories	 have	 no	 ontological	 import.”24	In	 subsequent	 iterations	 Dennett	 has	 refined	 his	
position.	Most	significantly,	the	intentional	stance	remains	optional	“but	the	facts	about	the	
success	 or	 failure	 of	 the	 stance,	 were	 one	 to	 adopt	 it,	 are	 perfectly	 objective.”25	Dennett	





la	 Fodor.26	Although	 initially	 a	 supporter	 of	 LoT,	 once	 “the	 only	 game	 in	 town,”27	he	 has	
never	held	that	realism	about	beliefs	necessitates	a	LoT.	Connectionism	offered	up	another	
game,	one	that	dispenses	with	LoT,	and	Dennett	has	been	learning	to	play	it	ever	since.28	So	
what	 is	 belief	 if	 neither	 a	 useful	 fiction	 nor	 something	 “in	 the	 head”?	 Belief	 is	 a	 “real	
pattern”29	that	can	only	be	discerned	from	the	perspective	of	the	intentional	stance.	These	
patterns	are	 there	 to	be	seen	but	 remain	 invisible	until	one	adopts	 the	 intentional	 stance;	
they	are	visible	to	us	because	we	are	designed	(by	evolution	and	culture)	to	detect	them.30	





























The	 intentional	 stance	 is	 a	 deliberate	decision	 to	 assume	a	 certain	 standpoint	 from	which	
real	 patterns	 can	 be	 perceived.	 However,	 multiple	 interpretations	 of	 the	 pattern	may	 be	
possible.	How	then	to	adjudicate	between	them?	In	The	Interpretation	of	Texts,	People,	and	
Other	 Artefacts	 Dennett	 notes	 that	 this	 problem	 has	 also	 vexed	 critical	 theorists.	 The	
traditional	 answer,	 “ask	 the	author,”	has	been	demolished	by	 the	 intentional	 fallacy:	 “it	 is	
simply	a	mistake	to	suppose	that	the	author’s	personal	opinion	about	the	meaning	of	a	text	
is	 authoritative.”35	The	 intentional	 stance	 is	 avowedly	 third-person	 and	 objective36	so	 the	
agent	to	be	interpreted	is	not	granted	privileged	access	to	his	or	her	own	beliefs	and	desires.	
Everyone	 must	 continually	 generate	 hypotheses	 through	 which	 to	 interpret	 their	 own	
behaviour	 just	as	 they	do	when	 interpreting	others.	Dennett	has	called	 the	results	of	 such	
self-reflection	“approximating	confabulations.”37	Approximating	because	language	forces	an	
artificial	 definitiveness	 on	 self-reported	 beliefs	 and	 desires.	 A	 self-interpreting	 agent	 may	
succeed	in	convincing	itself	of	these	clear-cut	beliefs	and	desires	governing	its	actions.	When	
quizzed,	 one	may	 report	 the	 wish	 for	 a	 30-day-hung	 rib-eye	 steak	 when	 really	 all	 that	 is	
desired	 is	 sustenance.	 Thus,	 personal	 avowals	 of	 belief	 and	 desires	 are	 interesting	 and	
available	but	need	not	restrict	the	interpreter.		
	
There	 can	 be	 no	 appeal	 to	 any	 underlying	 fact	 of	 the	matter	 about	 true	meaning,	merely	
alternative	 interpretations.	 What	 makes	 some	 interpretations	 better	 than	 others	 is	
determined	by	the	degree	to	which	they	accord	with	rationality.	 It	will	be	recalled	that	for	
Dennett	 we	 are	 by-and-large	 rational	 because	 close-to-optimal	 solutions	 are	 naturally	




I	 also	maintain	 that	when	 these	patterns	 fall	 short	of	perfection,	as	 they	always	must,	 there	









significant	 difference.	 Only	 one	 correctly	 predicts	 the	 patient’s	 suicide.	 For	 Dennett	 this	
success	 does	 not	 necessarily	 indicate	 a	 superior	 interpretation.	 So,	 intriguingly,	 the	




Essentially,	 the	 intentional	 stance	 is	a	 theory	about	how	one	 is	able	 to	make	sense	of	and	
predict	 the	other,	 “tacitly	 and	unconsciously.”40	However,	when	 confronted	by	 puzzling	 or	
peculiar	behaviour,	the	strategy	becomes	effortful	and	explicit;	the	act	of	interpreting	enters	
awareness.	Neuropsychiatric	phenomena	are	paradigmatic	instances	where	additional	effort	





third-person	perspective,	can	 the	 interpreter	establish	whether	 the	other	holds	 the	beliefs	
he	ought?	
	
A	 system’s	 beliefs	 are	 those	 it	 ought	 to	 have,	 given	 its	 perceptual	 capacities,	 its	 epistemic	
needs,	and	its	biography.	Thus,	in	general,	its	beliefs	are	both	true	and	relevant	to	its	life.41	
	
Likewise,	 in	 the	 “radical	 translation”	 of	 interpreting	 vervet	 monkey	 behaviour	 and	
vocalisations	the	interpreter	must	obtain:	
	






When	 interpreting	 fellow	 humans	 the	 matter	 of	 producing	 a	 “tentative	 catalogue”	 is	
somewhat	easier	given	perceptual	abilities	and	epistemic	needs	are	shared.	Therefore,	the	
interpreter’s	default	is	to	attribute	her	own	beliefs	about	the	immediate	environment	to	the	
other	 agent.	 	 Portions	 of	 a	 belief	 system	 are	 not	 concerned	 with	 beliefs	 about	 the	








Dennett’s	 conception	 of	 rationality	 is	 normative,	 in	 that	 it	 sets	 a	 standard	 for	 rationality	
against	 which	 we	 can	 be	 judged.	 A	 certain,	 although	 unspecified,	 degree	 of	 slack	 is	









For	 Dennett,	 the	 gold	 standard	 comparator	 of	 another’s	 rationality	 is	 one’s	 own.	 Hence,	
irrationality	 will	 be	 considered	 as	 such	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 interpreter’s	 intuitions	 on	 the	









anyone’s	 lights,	 the	 test	 of	 rational	 coherence	 is	 the	 preponderant	 measure	 of	 our	
attributions.44	
	
Incoherence	 is	 not	merely	 the	 absence	 of	 coherence	 but	 “blatant	 logical	 inconsistency.”45	
Humans	need	not	be	fully	consistent	at	all	times.	However,	when	inconsistency	is	brought	to	
one’s	 attention	 the	 belief-desire	 set	 should	 be	 modified	 to	 maximise	 consistency.	 If	
inconsistency	 is	not	eradicated	 then	 the	 interpreter	 is	at	a	 loss	how	to	proceed.	Sustained	
inconsistency	 destabilises	 and	 undermines	 the	 ascription	 of	 beliefs	 and	 desires,	 and	 so	 the	
interpreter	will	prefer	 to	explain	speech	and	behaviour	 through	the	physical	 stance.	Where	
beliefs	 and	 desires	 cannot	 be	 ascribed	 the	 interpreter	 will	 struggle	 to	 predict	 the	 other’s	
actions	 and	 behaviours.	 Indeed,	 failure	 to	 predict	 indicates	 the	 intentional	 stance	 is	
inapplicable.	
	
Dennett	 has	 considered	 his	 theory	 of	 the	 intentional	 stance	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 concept	 of	
personhood.46 	He	 argued	 that	 personhood	 consists	 of	 six	 hierarchical	 layers;	 being	 an	


















desires	 to	 that	person,	 at	 least	 those	 that	pertain	 to	 the	 symptoms	 in	question.	However,	
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sought	 to	 refute	 the	Wittgensteinian	picture,	 popular	 at	 the	 time,	 that	 reasons	 cannot	be	
causes	for	action	because	they	lack	the	law-like	nature	of	true	causal	explanation.	Davidson	




His	 behaviour	 seems	 strange,	 alien,	 outré,	 pointless,	 out	 of	 character,	 disconnected;	 or	
perhaps	 we	 cannot	 even	 recognise	 an	 action	 in	 it.	 When	 we	 learn	 his	 reason	 we	 have	 an	
interpretation,	a	new	description	of	what	he	did	which	fits	into	a	familiar	picture.4	
	
What	 marked	 Davidson’s	 work	 as	 significant	 was	 his	 development	 of	 a	 comprehensive	
philosophical	system;	his	philosophies	of	mind,	action,	and	language	cohere	and	support	one	
another.	His	theory	of	meaning	has	been	so	influential	for	it	employed	the	rigour	of	analytic	
philosophy	 in	 a	 domain	 previously	 considered	 formally	 untameable.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 the	
present	 study	 because	 he	 provided	 an	 explicit	 programme	 for	 understanding	 another’s	
words	called	“radical	interpretation.”	Although	Davidson	insisted	radical	interpretation	is	not	
a	theory	for	how	interpretation	actually	occurs	but	rather	a	claim	“about	what	must	be	said	
to	 give	 a	 satisfactory	 description	 of	 the	 competence	 of	 the	 interpreter,”5	more	 practically	
minded	philosophers	have	nevertheless	applied	it	to	real	problems.	Banner	&	Szmukler,6	for	
instance,	 drew	 on	 radical	 interpretation	 to	 expose	 the	 normativity	 inherent	 to	
determinations	of	decision-making	 capacity,	 contrary	 to	advice	 in	 the	Mental	Capacity	Act	












are	 parallels	 with	 Jaspers	 here.9	Mental	 states	 are	meaningful	 and	 operate	 in	 accordance	
with	completely	different	 laws	to	the	physical	world;	for	Davidson	these	 involve	rationality	
whereas	 for	 Jaspers	mental	 states	 are	 regulated	 by	 “internal	 causality.”	Contra	 Davidson,	
however,	Jaspers	considered	internal	causality	merely	analogous	to	its	physical	counterpart,	
“indicating	 the	 unbridgeable	 gulf	 between	 genuine	 connections	 of	 external	 causality	 and	
psychic	 connections.”10	Correspondingly,	 both	 held	 that	 interpretation	 of	 the	 other	 could	
fail,	with	catastrophic	consequences	for	the	would-be	agent.	
	
We	have	no	 trouble	understanding	 small	perturbations	against	 a	background	with	which	we	
are	 largely	 in	 sympathy,	but	 large	deviations	 from	reality	or	 consistency	begin	 to	undermine	
our	ability	to	describe	and	explain	what	is	going	on	in	mental	terms.11	
	
Davidson,	 like	 Jaspers,	 attributed	 de	 novo	 beliefs	 and	 desires	 to	 non-rational	 causal	
processes.	
	




This	 chapter	 aims	 to	 develop	 an	 understanding	 of	 Davidson’s	 theory	 of	 meaning	 and	
interpretation.	 There	 are,	 as	 Davidson	 himself	 noted,	 difficulties	 with	 the	 “empirical	






of	meaning.	Next,	 the	 constraints	 on	meaning	 that	 facilitate	 interpretation	 are	 presented.	
Thus	 the	 “principles	of	 charity”	will	 be	 elucidated,	which	 involves	 assuming	 the	 subject	 of	
interpretation	 is,	to	some	degree,	rational.	The	chapter	concludes	with	a	discussion	on	the	





One	 appreciates	 the	 boldness	 of	 Davidson’s	 radical	 interpretation	 by	 considering	 its	
epistemic	commitments:	interpretation	can	proceed	despite	the	interpreter	having	no	prior	
knowledge	 or	 theory	 regarding	 the	 mental	 state	 or	 language	 of	 the	 subject	 of	 radical	
interpretation.	Even	aliens	speaking	Saturnian	are	in	principle	interpretable.	Such	exotic	and	
extreme	 scenarios	 are	 clarifying	 devices.	 Even	 monolingualism	 poses	 an	 obstacle	 to	
interpretation;	 for	 why	 assume	 that	 the	 language	 spoken	 is	 the	 same?	 Perhaps	 this	
assumption	 is	 mistaken. 16 	Complicating	 matters	 further,	 Davidson	 was	 convinced	 that	
thought	and	language	are	holistic.	Belief	that	“the	gun	is	loaded”	depends	on	beliefs	about	
ammunition,	 the	 gun	 as	 a	weapon,	 the	 intransience	 of	 objects	 and	 an	 infinite	 number	 of	
interdependent	 beliefs.17	Some	 philosophers	 of	 language	 have	 argued	 for	 the	 primacy	 of	
either	thought	or	language,	using	one	to	gain	purchase	on	the	other.	However,	for	Davidson,	
thought	and	 language	 stand	or	 fall	 together:	 “We	should	 think	of	meanings	and	beliefs	as	
interrelated	constructs	of	a	single	theory.”18	One	can	only	understand	another’s	speech	act	
(“I	 want	 some	 chips!”)	 by	 simultaneously	 attributing	 to	 him	 mental	 states	 such	 as	 belief	
(“Chips	will	sate	my	hunger”)	and	desires	(“I	wish	my	hunger	sated.”)		
	







If	 one	 thought	 logically	 entails	 another,	 or	 provides	 a	 degree	 of	 rational	 support	 for	 it,	 the	
same	logical	and	confirming	relations	hold	between	the	sentences	that	express	that	thought.20	
	
The	problem,	 therefore,	 is	 to	break	 into	 this	 circle	without	knowing	either	 the	meaning	of	
utterances	 or	 the	 content	 of	mental	 states.	Davidson	 claimed	 this	 is	 possible	 because	 the	
content	of	thought	 is	propositional	 in	nature	and	propositions	by	definition	are	either	true	




for	Davidson,	 indicated	that	truth	 is	elementary	to	all	thought	and	language;	without	 it	we	
would	have	no	concepts	at	all.21			
	























where	 in	the	simplest	case	“p”	 is	 replaced	by	“s”.	Since	the	words	“is	 true	 if	and	only	 if”	are	
invariant,	we	may	interpret	them	if	we	please	as	meaning	“means	that.”26		
	
Without	 digressing	 into	 Tarski’s	 work,	 it	 is	 nevertheless	 important	 to	 appreciate	 how	 it	
differs	 from	Davidson’s.	When	Tarski	 states	 “s	 is	 true	 if	 and	only	 if	p,”	he	 is	 providing	 the	
conditions	of	 truth	 for	 the	 sentence	 “s”	 in	 an	 “object	 language,”	 such	 as	mathematics,	 by	
providing	a	translation	of	it	as	“p”	in	a	richer	“metalanguage”.	The	need	for	a	metalanguage	
arises	because	Tarski	proved	that	truth	could	not	be	defined	for	a	language	within	itself.	In	
providing	 the	conditions	 for	 truth,	Tarski	 took	as	unproblematic	 the	 translation	of	“s”	 into	
“p.”	 Davidson,	 in	 pursuit	 of	 translation	 from	 an	 “object	 language”	 such	 as	 German	 into	 a	
metalanguage,	say	English,	instead	took	truth	as	unproblematic.	Whilst	not	every	statement	
is	truthful	(“I	am	a	knight-errant!”)	the	vast	majority	of	assents	and	dissents	do	correspond	
to	 beliefs	 (“That	 is	 a	 tree.”	 “No	 that’s	 not	 a	 dog,	 it’s	 a	 cat.”)	 One’s	 attitude	 towards	 a	
statement	is	observable;	interpreters	observe	the	assents	and	dissents	even	when	ignorant	













we	 realise	 that	 any	 theory	 acceptable	 by	 this	 standard	 may	 yield,	 in	 effect,	 a	 useable	





thin	bits	of	 evidence	 (here	 the	 truth	 values	of	 sentences)	by	 imposing	a	 formal	 structure	on	
enough	bits.28	
	
Davidson,	 though	no	behaviourist,	 took	behaviour	 to	be	 the	public	evidence	 from	which	a	
theory	of	interpretation	is	constructed.	However,	the	range	of	possible	interpretations	must	









a	 fundamentally	 rational	 pattern,	 a	 pattern	 that	 must,	 in	 general	 outline,	 be	 shared	 by	 all	
rational	creatures.29	
	








to	 its	 neighbours	 and	 truth,	 which	 Davidson	 holds	 so	 fundamental	 a	 concept,	 imposes	 a	













language	 and	belief	will	 conform	 to	 the	 same	patterns	 due	 to	 their	 holism	–	 that	 by-and-
large	concurs	with	our	own	basic	rules	of	rationality.	This	agreement	matters.	Where	basic	












to	 the	 same	 basic	 rules	 to	 have	 any	 thoughts	 at	 all.	 Considering	 the	 other	 as	 rational,	 in	
terms	 of	 coherence,	 is	 less	 an	 assumption	 granted	 charitably	 but	 more	 a	 condition	 of	
treating	 him	 as	 an	 agent,	 who	 thinks,	 speaks,	 and	 acts.	 The	 charity	 comes	 in	 seeking	 the	
greatest	possible	coherence	in	the	speaker’s	utterances.	
	
[J]ust	as	we	must	maximise	agreement,	or	 risk	not	making	 sense	of	what	 the	alien	 is	 talking	














at	 other	 times	 (for	 example:	 “That	 is	 a	 rabbit”	 is	 true	 only	 when	 a	 rabbit	 is	 visible),	 this	
gradually	 enables	 the	 interpretation	 of	 names	 and	 other	 discoverable	 features	 of	 the	
environment,	like	“tall”	and	“beauty.”		
	
What	 seems	 basic	 is	 this:	 an	 observer	 finds	 a	 regularity	 in	 the	 verbal	 behaviour	 of	 the	
informant	which	he	can	correlate	with	events	and	objects	in	the	environment.35	
	
In	 order	 to	 correlate	 objects	 in	 the	 environment	 with	 words	 we	 must	 grant	 the	 speaker	
generally	to	be	correct	 in	his	assertions.	 Indeed,	we	must	grant	that	most	of	 the	speaker’s	
beliefs	are	true.	
	
Charity	 is	 forced	on	us;	whether	we	 like	 it	or	not,	 if	we	want	to	understand	others,	we	must	
count	them	right	in	most	matters.36	
 




to	 react	 similarly	 to	 salient	 features	 in	 the	 environment.	 These	 points	 of	 correspondence	
anchor	the	development	of	constructs	less	directly	observable,	such	as	emotional	states,	or	























Even	 with	 a	 theory	 of	 interpretation	 in	 place	 that	 maximises	 agreement	 and	 consistency	
some	other	 theory	 can	 yet	 be	 envisaged	 that	 fits	 the	 data	 equally	well.	 For	 instance,	 one	
could	 interpret	 a	 speaker	 as	 naming	 the	 animal	whenever	 he	 says	 “rabbit”	 on	 seeing	 one	
hop	 into	 view.	 However,	 it	 could	 equally	 well	 mean	 “dinner,”	 “hopping	 thing,”	 or	 “large	




towards	 sentences,	 would,	 we	 may	 be	 sure,	 have	 many	 equally	 intelligible	 rivals,	 for	





However,	 Davidson	 was	 not	 overly	 troubled.	 The	 indeterminacy	 is	 not	 of	 the	 degree	
suggested	 by	 WVO	 Quine	 who	 thought	 it	 fatally	 undermined	 any	 and	 all	 attempts	 at	




community	 will	 have	 multiple	 data	 points.	 Hence	 the	 number	 of	 possible	 interpretations	
greatly	reduced.	A	theory	so	constructed	can	be	applied	to	the	interpretation	of	individuals	
within	that	community	making	idiosyncrasies	of	belief	easier	to	interpret	as	such.	Secondly,	
indeterminacy	 is	 less	of	 a	problem	 for	Davidson	 than	Quine	because	 the	Tarski-style	 truth	
conditions	 and	Davidson’s	 assumption	of	 rationality	 impose	 greater	 constraint	on	possible	
interpretations	than	Quine	had	supposed	possible.42		
	






seeking	 to	 optimise	 coherence	 and	 consistency.	Whilst	 each	 interpretation	 of	 meaning	 is	
open	 to	 revision,	 it	 is	 nevertheless	 still	 a	 valid	 interpretation.	 Relatedly,	 there	 can	 be	
differences	between	 the	meaning	of	 the	words	used	and	 the	speaker's	 intended	meaning.	












This	 new	 theory	 is	 a	 co-creation	 between	 interlocutors.	 If	 one	 seeks	 comprehension	 he	
should	appreciate	how	he	 is	being	 interpreted	by	 the	other;	and	 if	he	uses	malapropisms,	










and	patient	commonly	share	a	 language,	 it	appears	 the	meaning	of	 their	utterances	 is	not	
shared	when,	 for	 instance,	 the	 patient	 states,	 “I	 am	 dead.”	 The	 epistemic	 position	 of	 the	
radical	 interpreter,	with	no	prior	 knowledge	or	 theory	of	what	 the	patient	might	mean	or	
believe,	seems	a	favourable	place	to	start.	Significant	themes	are	emphasised	by	italics.	
	
First	 and	 foremost,	 the	 principles	 of	 charity,	 given	 they	 are	 by	 definition	 rule-like	 and	
constrain	 interpretation,	 are	 obvious	 candidates	 for	 consideration.	 Due	 to	 holism	 of	 the	
mental,	 Davidson	 was	 explicit	 that	 lack	 of	 coherence	 impedes	 interpretability.	 Indeed,	








Correspondence	 constrains	 interpretation,	 as	 the	 interpreter	 will	 also	 hold	 most	 of	 the	










Rather	 than	 forming	 a	 fixed	 theory,	 an	 interpreter	may	well	 prevaricate	 between	 various	









Where	 the	 principles	 of	 charity	 seem	 to	 fail	 there	 will	 be	 increased	 indeterminacy	 of	
interpretations,	 hence,	 the	 number	 of	 contradictory	 interpretations	 will	 proliferate.	
Additionally,	 there	 will	 be	 a	 lack	 of	 evidence	 on	 which	 to	 decide	 between	 potential	
interpretations.	One	anticipates	that	the	interpreter	in	this	situation	will	prevaricate	between	
possible	 interpretations	 and	 none	 at	 all.	 This	 indeterminacy	will	 be	 both	 troublesome	 and	
troubling.	 Interpreters	 will	 doubt	 whether	 the	 speaker	 believes	 anything	 at	 all,	 or	 can	 be	
considered	to	entertain	desires	and	wishes.	 In	 the	severest	degree,	the	very	personhood	of	




In	 conclusion,	 we	 have	 seen	 that	 Davidson	 has	 provided	 a	 distinctive	 approach	 to	 the	
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divert	 one	 of	 his	 students,	Maurice	Drury,	 from	 an	 ecclesiastical	 path	 towards	 psychiatry.	
Wittgenstein	 is	 rumoured	to	have	contemplated	this	career	change	 for	himself.1	He	visited	
psychiatric	 patients	 at	 St	 Patrick’s	 Hospital	 during	 his	 stay	 in	 Dublin,	 prompting	 him	 to	





thing	 I	would	 fear	most	would	be	your	common-sense	attitude.	That	you	should	 take	 it	as	a	
matter	of	course	that	I	should	be	suffering	from	delusions.3	
	
For	 Drury’s	 birthday	 Wittgenstein	 sent	 him	 a	 copy	 of	 Freud’s	 Interpretation	 of	 Dreams,	
opining,	 “Here	 at	 last	 is	 a	 psychologist	who	has	 something	 to	 say.”4	He	was	 impressed	 by	
Freud’s	attempt	to	decode	psychiatric	symptoms	and	reinstate	meaning.	
	
Freud’s	 idea:	 In	madness	 the	 lock	 is	 not	 destroyed,	 only	 altered;	 the	 old	 key	 can	 no	 longer	
unlock	it,	but	it	could	be	opened	by	a	differently	constructed	key.5	
	
However,	 he	 came	 to	 regard	 Freud	 as	 having	 constructed	 a	 “powerful	 mythology,”6	a	
simulacrum	of	the	scientific	method.	
	





Wittgenstein’s	 last	 work,	 On	 Certainty	 (OC),8	is	 a	 series	 of	 interconnected	 notes	 rebutting	
radical	 scepticism.	 OC	 does	 not	 directly	 address	 the	 topic	 of	 mental	 disorder	 but	 the	










In	 recent	 years,	 OC	 has	 influenced	 a	 number	 of	 philosophers’	 writings	 on	 the	 nature	 of	
delusion.	 John	Campbell’s	 paper	Rationality,	Meaning,	 and	 the	Analysis	 of	Delusion11	is	 an	
important	and	influential	case	in	point.	The	bulk	of	the	paper	aims	at	refuting	the	currently	
popular	 theory	 that	 delusions	 are	 caused	 by	 an	 abnormal	 perceptual	 experience,	 often	
called	 the	 “empiricist”	 approach.	 The	 sufferer	 seeks	 an	 explanation	 for	 this	 abnormal	
perception,	 and	 the	 delusion’s	 content	 is	 provided	 by	 this	 explanation.	 Delusions	 are	
therefore	viewed	as	rational	response	to	the	anomalous	perception.	Campbell	invokes	OC	to	
offer	a	fundamentally	different	model.	In	his	self-styled	“rationalist”	account,	the	fault	is	said	
to	 lie	 in	 the	 background	 beliefs	 (A.K.A.	 framework	 beliefs)	 that	 Wittgenstein	 had	 argued	
form	the	basis	for	all	knowledge.	Delusional	beliefs	are	somehow	–	Campbell’s	explanation	is	





Introduction,	 Louis	 Sass	 employed	 a	 rather	 different	 aspect	 of	 Wittgenstein’s	 work	 to	
construct	meaning-laden	interpretations	of	Paul	Schreber’s	seemingly	inscrutable	thicket	of	







foundational.	 Theories	 of	 epistemology	 are	 either	 foundationalist	 or	 coherentist;	 that	 is,	
knowledge	is	either	founded	in	some	infallible	certainties	or	it	is	the	coherence	of	the	whole	
structure	 that	 justifies	 individual	 knowledge	 claims.14	Avrum	 Stroll,	 for	 instance,	 considers	
On	 Certainty	 definitively	 foundational.15	However,	 the	 text	 suggests	 a	 different	 reading.	
Consider,	 “When	 we	 first	 begin	 to	 believe	 anything,	 what	 we	 believe	 is	 not	 a	 single	






The	 purpose	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 formulate	 some	 key	 Wittgensteinian	 themes	 that	 bear	
directly	on	the	question	of	meaning	in	psychopathology.	These	themes	are	interwoven	but	
for	clarity,	each	is	explicated	in	turn:	 i)	meaning	is	use	according	to	a	rule;	 ii)	agreement	in	
judgment	 and;	 iii)	 hinge	 propositions.	 Explication	 of	 themes	 will	 be	 supported	 by	 textual	
evidence	 from	 Philosophical	 Investigations 19 	(PI)	 and	 On	 Certainty	 (OC).	 The	 chapter	






for	 an	 entity	 of	 some	 sort	 and	 that	 entity	 is	 the	meaning	 of	 the	word	 (e.g.	 for	 Augustine	
words	name	objects	in	the	world;	for	Locke	the	word	stood	for	an	“idea”;	for	contemporary	












A	 picture	 held	 us	 captive.	 And	 we	 could	 not	 get	 outside	 it,	 for	 it	 lay	 in	 our	 language	 and	
language	seemed	to	repeat	it	to	us	inexorably.	§11521	
	
The	 problems	 with	 taking	 words	 as	 naming	 objects,	 whether	 internal	 or	 external,	 are	
twofold.	 Firstly,	 many	 words	 just	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 name	 anything	 at	 all.	 To	 illustrate,	
Wittgenstein	considered	what	 is	named	by	the	words	“this”	and	“that”	and	observed,	“we	
do	 the	most	 various	 things	with	our	 sentences	§27.”22	Secondly,	Wittgenstein	began	PI	by	
quoting	Augustine’s	claim	to	have	 learnt	various	names	by	observing	his	parents	point	and	






















Not	 every	 instance	 of	 using	 a	 word	 is	 legitimate,	 however.	 It	 can	 be	 used	 correctly	 or	
incorrectly;	 otherwise	 there	 could	 be	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 meaning	 anything	 by	 a	 word.	 In	
Carroll’s	 Through	 the	 Looking	 Glass,	 Humpty	 Dumpty	 is	 considered	 perverse	 for	 his	
idiosyncratic	 use	 of	words.	 It	 is	 impossible	 to	 understand	what	 he	means	 by	 his	words	 as	
uses	them	however	he	pleases.25	But	correct	use,	and	therefore	meaning,	 is	rule-governed.	
So	the	question	of	what	 it	 is	for	a	word	to	have	meaning	 is	bound	up	with	the	question	of	
what	it	is	to	follow	a	rule.	What	is	it	to	act	or	talk	in	accord	with	a	rule	and	how	is	one	to	tell	
when	 the	 rule	has	been	 transgressed?	What	 fixes	 the	 rule	and	 its	 correct	application	over	
time	and	between	people?	Wittgenstein	 considered	 then	 rejected	various	alternatives.	He	
considered	 whether	 an	 image	 in	 the	 mind	 upon	 understanding	 a	 word	 (e.g.	 the	 mental	
image	of	a	“cup”)	could	ensure	that	all	future	applications	of	the	word	accord	but	concluded	
there	is	nothing	intrinsic	about	an	image	that	forces	any	one	particular	interpretation	of	it.	
Hence,	 an	 image	 cannot	determine	between	 correct	or	 incorrect	 application	of	 a	 rule	and	
the	ability	 to	 correctly	 interpret	 the	 image	 stands	 in	need	of	 explanation	 just	 as	 the	word	
does.	 Also,	 he	 considered	whether	 it	 is	 how	 the	 rule	 was	meant	 that	 enables	 it	 to	 guide	
future	use.	He	took	as	his	example	the	correct	continuation	of	an	algebraic	rule:		
	


























What	 this	 shews	 is	 that	 there	 is	 a	way	of	 grasping	a	 rule	which	 is	not	 an	 interpretation,	 but	






through	 practice,	 not	 predetermined	 beforehand.	 There	 is	 nothing	 deeper	 or	 more	
fundamental	 than	 the	practice	 itself.	We	are	brought	 into	 a	practice	 through	 training,	 the	
use	of	examples,	being	told	where	we	have	gone	right	and	gone	wrong.	Once	inculcated	into	
a	 particular	 practice	 it	 is	 this	 alone	 that	 determines	 whether	 someone	 does	 or	 does	 not	
follow	a	rule.	There	can	be	no	appeal	to	deeper	causes	or	explanations.	
	
“How	am	I	able	to	obey	a	rule?”	–	 if	 this	 is	not	a	question	about	causes,	 then	 it	 is	about	the	
justification	for	my	following	the	rule	in	the	way	I	do.	








A	practice	must	be	 sharable	with	others;	 there	 cannot	be	a	practice	 that	 is	private	 to	 just	
one	person.	To	understand	another	person	necessitates	sharing	practices.	The	concepts	of	
rule	and	that	of	agreement	are	closely	related;	understanding	the	one	means	understanding	







Determining	whether	 a	 rule	 is	 being	 followed	 correctly	 or	 not	 is	 a	matter	 of	 judgment.	 A	
community	applies	the	rules	of	language	in	a	standard	way	because	there	is	an	agreement	in	
such	 judgments	 within	 the	 community.	 The	 agreement	 Wittgenstein	 averred	 would,	 one	
supposes,	 arise	 from	our	 sharing	 biological	 characteristics,	 a	 cultural	 history	 and	 common	
practices	in	a	relatively	stable	world.	A	community	of	language	users	agreeing	on	a	particular	
concept	 does	 not	 make	 it	 objectively	 true	 or	 necessary	 but	 rather	 determines	 what	 we	
conceive	 to	 be	 true.	 Communication	 presupposes	 agreement.	 So	 when	 our	 judgments	



















While	 PI	 was	 concerned	with	 developing	 an	 understanding	 of	 language	 and	meaning,	OC	






If	 that	 can	be	 established	with	 certainty	 so	 too	 can	other	 knowledge	 claims.	Wittgenstein	
maintained	 that	 there	 are	 things	 –	 often	 called	 hinge	 propositions	 in	 the	 literature34	–	 of	
which	we	are	certain.	Upon	standing	one	does	not	query	the	existence	of	one’s	feet.	One’s	























inculcation	 (e.g.	 “We	 learn	with	 the	 same	 inexorability	 that	 this	 is	 a	 chair	 as	 that	 2x2=4.”	
§45538)	 while	 others	 are	 determined	 by	 our	 inherited	 nature.	 They	 are,	 in	Wittgenstein’s	
idiosyncratic	 use	 of	 the	 term,	 grammatical,	 in	 that	 they	 operate	 as	 rules	 for	 structuring	




expression	 itself,	 and	 the	 frame	 of	 mind	 in	 which	 one	 wants	 to	 use	 it,	 instead	 of	 always	
thinking	of	the	practice.	§60139	
	
When	 pointing	 to	 a	 red	 pillar-box	 to	 demonstrate	 a	 token	 of	 “red”	 to	 a	 young	 child,	 one	
forges	 an	 unassailable	 rule	 for	 the	 correct	 use	 of	 that	 word,	 bringing	 him	 into	 a	 shared	
practice.	 Once	 imbibed,	 such	 rules	 enable	 doubt	 but	 cannot	 themselves	 be	 doubted	 in	
normal	 circumstances.	 However,	 it	 may	 again	 make	 sense	 to	 say,	 “That	 is	 red”	 during	 a	
special	procedure	such	as	eye	examination.	Otherwise,	 “grammatical”	 rules	–	 the	hinges	–	
remain	unexpressed.	Hinge	propositions	taken	as	a	whole	form	a	coherent	structure,	and	it	
























sinners	go	 to	Hell”	was	considered	as	certain	as	 the	universal	hinge	“I	have	 two	hands”	 in	





rather	 than	 local	 or	 universal,	 yet	 still	 it	 cannot	 be	 doubted.	 Mayol-Sharrock	 sub-divided	
personal	hinges	 into	autobiographical	and	perceptual.	The	 former	 relate	 to	one’s	personal	
history	while	 the	 latter	 concern	perceptions,	 internal	 states,	 and	 spatio-temporal	position.	
Amnesia,	 confabulation,	 and	 delusional	 memory	 represent	 problematic	 autobiographical	








d.	 Linguistic	 hinges	 are	 engrained	 rules,	 such	 as	 the	 correct	 use	 of	 “red.”	What	 has	 been	
learnt	is	a	practical	mastery	of	language.	Rare	words	may	cause	one	to	pause	and	think	but	
common	words	are	known	with	certainty.	An	adult	who	suddenly	misuses	words	like	“red”	








intimately	 related	 to	 our	 facility	 to	 use	 language,	 judge	 in	 agreement	with	 others,	 and	 to	
engage	in	a	practice:		
	









to	 St	 Patrick’s	 Hospital.	 Furthermore,	 his	 situating	 meaning	 and	 understanding	 within	 a	
community	 practice	 chimes	 with	 a	 motif	 in	 the	 anti-psychiatric	 literature:	 the	 “mad”	 are	
deemed	 un-understandable	 hence	 ostracised.46	Although	Wittgenstein	 did	 not	 develop	 an	






If,	 by	Wittgenstein’s	 lights,	we	 are	 to	 understand	 someone’s	words	 (and	 actions)	 then	 he	
must	employ	those	words	in	a	standard	fashion.	Words	of	course	change	their	meaning	over	
time	and	across	cultural	and	subcultural	groups.	But	Wittgenstein	 insisted	that	a	rule	must	
be	 in	 principle	 learnable	 for	 the	 word	 to	 convey	 meaning.	 The	 pattern	 of	 use	 should	 be	
consistent	 and	 discernable	 to	 others	 from	 the	 same	 linguistic	 community.	 The	 close	
relationship	 between	 accordance	 with	 a	 rule	 and	 agreement	 is	 also	 of	 potential	 utility.	
Where	 there	 is	 disagreement	 in	 the	 usage	 of	 the	words	 “blue”	 and	 “orange”	 it	 is	 unclear	
whether	 judgments	 diverge	 (you	 judge	 it	 to	 be	 blue,	 I	 judge	 it	 orange)	 or	 the	 rules	 of	
application	differ.	Hence,	failure	to	agree	on	judgments	will	manifest	as	an	apparent	absence	
of	pattern	or	law-like	regularity.	Is	the	move	from	difficulty	with	meaning	to	non-accordance	
with	 a	 rule	 or	 disagreement	 in	 judgment	 in	 any	way	helpful?	Does	 it	 not	merely	 shift	 the	
problem	 from	 one	 abstruse	 concept	 to	 another?	 This	 however	 misses	 the	 point.	
Wittgenstein	 intended	 to	 show	 that	 meaning	 is	 not	 some	 impenetrable	 extra-linguistic	
object	 but	 is	 simply	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 our	 everyday	 linguistic	 competence.	 To	 be	 able	 to	
speak	a	language	is,	among	other	things,	to	know	when	words	are	misused.		
	




without	undergoing	changes…	Ever	since	 it	was	born,	 it	has	been	either	 in	contact	with	or	
not	 far	 from	the	 surface	of	 the	earth;	and	at	every	moment	 since	 it	was	born,	 there	have	
also	 existed	 many	 other	 things,	 having	 shape	 and	 size	 in	 three	 dimension”47	and	 so	 on.	
Mayol-Sharrock,	on	the	other	hand,	described	universal,	cultural	and	personal	categories	of	
hinge	 propositions.	 It	 should	 be	 possible	 to	 compare	 psychopathological	 content	 against	
these	 lists	 to	 identify	 any	 correspondence.	 Hinge	 propositions	 are	 normally	 unspoken,	 so	










amount	 of	 talking	 will	 align	 the	 two	 systems.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 –	 as	





Finally,	 unique	 to	 Wittgenstein	 was	 his	 discussion	 of	 the	 first-person	 subjective	
consequences	of	disruption	to	hinge	beliefs.	He	intimated	that	the	person	who	doubts	what	
once	was	certain	would	relinquish	all	judging,	for	nothing	can	be	relied	upon.	Alternatively,	
the	alteration	may	be	outside	awareness,	 so	 the	 subjective	 consequences	 less	 catastrophic	




Wittgenstein	 offers	 an	 account	 of	 meaning,	 if	 not	 a	 formal	 theory.	 Although,	 he	 is	 not	
infrequently	 invoked	 in	theoretical	discussions	of	psychopathology,	 there	has	to	date	been	
no	investigation	of	his	philosophical	thinking	in	actual	patients.	This	is	a	shame	given	that	On	
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The	 three	chapters	above	provided	overviews	of	 the	 three	philosophies	of	meaning	under	
consideration	and	concluded	with	some	suggestions	for	how	these	might	unfold	in	the	clinic.	
The	 time	has	come	to	offer	more	categorical	hypotheses	 from	each	 theory	 to	sequentially	













There	 follows	 an	 exploration	 of	 whether	 the	 patient	 conforms	 to	 Dennett’s	 vision	 of	
rationality	 when	 discussing	 the	 symptom.	 While	 it	 is	 acknowledged	 that	 Dennett	 is	 not	




This	 question	 will	 principally	 be	 addressed	 to	 the	 carer	 interviews	 but	 the	 patients’	









Similar	 to	 Dennett’s	 vision	 of	 rationality	 but	 Davidson	 gave	 more	 detailed	 examples	 of	
coherence	 and	 incoherence	 that	 could	 be	 tolerated	 by	 radical	 interpretation.	 Again,	 the	
patient	 interviews	 are	 surveyed	 for	 actual	 instances	 of	 incoherence,	 both	 the	 logical	 sort	
that	Davidson	held	as	 incompatible	with	 rationality	and	 the	weaker	quotidian	kind.	Carers	




The	 patient	 and	 carer	 interviews	 are	 examined	 to	 establish	whether	 and	where	 there	 are	
disagreements	about	 the	external	world,	which	Davidson	 thought	must	 largely	correspond	







The	 chapter	 on	 Wittgenstein	 produced	 a	 list	 of	 hinge	 beliefs	 and	 some	 instances	 from	
psychopathology	 where	 these	 might	 be	 contravened.	 Statements	 made	 by	 patients	 and	
carers	are	reviewed	and	potential	contravention	of	hinges	described	and	the	consequences	














with	 regards	 hinge	 beliefs	 will	 impact	 the	 sufferer.	 This	 material	 is	 predominantly	 drawn	
from	the	patient	interviews	although	carer’s	observations	are	of	course	also	important	here.		
	
Now	we	have	more	precise	 and	 tractable	questions	 in	place	we	 turn	 to	 the	 results	 of	 the	







Before	 considering	 the	 cases	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 philosophies	 of	 meaning,	 it	 is	
necessary	to	survey	the	range	of	opinion	concerning	meaningfulness	in	the	neuropsychiatric	
symptoms	with	which	the	cases	present.	This	will	demonstrate	the	diversity	of	opinion	and	




Capgras’	 delusion	 has	 an	 almost	 totemic	 status	 in	 the	 neuro-scientific	 understanding	 of	
psychopathology. 1 ,	 2 	The	 original	 paper3 	described	 Mme	 M’s	 horrific	 enmeshment	 in	 a	
logarithmic	expansion	of	doubles	that	reads	more	like	a	short	story	by	Edgar	Allen	Poe	than	
a	medical	 case	 history.	 Following	 the	 death	 of	 two	 daughters	 and	 twin	 boys	 she	 became	
convinced	 her	 only	 remaining	 daughter	 had	 been	 abducted	 and	 replaced	 by	 an	 imposter,	
who	in	turn	was	replaced	by	another	so	over	a	four	year	period	she	encountered	more	than	
2,000	doubles.	Amidst	this,	she	believed	her	husband	had	been	murdered	and	another	set	in	
his	 place.	 The	 entire	 police	 force	 were	 duplicated	 on	 numerous	 occasions,	 hence	 her	
inability	to	secure	justice.	Likewise,	the	doctors	in	the	hospital	multiplied,	each	undermining	


















absent.	 Thus,	 there	 is	 splitting	 and	 projection	 of	 the	 now	overt	 hateful	 feelings	 on	 to	 the	
imposter. 5 	Psychodynamic	 theories	 employ	 repression,	 regression,	 ambivalence,	 and	
depersonalisation	 to	 varying	 degrees,	 but	 have	 been	 criticised	 for	 being	 post-hoc,	 un-
falsifiable,	 reliant	 on	 unobservable	 defence	mechanisms,	 and	 unable	 to	 account	 for	 cases	
where	 the	 delusional	 content	 involves	 non-intimates,	 inanimate	 objects,	 and	 buildings.6	
Whatever	 the	 details	 of	 the	 psychodynamic	 explanation,	 they	 all	 share	 the	 principle	 that	
psychiatric	 symptoms	 are	 “reflections	 of	 unconscious	 processes	 that	 defend	 against	
repressed	wishes	 and	 feeling.”7	Bolton	and	Hill8	suggest	 that	 such	explanations	extend	 the	
allegedly	 universal	 human	 system	 for	 understanding	 and	 predicting	 others	 called	 folk	
psychology,9	which	 bears	 similarity	 to	Dennett’s	 intentional	 stance.	 Behaviour	 is	 predicted	
and	 explained	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 actor’s	 beliefs	 about	 the	 world	 and	 desires	 for	 certain	
outcomes.	However,	in	the	psychodynamic	approach,	desires	guiding	behaviour	may	well	be	
unconscious.	 Therefore,	 what	 appears	 in	 want	 of	 explanation	 –	 the	 delusion	 of	 an	 alius	
father	 –	 becomes	 readily	 understandable.	 Were	 it	 not	 for	 the	 hypothesised	 unconscious	


















criticising	 folk	 psychology	 in	 its	 current	 form	 as	 inadequate	 to	 the	 task.	 Central	 to	 his	
description	is	the	loss	of	an	“affective	familiarity,”	a	taken-for-granted	background	through	
which	 the	world	 is	experienced,	particularly	 those	objects	we	value.	Following	 its	 loss,	 the	
sufferer	no	longer	feels	at	home	in	the	world	and	“there	is	a	sense	in	which	an	‘absence,’	a	
‘not’	is	part	of	the	experience.”13	Thus,	her	altered	experience	of	the	world	is	uncanny.	She	
directly	perceives	her	husband	as	unfamiliar	yet	 identical;	 the	alius	 is	seen	as	an	 imposter.	
According	 to	Ratcliffe,	 due	 to	 its	 neglect	 of	 affect,	 folk	 psychology	 cannot	 account	 for	 the	
delusional	 content,	 but	 once	 introduced,	 the	 delusion	 becomes	 understandable	 without	
recourse	to	hypothecated	defence	mechanisms.	This	loss,	however,	leaves	much	in	want	of	
explanation.	 Even	 if	 everyday	 experiences	 of	 unfamiliarity	 do	 go	 some	 way	 towards	
understanding	this	uncanniness,	 the	 loss	of	affective	 familiarity	 itself	 remains	unexplained.	
Also,	why	such	a	general	experience	should	produce	the	relatively	circumscribed	focus	upon	
intimates	 and	 the	 frequently	 bizarre	 accounts	 of	 their	 disappearance	 (e.g.	 being	 beamed	
into	outer-space)	is	unclear.	Ratcliffe	acknowledges	that	an	additional	factor	is	required,	so	
posits	 a	 role	 for	 personality	 traits	 that	 pre-morbidly	would	 have	 been	 considered	 normal.	
When	 these	 as	 yet	 unspecified	 traits	 combine	 with	 the	 loss	 of	 affective	 familiarity	 the	




The	 phenomenological	 approach	 to	 the	 Capgras	 delusion	 has	 commonalities	 with	 the	
leading	cognitive	neuropsychiatric	account.	Rather	than	a	general	loss	of	affective	familiarity	
however,	a	modality	 specific	 loss	of	emotional	 recognition	 in	 the	visual	pathway	has	been	






to	 the	 specific	 content,	 the	 latter	 explaining	 the	 former.	 The	 delusion	 becomes	 quite	
understandable	once	 the	anomalous	experience	 is	 granted.	Meaning	–	 and	 rationality	 –	 is	
preserved.	Coltheart,	on	the	other	hand,	considers	that	both	the	anomaly	and	reasoning	lie	
outside	 conscious	 awareness.	 “What’s	 conscious	 is	 only	 the	 outcome	 that	 this	 chain	 of	
processes	 generated:	 the	 conscious	belief,	 ‘This	 person	 isn’t	my	wife.’”17	This	 implies	 that,	









its	 incompatibility	 with	 the	 hypothesis	 to	 which	 they	 have	 become	 committed;	 so	 the	
delusional	 belief	 persists…	 The	 second	 factor	 is	 a	 failure	 of	 the	 system	 whose	 job	 it	 is	 to	
consider	new	evidence…	so	as	to	revise	current	beliefs.18	
	















this	 implies	“that	woman”	is	not	 in	the	legal	relation	of	wife,	 i.e.	the	wedding	was	a	sham.	
Given	what	is	at	stake	–	the	continued	presence	of	an	individual	with	whom	the	sufferer	has	
shared	much	 history	 –	 the	 delusion	 is	 bettered	 characterised:	 “That	 [currently	 perceived]	
woman	is	not	that	[remembered]	woman.”21	Judging	“that	woman”	to	be	different	from	his	
remembered	wife	would	result	 in	a	 lack	of	affective	response	when	she	comes	 in	view,	so	
the	perceptual	abnormality	is	an	effect	rather	than	cause	of	the	delusion.	The	ideal	way	to	
check	 whether	 “that	 woman”	 is	 the	 remembered	 woman	 would	 be	 to	 discuss	 shared	
experiences.	As	 the	patient	 does	not	proceed	 in	 this	manner,	 Campbell	 concludes,	 he	has	
“lost	 his	 grip	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 word.”22	Campbell	 finds	 no	 reason	 to	 suppose	 that	
organic	change	or	dysfunction	cannot	change	localised	“hinges,”	with	repercussions	over	the	
entire	 belief	 network.	 Richard	 Gipps	 has	 pursued	 this	 line	 of	 enquiry	 and	 considers	
Campbell’s	 approach	 advantageous	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons,	 not	 least	 of	 which	 is	 the	
seeming	otherness	of	patients	with	delusions.	
	
What	 makes	 compelling	 the	 idea	 of	 delusions	 as	 altered	 frame-work	 beliefs	 is	 both	 the	
certainty	 with	which	 they	 are	 held	 and	 their	 inaccessibility	 to	 those	 (nonpsychotic)	 persons	





This	brief	 survey	should	demonstrate	 that	meaning	and	meaninglessness	 feature	 in	widely	
differing	 perspectives	 of	 the	 Capgras	 delusion.	 Indeed,	 meaning	 is	 a	 crucial	 albeit	
unexamined	 feature	 in	 each	 theoretical	model.	 It	 is	 preserved	 in	 psychodynamic	 accounts	
through	the	deployment	of	unconscious	mechanisms	while	phenomenological	and	Maher’s	
models	do	so	only	by	including	an	unexplained	loss	of	affective	familiarity	plus	unidentified	
personality	 traits.	 Positing	 unknown	 and	 unobserved	 processes	 is	 required	 to	 restore	
meaning	 to	 Capgras’	 delusion.	 Coltheart’s	 invoking	 of	 irrationality	 avoids	 addressing	
meaning	 directly	 but	 goes	 some	 way	 to	 accounting	 for	 the	 peculiarity	 of	 the	 delusional	
belief.	 It	 remains	an	open	question	whether	meaning	and	rationality	are	 tethered,	but	 the	
inconsistency	with	other	beliefs	and	de	novo	emergence	claimed	by	Coltheart	pits	his	model	




includes	a	hypothesised	dysfunctional	 checking	 system	 in	place	of	 the	psychodynamic	and	
phenomenological	 desiderata.	 Campbell’s	 rationalist	 approach	 differs	 fundamentally	 for	
there	 becomes	 a	 gulf	 between	 all	 communication;	 everything	 the	 patient	 says	 has	 been	
transformed	so	mutual	understanding	becomes	an	impossibility.	Once	again,	a	hypothesised	
mechanism	 is	 required	to	explain	how	a	hinge-belief	and	surrounding	structures	can	be	so	






A	 person	 is	 said	 to	 labour	 under	 a	 hallucination,	 or	 to	 be	 a	 visionary,	 who	 has	 a	 thorough	





patches	 –	 or	 “complex”	 –	 involving	 figures,	 animals,	 and	 extended	 landscapes	 –	 they	 are	
uncommon	 in	 the	 “functional”	 disorders.	 Hence,	 their	 relative	 neglect	 in	 the	 psychiatric	
literature.	 It	 is	 predominantly	 neurologists	 who	 have	 considered	 the	 causes	 of	 visual	
hallucinations.	As	the	late	Oliver	Sacks	described:	
	
There	 seems	 to	 be	 a	mechanism	 in	 the	 brain	 that	 generates	 or	 facilitates	 hallucination	 –	 a	
primary	 physiological	 mechanism,	 related	 to	 local	 irritation,	 “release,”	 neurotransmitter	
disturbance,	 or	 whatever	 –	 with	 little	 reference	 to	 the	 individual’s	 life	 circumstances,	
character,	 emotions,	 beliefs,	 or	 state	 of	mind…	 [patients]	 almost	 uniformly	 emphasise	 their	
meaninglessness.26	
	
This	 meaninglessness	 is,	 however,	 surprising.	 Prior	 to	 Esquirol’s	 introduction	 of	 the	 term	














of	 mind,	 are	 more	 exposed	 to	 it	 than	 others,	 especially	 if	 they	 have	 previously	 applied	
themselves	to	speculative	and	abstract	studies.28	
	




sophisticated	 clinicians	 have	 refused	 to	 imbibe	 whole	 the	 neurologicisation	 of	 visual	














Freud	 too	 likened	 visual	 hallucinations	 to	 dreams	 and	 correspondingly	 undertook	 their	
analysis.	 Repressed	 memories	 or	 conflicts	 are	 transformed	 into	 externalised	 images	 that	
simultaneously	 conceal	 and	 reveal	 their	 unconscious	 origins. 32 	Thus,	 Paul	 Schreber’s	
hallucinated	 heavenly	 rays	 were	 interpreted	 as	 a	 concrete	 representation	 of	 repressed	
libidinal	 impulses	 towards	 his	 father,	 represented	 as	 God.33	If	 this	 is	 correct,	 then	 the	







For	 example,	 hallucinating	 recently	 deceased	 relatives	 is	 common,	 particularly	 in	 the	
distressed,	 lonely	 and	 isolated,	 and	 they	 are	 almost	 uniformly	 comforting,35	suggesting	 a	
wish-fulfilling	 or	 functional	 role.	 The	 preponderance	 of	 hallucinated	 faces,	 people,	 and	
animals	 over	 inanimate	 objects	 is	 said	 to	 meet	 “unconscious	 affiliative	 impulses.” 36	
Alternatively,	 hallucinations	 in	 bereavement	 may	 be	 atypical	 as	 those	 considered	
pathological	are	distorted	in	size,	occupy	odd	spatial	locations,	and	jar	with	the	setting.37	The	
hallucinated	 content	 can	 be	 either	 mundane	 –	 a	 man	 sitting	 in	 a	 chair	 –	 or	 fantastical	 –	
gargoyle	 faces,	a	brightly	coloured	circus	 troupe,38	extended	vivid	 landscapes	bustling	with	
people	and	objects.39	Images	can	be	static,	rove	within	the	visual	field,	or	move	dynamically.	
Although	 where	 there	 is	 movement	 no	 narrative	 unfolds, 40 	in	 contrast	 to	 dreams.	










processing.”	 The	 authors	 “stress	 the	 interaction	 of	 multiple	 processes	 within	 scene	
perception	 rather	 than	 the	 activation	 or	 release	 of	 specific	 visual	 areas.” 42 	Top-down	
expectations	 of	 the	 setting	 create	 a	 visualised	 object	 in	 the	 scene	 from	 an	 anticipated	
“proto-object.”	This	explains	the	vivid	clarity	with	which	hallucinations	are	experienced	even	
in	 those	 with	 poor	 vision.	 As	 eyes	 and	 mouths	 attract	 our	 gaze	 more	 than	 other	 facial	







over	 another	 of	 significance?	 Berrios	 has	 bemoaned	 the	 “loss	 of	 semantic	 pregnancy”44	in	
the	study	of	visual	hallucinations;	rather	 ironically	given	his	own	declaration	that	delusions	






argument	 from	 hallucination	 is	 used	 to	 support	 sense-data	 theories	 of	 perception	 and	








There	 are	 bipolar	 perspectives	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	 visual	 hallucinations.	 Psychoanalytic	







evidence	 for	 the	 biological	 and	 contingent	 nature	 of	 the	 hallucinated	 content.	 The	




Serge	Korsakoff	 described	a	 37-year-old	Russian	writer	with	 a	 fondness	 for	Brandy-fuelled	




meaning,	“to	talk	with,”	 irrespective	of	the	truth-value	of	what	 is	said.51	The	word	arose	 in	








in	 Anton’s	 syndrome.)	 Advocates	 of	 the	 broader	 conception	 prize	 the	 parsimony	 of	
accounting	for	various	clinical	phenomena	previously	thought	unrelated.	Thus,	anosognosia,	
misidentification	 syndromes	 (including	 the	 Capgras	 delusion),	 verbal	 reports	 of	 right	
hemisphere	 initiated	 acts	 in	 split-brain	 patients,	 and	 self-deception	 are	 each	 explained	 in	
terms	of	deficient	knowledge	and	faulty	monitoring	systems	in	the	brain.55	Confabulations	of	
differing	 types	 have	 been	 described.	 It	 is	 claimed	 that	 all	 healthy	 individuals	 have	 the	
potential	 to	 confabulate	 responses	when	 they	 cannot	 know	 the	 answer.	Nisbett	&	Wilson	










more	 severe	 and	 distinct	 phenomenon.	 They	 have	 also	 been	 found	 to	 involve	 episodic	
content	 to	 a	 far	 greater	 extent	 than	 the	 provoked	 sort,	 which	 are	 restricted	 to	 personal	
semantic	 material	 occasioned	 by	 direct	 questioning. 61	It	 is	 spontaneous	 confabulations	
about	episodic	memory	that	are	the	focus	of	the	current	investigation.	A	variety	of	models	









The	 theories	 differ	 in	 their	 details,	 but	 all	 involve	 failings	 of	 executive	 function,	 such	 as	
initiating,	planning,	monitoring,	and	inhibiting	memory	searches.	Gilboa	&	Moscovitch64	base	
their	 theory	 of	 confabulation	 on	 an	 empirically	 grounded	 neuropsychological	 model	 of	
normal	 memory	 function.	Memory	 traces	 are	 laid	 down	 by	 the	 hippocampus	 and	 related	













identified	 memory	 traces.	 The	 faulty	 cue-dependent	 retrieval	 can	 activate	 perseverated	
memories	and	recently	activated	memories.	Or,	cues	from	the	immediate	environment	can	
trigger	 a	 memory	 trace	 inappropriate	 to	 the	 search	 goals,	 which	 may	 account	 for	 the	
apparent	 suggestibility	 of	 people	 who	 confabulate.65	Inadequate	 specification	 of	 cues	 –
unduly	 influenced	 by	 environmental	 factors,	 wishful	 thinking,	 familiarity,	 temporal	
confusion,	 or	 perseveration	 –	 causes	 activation	 of	 incongruous	 or	 irrelevant	 memories.	
Gilboa	et	al66	now	consider	defective	monitoring	of	retrieved	memories	the	prime	factor	in	
confabulations.	Post-retrieval	monitoring	has	 three	components.	The	 first	 is	a	pre-retrieval	
“feeling	 of	 knowing”	 about	 which	 little	 is	 understood.	 The	 second	 crucial	 stage	 is	 the	
intuitive	and	immediate	“feeling	of	rightness”	(FOR)	mentioned	above.	FOR	is	influenced	by	
the	 strength	 of	 the	 memory	 representation,	 and	 as	 memories	 concerning	 the	 self	 are	
particularly	 salient,	 autobiographical	 information	 evokes	 powerful	 “feelings	 of	 rightness.”	




Strategic	 retrieval	 models	 of	 confabulation,	 despite	 incorporating	 idiographic	 aspects	
(autobiography,	 wish-fulfilment,	 etc.),	 essentially	 disvalue	 the	 actual	 content.	 Kopelman	
observed	 that	 Luria	 described	 confabulations	 as	 “spontaneous	 ‘outpourings’	 of	 irrelevant	
associations”;	himself	considering	them	“extremely	incoherent	and	context-free	retrieval	of	









false.	But	 this	presupposes	 the	very	process	 the	mechanism	 is	 supposed	to	explain,	unless	






Dalla	 Barba	 proposes	 the	 Memory,	 Consciousness,	 and	 Temporality	 Theory70	(MCTT),	 a	
variant	of	context	and	source	monitoring	deficit	models.	These	conceive	confabulations	as	
the	 faulty	 temporal	 ordering	 of	 memories,	 the	 content,	 therefore,	 consisting	 of	
inappropriately	 combined	 and	 conjoined	 memory	 fragments.	 Entirely	 false	 narratives	 are	
created	 from	 licit	 memories.	 The	 problem	 is	 not	 impaired	 memory	 as	 such	 but	 rather	 a	
disordered	 “temporal	 consciousness,”	which	 contrasts	with	 “knowing	 consciousness.”	 The	
latter	is	similar	to	semantic	memory	in	that	it	is	the	mode	of	consciousness	directed	towards	
objects	 in	 their	 atemporal	 “multiplicity.”	 Knowledge	 of	 cats	 does	 not	 necessitate	 thinking	
about	 an	 individual	 cat	 on	 any	 one	 particular	 occasion.	 Temporal	 consciousness,	 on	 the	
other	 hand,	 is	 knowledge	 of	 the	 object’s	 place	 in	 time,	 thereby	 enabling	 the	 subject	 to	
experience	herself	as	continuous.	It	is	absent,	apparently,	in	the	severely	amnestic	who	live	
in	a	perpetual	present,	such	as	Clive	Wearing,	whose	notebooks’	abound	with	entries	such	
as,	 “I’m	awake	now…	now	 I’m	 totally	 awake.”71	According	 to	Dalla	Barba,	 in	 confabulation	
the	temporal	consciousness	is	dysfunctional.	Less	stable	memories	are	no	longer	available	to	
the	 temporal	 consciousness,	 so	 overlearned	 recollections	 concerning	 the	 subject’s	 habits	
and	routines	intrude	as	if	they	were	a	specific	event	in	time.	Confabulations	are	identified:	
	




patient.	 It	 is	out	of	context.	However,	 the	confabulation	may	nevertheless	be	semantically	
appropriate.	 So,	 the	 confabulated	 response	 “I’m	 just	 back	 from	 visiting	 my	 mother	 in	





distinction	 to	 have	 greater	 validity	 than	 the	 momentary/fantastical	 and	
provoked/spontaneous	dichotomies.	For	Dalla	Barba,	anomalous	semantic	content	indicates	











actual	 content	 of	 confabulations.75	Why	 is	 this	 being	 said	 now?	 Conway	 &	 Tacchi	 have	
observed	 the	 frequency	 with	 which	 neurocognitive	 deficit	 accounts	 describe	 the	 verbal	
output	 of	 confabulators	 as	 “purposeless,”	 “incidental	 and	 unmotivated,”	 and	
“unintentionally	 incongruous.” 76 	Basically,	 content	 is	 considered	 mere	 accident,	 hence	
uninteresting	 to	 clinicians	 and	 researchers.	 Others,	 however,	 while	 accepting	 a	 role	 for	
cognitive	 deficit,	 stress	 the	 relevance	 of	 motivational	 factors	 and	 pre-morbid	 personality.	
This	 perspective	 has	 been	 most	 rigorously	 stated	 and	 studied	 by	 the	 psychoanalytically-
inclined	 neuropsychologist	 Aikaterini	 Fotopoulou. 77 ,	 78 ,	 79 	Motivational	 accounts	 seek	 to	
address	various	features	unaccounted	for	by	neuropsychological	deficit	alone.	For	instance,	
patients	who	 confabulate	 are	 visibly	 less	 irritable	 and	 anxious	while	 doing	 so;80	content	 is	
often	grandiose	and	enhancing	of	one’s	self-image;81	and	the	stories	frequently	appear	wish-
fulfilling82	or	 redemptive.83	Fotopoulou	 and	 colleagues	 suggest	 that	 confabulations	 convey	
an	 overly	 positive	 perspective	 to	 bolster	 self-esteem	 and	 defend	 against	 depression,	
although	at	the	expense	of	realism.84	Imperfect	memory	and	selective	recall	are	understood	














statements.” 86 	Secondly,	 although	 the	 emotional	 valence	 of	 confabulations	 is	 more	
frequently	positive	than	the	pseudo-confabulations	elicited	from	healthy	controls,	the	latter	
replicated	 the	 frequency	 of	 positive	 and	 negative	 statements	 they	 were	 shown	 as	
illustrations.	 This	 may	 have	 framed	 the	 controls’	 own	 creations	 producing	 a	 spurious	




The	diversity	 of	 confabulated	 claims	 and	 association	with	memory	 (albeit	 false	memories)	
invites	 the	 reading	 of	 some	 personal	 significance,	 or	 meaning,	 into	 the	 specific	 content.	
While	 acknowledging	 autobiographical	 elements,	 the	 standard	 neuropsychological	 deficit	
models	 hold	 these	 as	 being	 too	 incongruent	 with	 the	 circumstance	 and	 internally	
inconsistent	 to	 be	 taken	 as	meaningful	 statements.	 The	motivational	 theory	 on	 the	 other	
hand	 cedes	 a	 role	 to	 impaired	 retrieval	 while	 refusing	 to	 accept	 that	 content	 is	 mere	
accident.	 This	 is	more	 a	matter	 of	 emphasis	 than	of	 essence.	 But	 still,	 the	deficit	 theories	
seek	 to	 explain	 how	 apparently	meaningless	 claims	 come	 to	 be	whereas	 the	motivational	
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Dave	 is	 a	71-year-old	 retired	painter	 and	decorator	diagnosed	 to	be	 in	 the	early	 stages	of	
Lewy	Body	Dementia.	Six	months	prior	to	the	interview	he	began	to	believe	that	an	imposter	
had	 replaced	his	wife	 Jane.	Distressed,	 he	 repeatedly	 asked	 after	 Jane’s	whereabouts	 and	
rejected	assurances	that	contradicted	his	belief.	This	is	a	second	marriage	for	Dave.	The	first	
ended	 in	his	early	thirties	as	a	consequence	of	her	 infidelity.	He	has	been	 in	a	relationship	
with	his	current	wife	for	ten	years,	married	for	the	past	four.	The	Capgras	delusion	worsened	
markedly	 after	 the	 death	 of	 Dave’s	 brother.	 He	 would	 talk	 to	 Jane	 as	 if	 she	 was	 his	 late	









indicates	 the	 centrality	 of	 death	 in	 his	 thinking,	 though	 it	 is	 absent	 while	 discussing	 the	
actual	 Capgras	 delusion.	 Hence,	 death	 may	 be	 an	 important	 theme	 yet	 unrelated	 to	 the	
delusional	content.	Dave’s	opening	remark	of	the	interview	is	revealing:	“for	’er	it’s	an	illness	
a	funny	illness,	well	not	funny	but	frightening,	has	passed	a	lot	of	stuff	through	my	mind	of	
what	 is	going	 to	happen,	how	 it	 is	going	 to	happen	and	hopefully	 in	 the	end	 it	might	be	a	
better,	for	the	want	of	a	better	word,	finish”	(216)	
	
“Being	 toward	 death”	 is	 an	 avowedly	 Heideggerian	 term	 that	 captures	 Dave’s	 situation.	







is	an	undeniable	 sense	of	 regret	but	also	affirmation	of	having	partaken	 in	 the	 struggle	 to	





Dave	 frequently	 compares	 himself	 unfavourably	 with	 his	 past	 identity	 and,	 especially,	 his	
pre-morbid	 capacities.	 He	 speaks	 of	 having	 possessed	 a	 “sharp”	 mind:	 being	 able	 to	
remember	 songs	and	poems.	Such	assertions	of	vitality	and	 intellectual	 capability	 serve	 to	
bolster	 a	 positive	 self-image	 yet	 simultaneously	 undermine	 given	 the	 contrast	 with	 his	
current	condition.	“When	I	was	like	that	and	they	said,	‘So	what	do	you	think	about	that?’	it	
was	bap-bap-bap-bap	and	I	couldn’t	go	wrong	at	all.”	(216)	It	appears	these	deliberations	on	
decrepitude	 conflict	with	 a	more	 sanguine	 attitude	 towards	 himself.	When	 discussing	 the	
















not	 going	 to	 be	 good	 enough,	 strong	 enough	 to	 stand	 up	 to	 them	 [the	 dementia].”	 (228)	
Similarly,	 his	 experience	 of	 emotion	 is	 described	 as	 overwhelming	 and	 unmanageable.	 In	






As	 details	 of	 the	 Capgras	 delusion	 were	 explored,	 themes	 of	 rejection	 and	 abandonment	
came	to	the	fore.	Dave	drew	parallels	between	his	present	fear	of	abandonment	and	his	ex-
wife’s	infidelity.	That	others	knew	of	her	cuckoldry	before	him	nurtures	his	suspicions	about	
Jane.	 The	 overwhelming	 anxiety	 and	 anger	 alongside	 the	 wandering	 search	 for	 his	 “real”	
wife	is	reminiscent	of	toddlers’	ambivalent	attachment	behaviour.	“So	the	others	I	was	just	
meeting	them,	they	would	go	away	and	I	would	go	and	look	for	Jane	and	Jane	wasn’t	there…	
and	I	would	start	to	boil	a	bit	and	start	to	a	panic.”	(219)	“[N]ow	Jane,	 is	 just	 is	Jane	there	
and	that	is	all	I	wanted,	nothing	else.”	(225)	
	







then	 for	 him	 and	 it	 is	 awful.”	 (227)	 Thus,	 aspects	 of	 the	 Capgras	 delusion	 and	 his	
understanding	of	his	ex-wife’s	actual	leaving	correspond.	This	however	neither	explains	the	





Dave	 intermittently	 acknowledges	 his	 illness,	 although	 he	 talks	 primarily	 of	 a	 memory	
problem	rather	than	dementia.	He	frequently	deprecates	medical	explanations,	information	
leaflets,	 and	 the	 consequences	of	 illness.	At	most	he	 sees	 the	medical	 explanation	as	one	
model	among	others	equally	plausible,	but	he	considers	 it	 irrelevant	 to	 the	content	of	 the	
Capgras	 delusion	 and	 alienating.	When	 he	 does	 endorse	 an	 illness	 attribution	 it	 is	 on	 the	
basis	of	medical	authority	only	and	not	for	any	reason	with	which	he	concurs.	“Even	when	
someone	says	to	me,	‘Well	it’s	a	sickness,’	you	know	once	I	heard	that	I	had	it,	it’s	a	sickness,	
and	it’s	an	 illness.	 	 I	thought	 it’s	not	an	illness	for	God’s	sake.	An	illness	 is	when	something	
they	 give	 you	makes	 you	 alright	 but	 it’s	 all	mixed	 up	 together,	 the	memory	 thing	 I	would	





Of	 psycho-educational	 literature:	 “[I]n	 a	 case	 like	 this,	 when	 you	 start	 reading	 it	 and	 you	
develop	a	piece	of	 it	again	and	again	you	start	to	think:	Oh	yes,	oh	yes,	you	do	um	you	do	
think	um…	 that	 is	what	 you	do	and	plus	 you	 carry	on	with	anything	else	 you	 can	get	 your	
hands	on	[laughs]…	I	liked	reading	it	and	then	having	to	read	it	again	to	understand	what	I	
am	reading	about”	(227-8)	Dave	seems	reluctant	to	accept	he	is	unwell	since	that	implies	his	
beliefs	about	Jane	disappearing	are	 incorrect.	Reciprocally,	 if	he	accepts	he	 is	wrong	about	
his	wife	then	he	must	accept	he	is	unwell.	There	is	a	sense	in	which,	if	he	is	wrong	about	his	


















I	 say	 some	 of	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 understand	 it	 is	 more	 about	 where	 he	 would	 get	 the	 logic	 of	
thinking	 what	 he	 is	 saying”	 (236)	 Jane’s	 repeated	 quoting	 of	 Dave	 serves	 a	 number	 of	
functions.	 For	 one,	 it	 demonstrates	 her	 excellent	 recall	 of	 events,	 superior	 perhaps	 to	
Dave’s.	This	demonstrates	that	she	listens	to	Dave	while	also	holding	him	to	account	for	his	
words	–	they	cannot	later	be	denied.	Implicit	in	the	use	of	quotes	is	that	others	will	concur	
with	 her	 evaluation	 of	 them	 as	 erroneous,	 ill-grounded,	 and	 irrational.	 The	 irrationality	 is	
obvious	 to	all	except	Dave	who	 is	both	 included	and	excluded	by	 the	quotations.	 “I	would	
say	‘if	I	wasn’t	here	how	would	I	know	all	this?’	and	he	would	say	‘you	are	a	witch,	yous	(sic)	
are	all	witches	and	that	is	how	you	tell	each	other,	and	you’re	going	to	tell	her	now	and	when	
she	 comes	 tomorrow	 she	will	 tell	me	 everything	 that	 happened	 because	 she	will	 say	 that	
she’s	been	there,	but	she	wasn’t	there.’”	(236)	
	
Supporting	 her	 view	 of	 Dave	 as	 irrational	 are	 occasional	 references	 to	 animal-like	 and	
childlike	states:	quintessentially	exclusive	of	full	rationality.	She	says	Dave	“is	like	a	dog	with	
a	 bone.”	 (237)	 Contextually	 this	 refers	 to	 his	 tenaciously	 asking	 after	 Jane’s	whereabouts,	













thing.”	 (235)	 The	 difficulty	 arises	 in	 understanding	 the	 underlying	 beliefs.	 “Even	 though	 I	
have	done	my	best	to	convince	him	that	they	don’t	actually	exist	to	him	they	do,	but	that	is	
fair	 enough,	 though	 therefore,	 as	 he	 says,	 if	 they	 are	 in	 the	 house	 they	must	 have	 keys.”	
(238)	At	 other	 times	 Jane	 reasons	with	 him	hoping	 to	 persuade	him	of	 his	 error:	 “I	 try	 to	
think	and	say,	‘Ask	me	something	nobody	will	know	but	me.’	Anything	you	know,	I	would	say	
to	 him	 ‘Look	 at	 my	 tattoo’	 and	 he	 will	 say	 ‘You	 all	 have	 it.’”(236)	 But	 the	 basis	 for	 the	
delusion	is	difficult	to	“grasp.”		
	
Having	 criticised	 some	of	his	utterances	as	 “gobbledegook,”	 (234)	 Jane	expands:	 “Well	we	
are	 not	 talking	 about,	well,	 we	 haven’t	watched	 something	 on	 the	 TV	where	 there	was	 a	
woman	in	it	and	there	was	a	giraffe	in	it,	you	know,	you	look	out	whether	it	is	the	plants	or	
something	 he	 seems	 to	 see.”	 (235)	 She	 clearly	 looks	 for	 explanations	 for	 his	 beliefs	 and	
attempts	 interpretations	preserving	of	 rationality.	This	can	 lead	to	difficulties:	“Because	he	
says,	‘I	don’t	understand	how	you	couldn’t	have	seen	them’	and	he	says	‘I	am	distressed	now	







utterances	 no	 longer	 have	 the	 import	 and	 weight	 of	 true	 communication:	 “My	





she	 no	 longer	 attempts	 to	 engage	 him.	 She	 distracts	 him	 with	 another	 topic,	 leaves	 the	




Echoing	 the	 subtheme	of	 childishness,	 this	 theme	arose	at	both	beginning	and	end	of	 the	
interview.	 Jane’s	 description	 of	 Dave	 escaping	 from	 hospital	 to	 home	 and	 the	 aftermath	
illustrates	salient	facts.	Firstly,	he	returned	home	to	her.	Secondly,	she	knew	more	than	the	
nursing	staff	and,	significantly,	his	daughter.	Jane	thereby	demonstrates	that	 in	spite	of	his	
denials	 he	 acknowledges	 her	 as	 his	 wife	 by	 his	 actions	 and,	 furthermore,	 she	 provides	
superior	 care	 to	him	 than	others	are	able.	The	caring	 relationship	 is	unaltered	despite	 the	















A	recurrent	 theme	 is	Dave’s	 fear	of	 rejection.	She	 interprets	his	claim	that	 the	 real	 Jane	 is	
absent	as	signifying	an	insatiable	need.	“He	is	always	looking	for	me….	He	used	to	just	follow	







Despite	 this,	 she	 is	 not	 always	 convinced	 of	 the	 interpretation	 and	 her	 centrality	 is	 not	
always	 reassuring:	 “It	 really	 bugged	 me	 in	 the	 beginning,	 as	 I	 said	 to	 him…	 ‘I	 don't	





to	his	 dementia.	 She	 repeatedly	discussed	medical	 issues	 and	how	 receiving	 the	diagnosis	
had	been	helpful.	However,	it	is	a	queer	sort	of	help	that	offers	little	of	obvious	substance:	
“It	was	nice	for	someone	to	actually	say	well	you	know	what	it	is	and	you	can	thank	God	at	
last.”	 (244)	 The	 diagnosis	 helped	 her	 to	 formulate	 an	 understanding	 that	 encompasses	
biological	elements	and	Dave’s	premorbid	characteristics.	She	twice	described	the	problems	
as	arising	not	from	faulty	memory	per	se,	but	as	a	consequence	of	impaired	access	to	intact	




present	 state	 and,	 reciprocally,	 past	 drunkenness	 became	 intelligible	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	
dementia	diagnosis.	Drunkenness	conveys	a	 surfeit	of	 symbolism;	 it	 is	no	coincidence	 that	
Dionysius	is	the	God	of	both	wine	and	madness.	Alcohol	has	undeniable	biological	effects	yet	
the	 drunk	 is	 not	 rendered	 entirely	 senseless.	 There	 are	 associations	 with	 aggression	 and	





Liz	 is	 a	 pleasant	 South	 Londoner	 in	 her	 mid-seventies.	 She	 is	 down-to-earth	 and	 speaks	





time	 on	 the	 Intensive	 Care	 Unit	 (ICU).	 Afterwards,	 she	 began	 to	 experience	 visual	
hallucinations,	with	occasional	auditory	components.	Upon	regaining	consciousness	she	saw	








for	 adoption	 at	 five	 months.	 Liz	 has	 never	 discovered	 why,	 although	 her	 siblings	 have	
intimated	 they	 know	 the	 reason.	 She	was	 raised	 in	 a	 Salvation	 Army	 orphanage.	 She	 had	
contact	 with	 both	 parents	 until	 their	 deaths	 but	 developed	 a	 closer	 attachment	 to	 her	
father.	Liz	married	but	this	ended	due	to	his	drinking	and	infidelity.	Her	ex-husband	has	since	
passed	 away.	 She	 twice	 hallucinated	 his	 image	 prompting	 a	 vituperative	 dismissal.	 Liz	 has	
not	seen	him	again.	She	was	referred	to	a	psychiatrist	due	to	anger	and	aggression	towards	
others,	 which	 has	 led	 to	 her	 being	 ostracised.	 The	 hallucinations	 are	 unresponsive	 to	
treatment	 and	 their	 aetiology	 remains	 a	 mystery.	 Charles-Bonnet	 syndrome	 has	 been	
proposed	but	her	 vision	 is	 far	better	 than	would	be	expected.	Peduncular	hallucinosis	 is	 a	
possibility	 (although	 visual	 material	 dominates	 other	 modalities	 can	 be	 involved1)	 but	





it	 can’t	 be	 true,	 animals	 don’t	 talk	 to	 you	 unless	 they	 are	 real,	 but	mine	 do.”	 (246)	 Liz	 is	
unsure	 why	 these	 experiences	 have	 begun	 and	 finds	 the	 medical	 explanations,	 as	 she	
understands	them,	unsatisfactory:	“They	just	said	“your	brain	is	dead,	on	the	left	side”…	but	
it	 is	 not	 the	 full	 explanation.”	 (253)	 However,	 her	 uncertainty	manifests	 in	 her	 vacillating	
between	the	view	that	she	is	ill,	and	acceptance	that	the	perceptions	are	veridical.	“No	it	is	









Liz	no	 longer	 trusts	 the	word	of	others.	Not	her	GP,	not	 the	doctors	or	 their	explanations,	
and	not	her	 family.	Of	doctors	 Liz	wonders,	 “I	 don’t	 know	 if	 they	are	 confused	or	what	or	
hiding	 something.”	 (256)	 She	 is	 particularly	 critical	 of	 her	 GP	whom	 she	 accuses	 of	 being	
callous:	 “If	 you	 go	 down	 to	 the	 doctors’	 surgery	 and	 you	 are	 telling	 him	 about	 your	 life	
history,	what	is	he	going	to	say?	He	can’t	do	nothing.”	(263)	Similarly,	she	feels	disbelieved	
by	her	friends	and	family.	“They	say	that	‘It	is	all	in	your	head...	you	are	imagining	it	all,’	I	say	
‘I	 wish	 I	 was.’”	 (255)	 Furthermore,	 she	 feels	 belittled	 and	 denigrated	 rather	 than	
understood:	 “Friends	 don’t	 understand,	 they	 laugh	 at	me…	 but	 they	 laugh	 at	me	 and	 say	
‘Don’t	talk	stupid	you	haven’t	got	a	dead	brain’…	but	 it	goes	through	their	ear	and	out	the	
other	 end,	 they	 are	 not	 really	 interested.”	 (255)	 This	 lack	 of	 mutual	 trust	 has	 soured	
relations.	 Liz	has	withdrawn	 from	social	 groups	and	no	 longer	 confides	 in	others.	 “No	one	






understand	why	 they	are	happening	–	 they	 seem	to	have	no	 reason	 for	being	 there	–	 she	
cannot	understand	why	these	images:	“I	don’t	know,	I	have	been	asking	myself	‘why?’”	(249)	















Death	 is	a	recurring	 leitmotif	 in	the	 interview.	Liz	believes	that	she	was	brought	back	from	
the	dead,	part	of	her	brain	is	dead,	the	seven-foot	woman	is	an	angel	signifying	her	death,	
and	 some	 of	 the	 people	 seen	 are	 dead.	 She	 takes	 the	 hallucinations	 as	 signifying	 her	
imminent	demise:	“Oh	well,	 it	won’t	be	 long	before	 I	am	down	there.	You	know	 it	 is	 just	a	


















Liz	 is	constantly	 in	 fear	 that	her	brain	 is	dead	and	that	she	 is	becoming	“mental.”	“What’s	
going	on	up	there,	but	I	don’t	want	to	be	one	of	these	people	who	go	mad,	I	mean	you	see	a	















He	was	abstemious	and	hard	working	until	 the	death	of	his	wife	 shortly	 after	 their	 fourth	
child	was	 born.	 Thereafter,	 John	 raised	 the	 children	 alone	 but	 drank	 heavily	 to	 cope	with	
stress.	Seven	years	ago,	he	moved	 into	the	same	sheltered-housing	scheme	as	his	sister	at	
which	point	he	regained	sobriety.	All	was	well	until	a	few	months	before	his	recent	hospital	




his	 ability	 to	 remember	 recent	 conversations	 and	 requested	 referral	 to	 the	 local	memory	
clinic.	 Suddenly	 he	 disappeared	 for	 48	 hours	 and	 was	 brought	 to	 the	 local	 Emergency	






John’s	 repeated	 assertions	 of	 truthfulness	 are	 intriguing	 given	 some	 have	 dubbed	
confabulations	 “honest	 lying.”2	Honesty,	 for	 John,	 is	 equated	with	maturity	 and	humanity.	













John	 also	 considers	 the	 assumption	 of	 truthfulness:	 “I	 mean	 what	 can	 you	 do?	 Um,	 if	
someone	tells	you	something	you	think	it’s	true,	or	vice	versa.”	(272)	But	this	assumption	is	
not	always	granted	 to	 John,	with	grave	 consequences:	 “Oh	 if	 you	are	 telling	 the	 truth	and	






John	 contrasts	 his	 own	dependability	with	 the	duplicity	 of	 others.	 “I	 don’t	 tell	 lies,	 I	 don’t	
have	 to.	 Other	 people	 can	 tell	 them,	 I	 go	 away	 and	 laugh	 because	 it	 doesn’t	 bother	me.”	





Nevertheless,	 John	 has	 an	 inkling	 he	 may	 less	 reliable	 than	 he	 presents,	 acknowledging	
himself	 a	 good	 teller	 of	 “stories”	 and	 that	 others	 doubt	 him:	 “I	 suppose	 they	 think	 I’m	
making	it	up.	Maybe	at	times	I	do.	I	don’t	know.”	(284)	Even	he	has	trouble	accepting	some	
of	 his	 claims,	 “Sometimes	 I	 find	 it	 bloody	 funny	myself,	 you	 know	 things	 happen	 that	 you	
wouldn’t	 think	 would	 happen.”	 (284)	 Indeed,	 early	 in	 the	 interview	 John	 identifies	 the	
problem,	 “It	 is	 just	 that	 I	 imagine.”	 (270)	 John’s	 frequent	 assertions	 of	 honesty	








































John	 repeatedly	 denies	 being	 ill	 while	 acknowledging	 that	 others	 may,	 “Wonder	 whether	
that	 fella	 is	 the	 full	 shilling.”	 (285)	 Proclaiming	 rude	 health	 he	 assures,	 “My	 sister	 doesn’t	
think	 that	 I’m	 sick,	 maybe	 they	 think	 that	 I	 am	 sick	 up	 there,	 but	 I	 am	 not	 sick	 up	 there	
neither,	 ’cos	 I’m	 intelligent	 enough.”	 (269)	 He	 acknowledges	 his	 poor	memory	 and	 recalls	
undergoing	 investigation	 at	 the	 local	memory	 clinic.	While	he	 initially	 asserts,	 “The	doctor	
said	that	they	found	nothing	[wrong	on	the	CT	head]”	(271)	this	 later	gives	way	to	anxious	





on	 an	 awareness	 of	 what	 must	 be	 denied,	 so	 it	 is	 simultaneously	 known	 and	 unknown.	
Humour	 is	 deployed	 in	 a	 way	 that	 allows	 John	 to	 vent	 his	 fear	 of	 mental	 illness	 and	
involuntary	confinement:	“Is	he	a	doctor	an’	all?	[laughs]	He’ll	 lock	me	up	and	throw	away	
the	 key.”	 (288)	 This	 fear	 that	 there	 is	 something	wrong	 is	 revealed	 in	 John’s	 belief	 in	 the	
omnipotence	 of	 the	 psychiatric	 gaze:	 “I	 mean	 the	 psychiatrist,	 they	 will	 know	 everything	
about	 you	 and	 if	 they	 printed	 everything	 they	 know	 about	 you,	 then	 you’ll	 be	 in	 prison	
[laughs].”	 (278)	 This	 omnipotence	 contrasts	 with	 an	 apprehension	 that	 his	 own	 self-





circumstance	 than	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 case.	 These	 positive	 self-portrayals	 are	 buttressed	 by	
repeated	allusions	to	himself	as	an	industrious	autonomous	agent:	“I	can	do	all	casual	work	
or	something	you	know	in	the	farms	so,	um,	I	can	draw	me	money.”	(271)	Such	assertions	are	
however	 in	 diametric	 opposition	 to	 an	 increasing	 dependence	 on	 others.	 Similarly,	 his	








been	 close	 for	 many	 years,	 but	 over	 the	 past	 six-months	 she	 has	 become	 increasingly	
worried.	She	 feels	unable	 to	cope	with	his	wandering	and	takes	a	dim	view	of	his	drinking	
alcohol	 after	 seven	 years	 abstinence.	 She	 is	 both	bewildered	 and	bemused	by	his	 tales	 of	
misadventure	but	is	now	adamant	he	should	be	placed	in	an	environment	that	restricts	his	
perambulations.	 Cath	 has	 her	 own	 health	 worries	 so	 insists	 that,	 despite	 the	 care	 she	





used	to	work	 in	the	hospice,	and	she	was,	she	was	a	good	woman.	 I	mean	 if	you	 lose	your	
wife	and	you	have	all	them	kids,	you	can’t	be	right,	to	look	after	a	little	baby	just	born.	And	
that	 is	 when	 he	 started	 the	 drink.”	 (298)	 The	 burden	 of	 being	 a	 single-father	 with	 four	
children	 to	 care	 for	was	 compounded	by	 the	death	of	 an	 infant:	 “He	 lost	a	 little	baby	 too	
when	 she,	 um,	 for	 a	 few	 months,	 um,	 when	 she	 was	 born	 with	 pneumonia.	 He	 often	
mentions	 that.”	 (297-8)	 Cath	 believes	 that	 a	 visit	 to	 his	 late-wife’s	 grave	 has	 reactivated	
unresolved	grief.	“When	Bert	his	son	took	him	to	the	graveyard	to	his	wife’s	grave	and	put	a	















work…	and	 then	he	went	 looking	 for	his	kids.”	 (294)	 In	particular,	 John	has	 reverted	 to	his	





















a	 capsized	 small	 boat	 as	 a	 schoolboy.	 Other	 confabulations,	 however,	 are	 less	 readily	





Cath	 is	 disconcerted	 by	 the	 confabulations	 because	 they	 are,	 for	 her,	 self-evidently	 false:	
“Well	I	thought:	It	is	not	true,	you	can’t	think	that	is	true.	I	could	never	think	that	he	was	on	a	





But	you	can’t	 say	 to	him	 ‘You	wasn’t,’	you	know.”	 (301)	“He	thinks	 that	 I	am	daft	 [laughs]	
because	 I	 don’t	 believe	 them.”	 (309)	Cath	 scorns	 the	wardens	 in	 the	housing-scheme	who	
advised	against	challenging	John.	“The	warden	says,	‘You	can’t,	you	just	have	to	say,	“Yes,”	
say	 “Alright,”’	 but	 I	 can’t,	 I	 can’t	 do	 that.	 I	 have	 to	 ask	 him,	 ‘Where	 is	 this?	Why	 did	 this	
happen?’”	 (303)	 Questioning	 his	 anecdotes	 is,	 for	 Cath,	 an	 act	 of	 care	 that	 dignifies	 his	
humanity.	 “You	 see,	 you	 never	 know	 a	 person,	 you	 have	 to	 know	 them	 deeper	 than	 just	
saying,	‘Yes.’”	(303)	Cath	hopes	her	inquisitions	will	prompt	John	to	doubt.	He	might	reflect,	





perceptible	 in	everyday	actions	and	behaviour.	 It	was	 the	observation	of	change	here	 that	
alerted	her	to	illness	before	even	the	confabulations,	“Because	I	am	so	used	to	him	I	know,	I	




married	 and	 settled,	 so	 he	 couldn’t	 have	 always	 been,	 he	was	 a	worker,	 he	worked,	 even	
when	he	had	his	 kids	he	paid	a	woman	 to	 look	after	 them	 to	work	and	go	 to	work,	 so	he	








be	 cleaning	 and	 he	would	 have	 his	whole	 flat	 all	 cleaned…	 because	 he	 always	 used	 to	 be	







John	 was	 gravely	 ill	 a	 few	 years	 previously,	 at	 which	 time	 he	 confabulated	 stories	 about	
being	left	at	a	train	station	and	being	imprisoned	in	the	hospital	attic.	Cath	fears	that	John	is	
willingly	approaching	death	once	again.	 “He	 is	not	worried	 if	he	dies,	 you	know	he	doesn’t	
worry	about	that.”	(296)	His	rejection	of	life	is	most	visible	in	his	refusal	to	eat	the	food	she	





another:	 “I	 think	 they	 [the	 demented]	 are	 in	 a	 nicer	 place…	 He	 doesn’t	 worry,	 nothing	 is	
worrying	him	anymore…	and	he	 is	not	worried	 if	he	dies,	he	will	 tell	 you	he	 is	not	worried	
about	dying.”	 (308)	He	will	 in	death	be	united	with	 the	 “good”	and	 “settled”	woman	who	
was	able	to	“keep	him	without	the	drink.”	(298)	The	nature	of	his	altered	habitus	that	stands	
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not	 insane”	 but	 have	 instead	 sustained	 “brain	 injury.” 4 	As	 he	 advocates	 the	
neuropsychological	 model	 of	 the	 delusion	 –	 an	 explanation	 at	 the	 design	 level	 –	 and	
describes	 the	 content	 as	 “imagination	 stretching,”	 “metaphysically	 extravagant,”	 and	
“bizarre,”	 one	 surmises	 the	 delusion	 is	 uninterpretable	 from	 the	 intentional	 stance.	
Instances	 of	 murder	 do	 demonstrate	 people	 act	 based	 on	 the	 delusional	 content,	 thus	
showing	 that	 action,	 belief,	 and	 desire	 meaningfully	 interconnect.	 However,	 this	 may	 fall	
under	Dennett's	“nature	of	response	patterns”5	that	neuro-scientific	explanations	of	mental	
disorder	 should	 provide.	 The	 delusion	 he	 describes	 is	 a	 circumscribed	 and	 “emergent”	
mistaken	 belief:	 “The	 sufferer	 has	 deemed	 true	 some	 very	 specific	 propositions	 of	 non-
identity:	 ‘This	 man	 is	 not	 my	 husband.’”6	As	 Dennett	 takes	 the	 view	 that	 the	 delusion	
represents	 “cognitive	 pathology,”7	it	 follows	 that	 Dave	 should	 not	 be	 understandable	 or	
predictable	 from	 the	 intentional	 stance.	 However,	 Dennett's	 rather	 neat	 description	 and	









um,	 Jane	 would	 disappear….	 and	 then	 when	 Jane	 came	 back	 it	 was	 just	 something	 that	
wasn’t	the	same.”	(217)	From	an	observer’s	perspective	he	ought	to	believe	that	Jane	is	his	
wife	 but,	 suddenly	 and	 inexplicably,	 he	 does	 not.	 The	 failure	 to	 hold	 the	 belief	 about	 his	
wife’s	 identity	 that	 he	 ought	 is	 not	 restricted	 to	 the	 immediate	 environment	 but	 involves	
non-perceptual	aspects	too;	claiming	someone	is	an	imposter	is	to	know	something	of	his	or	
her	personal	history.	Dave	is	convinced	Jane	plans	to	leave	him:	“I	was	panicking	and	I	was	
afraid,	 I	 was	 afraid	 I	 was	 going	 to	 lose	 Jane.”	 (219)	 Both	 he	 and	 Jane	 link	 his	 fear	 of	
abandonment	 to	an	earlier	divorce.	His	adulterous	ex-wife	may	have	been	someone	other	
than	he	thought,	 in	the	colloquial	sense,	but	cannot	account	for	his	believing	 in	 imposters.	
Thus,	 while	 Dave’s	 personal	 history	 partially	 explains	 Capgras-relevant	 non-perceptual	
beliefs,	 a	 gap	 persists.	 Dave	 also	 claims	 to	 see	 animals	 that	 others	 do	 not	 see,	 such	 as	 a	
giraffe	in	their	garden.	Aware	of	these	claims	to	believe	things	he	oughtn’t,	Jane	attempts	to	
minimise	the	mistakes.	She	recasts	his	misidentifying	her	as	a	recently	deceased	brother	an	
effect	 of	 grief	 and	 the	 giraffe	 a	misperceived	 tree.	 But	 there	 is	 a	 tension	here.	 She	 either	
disavows	his	explicit	claims	in	order	to	preserve	overall	psychological	coherence,	or	accepts	




Instances	of	possible	 irrationality	can	be	 identified	 in	 the	 interview,	apparent	also	 to	 Jane:	
“Where	 he	 would	 get	 the	 logic	 of	 thinking	 what	 he	 is	 saying?”	 (236)	 Examples	 of	
inconsistency	 about	 the	 misidentification	 include	 Dave’s	 quotidian	 interactions	 with	 Jane	
whom	 he	 considers	 an	 imposter;	 acknowledging	 human	 proportions	 yet	 searching	 the	
laundry	 basket	 for	 intruders;	 stating	 both	 that	 he	 must	 be	 ill	 and	 completely	 well;	 and	
fearing	 imminent	 abandonment	 while	 saying	 she	 has	 already	 departed.	 	 Dave	 seems	 to	
tolerate	mutually	incompatible	actions	and	utterances	without	undue	concern.	To	maximise	
interpretability	 and	 coherence,	 Jane	 invokes	 unconscious	 mechanisms	 such	 as	 denial	 of	






In	 Making	 Sense	 of	 Ourselves8	Dennett	 considers	 full	 logical	 consistency	 an	 unnecessarily	
stringent	condition	on	rationality,	preferring	a	weaker	“minimal	rationality”	as	advocated	by	
Cherniak.9	But	how	minimal	 is	 this	minimal	 rationality?	Helpfully,	he	goes	on	 to	describe	a	
case	of	inconsistency	sufficient,	from	his	perspective,	to	undermine	rationality.	This	involves	
a	 customer	 receiving	 the	 wrong	 change	 despite	 a	 purveyor	 of	 lemonade	 having	 correctly	










by	 not	 settling	 on	 any	 one	 interpretation	 but	 rather	 entertaining	 an	 array	 of	 competing	
possibilities,	 none	 of	 which	 she	 finds	 to	 her	 satisfaction.	 This	 interpretative	 instability	
forestalls	 communication	 between	 them:	 “It	 can	 be	 really,	 really	 difficult	 and	 it	 is	 difficult	
because	 of	 not	 knowing	 how	 to	 answer	 his	 questions.”	 (240)	 Frank	 inconsistency	 that	 is	
objectively	obvious	while	the	subject	is	oblivious	is	difficult	to	tolerate	but	still	interpretation	
goes	on.	For	Dennett,	“We	make	these	hypotheses	simply	on	the	basis	of	our	abhorrence	of	





group	 of	women:	 “what	 used	 to	 protect	me	 is	 I	 know	 that’s	 not	 Jane,	 because	 she	 is	 too	
short,	I	know	that’s	not	Jane	because	her	hair	is	dark,	but	not	as	dark	as	Jane’s.	I	would	figure	
it	out	from	there	and	whittle	it	down	to	that	is	Jane	there.”	(218)	However,	he	acknowledged	








and	 psychological	 explanations	 are	 compatible	 and	 she	 successively	 proffers	 examples	 of	
each	 without	 settling	 on	 either	 style	 of	 explanation.	 Despite	 the	 interpretative	 and	
predictive	difficulties	 she	does	not	unequivocally	drop	 to	 the	design	or	physical	 stance,	 as	
Dennett	 recommends	 she	 should.	 She	 knows	 that	 he	 is	 ill	 yet	 continues	 to	 seek	 a	
psychologically	meaningful	explanation	for	his	misidentification	of	her.	Indeed,	he	does	too.	
While	 Dennett	 has	 stated	 that	 intentional	 stance	 interpretability	 is	 a	 foundation	 for	
personhood,	Jane	never	stops	treating	Dave	as	a	person	despite	her	noticing	his	instances	of	
irrationality.	Nevertheless,	he	perceives	a	 fall	 in	his	 status	during	 interactions	with	others:	
“that	to	me,	that	sort	of	thing	gives	you	the	feeling	of	not	being	all	there,	and	that	makes	you	






from	 the	 intentional	 stance.	Dennett’s	more	pessimistic	predictions	however	do	not	 seem	
borne	 out.	 Treating	 his	 statements	 as	 meaningless	 also	 overlooks	 the	 striking	 parallels	
between	his	 fear	of	 losing	 Jane	and	 the	history	of	 rejection	and	 fear	of	 losing	his	memory	
and	 vitality.	 Of	 course,	 these	 need	 not	 be	 relevant,	 but	 the	 intentional	 stance	 approach	






Davidson	 recognised	 his	 rationality	 constraints	 should	 not	 be	 overly	 restrictive.	 However,	







to	 ascribe	 Dave	 the	 belief,	 “My	wife	 has	 been	 replaced	 by	 an	 imposter.”	Marga	 Reimer15	
offers	 an	 alternative	 appraisal	 of	 Davidson’s	 radical	 interpretation.	 Like	 Maher	 and	 the	
phenomenologists,	 Reimer	 argues	 that	 Capgras’	 delusion	 is	 a	 rational	 response	 to	 an	




not	 unreasonable.	 Typically,	 imposters	 are	 not	 recognised	 as	 such	 by	 anyone	 except	 their	
nearest	 and	 dearest.	 By	 adopting	 this	 belief	 in	 preference	 to	 the	 one	 offered	 by	 the	
neurocognitively-orientated	 psychiatrist	 the	 sufferer	 is	 not	 being	 irrational	 because	
biological	explanations	may	sound	as	alienating	and	far-fetched	as	belief	in	imposters;	unless	
one	 is	 already	 a	 cognitive	 neuropsychiatrist!	 Reimer	 seeks	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	
delusional	 belief	 is	 consistent	with	other	beliefs;	 congruent	with	 the	 (strange)	 experience;	
and	 coheres	 with	 the	 sufferer’s	 actions,	 emotions	 and	 attitudes.	 Here	 therefore	 are	 two	
contradictory	readings	of	Davidson’s	philosophy	as	applied	to	the	Capgras	delusion.	As	the	























just	don’t	 know	 it	was	a	 terrible,	 terrible,	 terrible	 experience,	 I	mean	 really	bad	because	 it	




imposter,	 therefore	 reasonable	 to	 doubt	 its	 plausibility.	 Furthermore,	 Dave’s	 previous	
experience	of	 rejection	 coheres	with	 the	delusional	 content	 if	we	 grant	 him	awareness	of	
diminished	vitality,	 the	very	 reason	he	gives	 for	his	 first	wife’s	 cuckoldry,	 “well	 there	must	




this,	 it	 is	 true	 he	 resides	 with	 an	 alleged	 imposter,	 although	 not	 peaceably	 but	 every	
implication	 of	 a	 belief	 need	 not	 be	 acted	 upon,	 and	 to	 defend	 the	 belief	 he	 flouts	 the	
Occidental	system	of	belief	with	his	appeal	to	sorcery:	“you	[Jane]	are	a	witch,	yous	(sic)	are	
all	 witches	 and	 that	 is	 how	 you	 tell	 each	 other…”	 (236)	 Davidson	 allows	 for	 a	 degree	 of	
inconsistency	 so	 long	 as	 it	 does	 not	 persist	 when	 brought	 to	 the	 subject’s	 attention.	
Inconsistency	 is	 permitted	 because	 there	 is	 some	 partitioning	 of	 the	 mind;	 inconsistent	














gone,	she	 isn’t	gonna	stick	around	for	 this.’”	 (233)	The	cause	need	not	be	psychological	so	
the	 irrationality,	 to	 the	 extent	 it	 is	 present,	 could	 be	 accounted	 by	 an	 extra-mental	 event	
such	as	biological	disorder:	“I	started	to	think	‘have	you	had	a	bleed,	a	bleed	on	the	brain	or	
something?’”	 (232)	 Either	 option	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 account	 for	 some	 irrationality	while	














you	and	 you	won’t	 answer	 the	question’.”	 (234)	 This	 lack	of	 correspondence	pointed	 Jane	
towards	suspecting	he	was	unwell:	“saying	I	was	a	liar,	why	was	I	saying	that?	And	I	didn’t	
know	whether	maybe	 he	 could	 have	 had	 a	 urine	 infection	 or	 something.”	 (230)	 From	 the	
perspective	 of	 radical	 interpretation,	 problems	 with	 correspondence	 may	 not	 undermine	
meaning	to	the	same	extent	as	coherence,	but	they	look	to	be	readily	apparent	to	carers	and	




how	he	came	by	his	beliefs,	 she	never	questions	 their	 status	as	 such.	 Indeed,	even	where	






His	 behaviour,	 his	 distress,	 his	 statements,	 his	 puzzlement	 only	 makes	 sense	 when	 it	 is	
granted	he	does	 indeed	believe	his	wife	has	been	replaced.	Coherence	 is	better	preserved	


















































I	 should	 not	 understand	 where	 a	 doubt	 could	 get	 a	 foothold	 nor	 where	 a	 further	 test	 was	
possible.	§35624	
	
One	 might	 simply	 say	 “O,	 rubbish!”	 to	 someone	 who	 wanted	 to	 make	 objections	 to	 the	
propositions	that	are	beyond	doubt.	That	is,	not	reply	to	him	but	admonish	him.	§49525	
	
So,	 from	 the	Wittgensteinian	perspective,	 the	Capgras	delusion	 should	be	unintelligible	 to	






“Do	I	know	or	do	I	only	believe	.	 .	 .	?”	might	also	be	expressed	like	this:	What	if	 it	seemed	to	
turn	out	that	what	until	now	has	seemed	immune	to	doubt	was	a	false	assumption?	Would	I	
react	as	I	do	when	a	belief	has	proved	to	be	false?	or	would	it	seem	to	knock	from	under	my	






one	open	to	doubt.	Or,	alternatively,	 the	spouse’s	 identity	moves	 from	beyond	doubt	 to	a	
certainty	 with	 regards	 his	 or	 her	 non-identity.	Wittgenstein	 did	 not	 intend	 to	 predict	 the	
outcome	 of	 such	 a	 change	 in	 hinge	 beliefs,	 however	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 he	 considered	 it	
























Different	 language-games	 are	 thus	 opposed,	 the	 patient	 versus	 the	 carer	 and	 clinician	
(although	 the	 patient-carer	 and	 patient-clinician	 are	 involved	 in	 their	 own	 differing	
language-games.)	
	







stop	 judging	 altogether.	 He	 may	 be	 “plunge[d]	 into	 chaos.”	 Alternatively,	 he	 may	 play	 a	





disappear	 and	 another	 girl	 would	 come	 along.”	 (217)	 Dave’s	 doubt	 about	 Jane’s	 identity	
does	not	neatly	 involve	 just	one	 type	of	Mayol-Sharrock’s	hinge	belief.34	Rather,	universal,	
local,	 personal,	 and	 linguistic	 hinges	 are	 all	 implicated.	 It	 is	 universally	 held	 that	 identity	
persists	 over	 time,	 as	 Wittgenstein	 illustrated	 in	 his	 talk	 of	 spontaneously	 materialising	
mountains;	Western	educated	people	generally	discount	a	role	for	witches	in	their	daily	lives	
(which	Dave	does	not);	both	Dave’s	autobiographical	and	perceptual	experience	of	Jane	are	
fundamentally	 altered	 (“then	when	 Jane	 came	back	 it	was	 just	 something	 that	wasn’t	 the	
same”	 (217));	and,	 it	could	be	argued,	his	facility	with	the	words	“wife”	and	“disappear”	 is	












When	 directly	 questioned	 about	 the	 use	 of	 language,	 neither	 Dave	 nor	 Jane	 reports	 any	
problems	 with	 comprehension	 of	 words	 and	 phrases.	 Indeed,	 Jane	 praises	 Dave’s	 facility	





is	saying.”	 (236)	 Jane	discusses	her	 inability	 to	reason	with	Dave.	Sometimes	she	attempts	




be	no	mere	mistake,	as	 that,	 for	her,	 is	 ruled	out	here.	They	cannot	agree	on	what	 is	 true	
and	what	 is	 false	 and	 even	 disagree	 on	what	 counts	 as	 evidence	 in	 the	matter.	 So,	 does	
Dave’s	refusal	to	engage	in	justification	represent	a	different	form	of	life	incommensurable	
with	 Jane’s?	 Despite	 appearances,	 it	 seems	 not.	 Recall	 that:	 “In	 the	 beginning	 was	 the	
deed.”36	Yet	 shared	 practice	 does	 not	 break	 down	 quite	 as	 fundamentally	 as	 one	 might	
suppose	 from	the	discussion	above.	 Jane	continues	 to	provide	 love,	 care,	and	cups	of	 tea,	
which	 Dave	 appears,	 by-and-large,	 to	 accept.	 Furthermore,	 the	 vast	 bulk	 of	 their	
conversation	 proceeds	 without	 event	 indicating	 that	 the	 difficulties	 arise	 against	 a	













Wittgenstein	 considered	 the	 first-person	 perspective:	 either	 all	 judgment	 would	 be	
undermined	 or	 an	 entirely	 different	 language-game	 would	 be	 played	 and	 certainty	
sustained.	 What	 actually	 happens	 for	 Dave	 is	 however	 not	 quite	 what	 the	 dichotomy	
predicts.	On	 the	one	hand,	 as	we	have	 seen	above,	 there	 is	 no	 convincing	evidence	of	 an	
incommensurable	 gap	 between	 Dave’s	 language	 and	 his	 community.	 Dialogue	 has	 been	
hindered:	“I	never	tried	to	get	any	knowledge	from	one	of	them,	the	other	one	would	stand	
beside	her	and	they	would	look	at	each	another	and	sort	of	um,	yeah	yeah	yeah,	blah-blah	
and	 leave	 me	 there,	 and	 it	 would	 make	 me	 feel	 sort	 of	 not	 quite	 there.”	 (219)	 Dave	 is	
searching	 for	 certainties	 rather	 than	 acting	 upon	 idiosyncratic	 ones:	 “That	 is	what	 you	 do	
and	plus	 you	carry	on	with	anything	else	you	can	get	 your	hands	on.”	 (227).	While	on	 the	
other,	 the	experience	 is	clearly	 troubling	 for	him	–	“a	terrible,	 terrible,	 terrible	experience”	
(219)	–	and	 it	 leads	him	to	suspect	his	sanity,	 for	 if	he	 is	wrong	about	 this	 then	he	can	no	
longer	trust	his	judgement:	“well	it	means	that	I	had	it	then,	doesn’t	it,	 it	must	mean	that	I	










something	 unfathomable	 and	 unreachable	 about	 the	 experience	 and	 the	 words	 used	 to	
describe	the	beliefs.	And	yet	despite	this,	not	all	communication	is	plunged	into	chaos.	Life	
continues,	 tea	 is	 brewed,	 and	 appointments	 are	 kept.	 That	 they	 can	 carry	 on	 despite	 the	







It	 is	 natural	 to	 consider	 whether	 hallucination	 would	 be	 understandable	 within	 radical	
interpretation	given	the	principle	of	correspondence.	This	principle	states	that	an	interpreter	
must	grant	most	of	the	speaker’s	beliefs	about	the	environment	to	be	true	and	“the	speaker	





has	 experienced	 an	 illusion,	 or	 that	 he	 meant	 to	 say	 “cap”	 but	 misspoke.	 These	 re-
descriptions	 are	 charitable	 because	 they	 are	 rationality	 preserving.	 However,	 neither	 is	
available	when	discussing	hallucinations	as	i)	there	is	no	object	to	stimulate	an	illusion	and	ii)	
further	questioning	would	reveal	that	he	did	 indeed	say	“cat.”	Nevertheless,	Davidson	tells	
us	 that	 false	 perceptual	 beliefs	 are	 not	 devastating	 to	 radical	 interpretation	 as	 “small	
perturbations	 against	 a	 background	 with	 which	 we	 are	 largely	 in	 sympathy”40 	can	 be	
accommodated	while	 logical	 inconsistency	cannot.	 If	someone	were	to	 live	 in	a	permanent	
state	 of	 extended	 scenic	 hallucinations,	 could	 we	 interpret	 her?	 Davidsonian	 radical	
interpretation	 would	 seem	 to	 suggest	 not,	 although	 the	 focus	 on	 vision	 in	 Davidson’s	
writings	 underplays	 the	 shared	 tactile	 and	 auditory	 components	 of	 perception.	 We	
understand	 the	 blind	 and	 even	 the	 insensate	 once	 these	 deficits	 are	 taken	 into	 account.	













oversized	 cat	 she	 could	 see	 from	her	 hospital	window	 she	 acknowledged,	 “It	was	 so	 big	 I	
couldn’t	believe	it,	but	my	family	couldn’t	see	it”	(258)	But	this	awareness	does	not	lead	her	
to	question	her	own	experiences:	“When	my	daughter	said	there	was	nobody	in	that	house	I	
said,	 ‘Yes	 there	 is!’….	 No,	 I	 still	 didn’t	 believe	 my	 kids.”	 (259)	 As	 Liz	 and	 her	 family	 are	
responding	 to	 many	 of	 the	 same	 features	 of	 the	 world	 there	 are,	 perhaps,	 sufficient	




claims	 and	 she,	 in	 turn,	 distrusts	 her	 family’s.	 Communication	 on	 the	 matter	 has	 been	
terminated.	“So	that	is	why	I	don’t	talk	about	it	to	outsiders.	It’s	alright	you’re	a	doctor.	I	am	
talking	to	you,	but	I	couldn’t	go	home	and	tell	‘em	or	sit	around	the	table	and	say	something,	
I	 couldn’t	 tell	 ‘em.”	 (262)	So	 it	would	appear	 that	we	can	ascribe	 content	and	meaning	 to	




Liz	 displays	 numerous	 inconsistencies,	 often	 juxtaposed:	 “I	 live	 on	 my	 own	 and	 it	 is	 very	
scary...	when	you	know	that	you	have	to	watch	everything	in	your	home...	not	really	scared,	
because	 they	 are	 my	 animals	 I	 have	 had	 them	 so	 long…	 but	 it	 is	 just	 the	 noise	 and	 the	
laughter	 what	 frighten	 me…	 well	 why	 should	 it	 be	 scary?	 I	 know	 it	 is	 only	 animals….	 it	
frightens	me…”	(248)	During	the	course	of	the	 interview	Liz	says	both	that	the	perceptions	
are	 “real”	 and	 a	 consequence	 of	 brain	 damage;	 she	 claims	 the	 dolls	 move	 despite	
acknowledging	its	 impossibility;	she	is	simultaneously	frightened	and	unperturbed;	and	she	
wants	 the	 dolls	 removed	 and	 a	 tablet	 to	 cure	 her.	 Davidson	 found	 such	 “synchronic	
inconsistency”	irrational	for	it:	
	







Liz	 is	 inconsistent,	 yet	we	 can	 still	 understand	what	 she	 says,	 attribute	 content	 to	 it,	 and	
even,	to	some	degree,	appreciate	 its	cause.	She	 is	confused	by	what	 is	happening	–	“and	 I	
know,	 I	 know	 it	 can’t	be	 true,	animals	don’t	 talk	 to	you	unless	 they	are	 real,	but	mine	do”	
(246)	 –	 while	 her	 inconsistency	 follows	 a	 coherent	 pattern.	 Either	 the	 dolls	 are	 animate,	
which	frightens	her	and	causes	her	to	run,	or	she	is	hallucinating	because	there	is	a	problem	




not	 apply	 the	 principle	 of	 conservation:	 change	 as	 few	 beliefs	 as	 possible	 in	 light	 of	 new	
experiences.	This	despite	having	been	given	a	reasonable	and	conservative	explanation	for	
the	phenomena,	which	she	partially	accepts.	“I	died	and	they	brought	me	back	but	it	has	left	
this	part	of	 the	brain	no	good,	not	working.	That	 is	 the	 cause.”	 (246)	 “They	 just	 said	 ‘your	
brain	is	dead,	on	the	left	side.’	That	is	all	I	have	been	told…	but	it	is	not	the	full	explanation.”	
(253)	 Lack	 of	 coherence	 is	 an	 irredeemable	 failing	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 radical	 interpretation;	
however,	Liz’s	flagrant	inconsistencies	do	not	seem	to	undermine	our	interpretations	of	her.	





some	 core	 Freudian	 concepts	 –	 the	 partitioning	 of	 the	 mind,	 a	 structure	 in	 each	 quasi-














Dennett,	 possibly	 in	 homage	 to	 Descartes,	 begins	 Consciousness	 Explained	 contemplating	
the	implications	of	hallucination.43	He	doubts	complex	and	vivid	hallucinations	are	possible;	








input	 and	 top-down	 hypothesis	 testing.	 Hallucinations	 are	 a	 consequence	 of	 normal	
hypothesis	testing	receiving	inappropriate	confirmation.	Thus,	sensa	incorrectly	validate	the	





and	 this	 model	 of	 hallucination	 provides	 for	 that	 feature	 without	 the	 intervention	 of	 an	
implausibly	 knowledgeable	 internal	 storyteller	 who	 has	 a	 theory	 or	 model	 of	 the	 victim’s	
psychology.46	
	
Hence,	 Dennett	 is	 able	 to	 meaningfully	 link	 content	 and	 individual	 psychology	 without	
recourse	to	Freudian	dynamics.	This	discussion	of	hallucinations	is	not	a	fully	formed	theory	
but,	as	for	Descartes,	the	first	move	in	an	account	of	consciousness.	Nevertheless,	it	is	clear	







about	 its	 environment.	Where	 false-beliefs	 occur	 a	 special	 story	 explaining	 their	 origin	 is	
required,	 and	 Dennett	 gives	 hallucination	 and	 illusion	 as	 examples.	 So	 hallucinations	
produce	a	false-belief	but	they	are	“grown	in	a	culture	medium	of	true	beliefs.”48	Thus,	it	is	
perfectly	 acceptable	 to	 attribute	 a	 false-belief	 that	 cites	 hallucination	 as	 its	 cause.	When	
such	special	stories	extending	the	intentional	stance	beyond	its	belief/desire/action	base	are	





The	 immediate	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 is	 no;	 Liz	 clearly	 holds	 some	 rather	 particular	






and	most	 of	what	 she	 ought	 to	 believe	 she	 does,	 i.e.	 she	 is	 in	 London,	 in	 her	 house,	 and	
these	are	dolls	and	flowers.	There	is	a	plentiful	“culture	medium”	of	true	beliefs.	So	while	Liz	
does	 not	 believe	 everything	 she	 ought,	 this	 cannot	 here	 undermine	 the	 interpretation	 of	
statements	 related	 to	 the	 hallucinations.	 As,	 however,	 the	 presence	 of	 hallucinations	 is	
unpredictable	 from	 the	 intentional	 stance,	 Dennett	 drops	 to	 a	 physical/design	 level	
neuropsychological	model	to	explain	their	origin.	Liz	is	aware	that	aspects	of	her	false-beliefs	




Liz	 appears	 to	 act	 by-and-large	 in	 conformity	with	 the	hallucinations:	 “so	now	 I	 go	 to	 bed	
with	earplugs	in	and	all	the	dolls	and	that	I	put	in	a	black	bag	and	tie	the	black	bags,	but	I	lay	
there	and	listen,	I	listen	and	I	take	my	ear	plug	out	and	I	can	hear	them	and	I	put	them	back	




unusually	 passive.	 Liz	 also	 reasons	 that	 the	 hallucinated	 experiences	 must	 be	 real	 as	 a	
consequence	of	the	objects’	perceived	agency.	They	materialise	when	she	is	on	the	verge	of	
sleep	and	vanish	on	request,	“because	it	 is	so	funny	how	they	can	get	in	and	when	you	tell	
them	 to	 go,	 they	 go.”‡ 	(250)	 Extrapolating	 from	 her	 cultural	 background	 and	 personal	
history,	dancing	flowers	and	animate	dolls	should	be	implausible,	and	they	strike	Liz	as	such	




(246)	 Liz	 does	 not	 resolve	 this	 contradiction	 but	 she	 acknowledges	 it.	 Indeed,	 she	 draws	



































have	 lost	her	brain	a	bit,	but	 they	 still	 carry	on.	 	Why	can’t	 I	 still	 carry	on?”	 (254)	Physical	
level	explanations	are	alienating	in	self-interpretation	because	the	assumption	of	rationality	
cannot	 coherently	 be	 withdrawn	 from	 oneself.	 Declaring	 oneself	 fundamentally	 irrational	
from	 the	 intentional	 stance	 raises	 complexities	 similar	 to	 the	 liar’s	 paradox:	 if	 true	 then,	
despite	 appearances,	 it	 is	 meaningless;	 if	 false	 it	 is	 self-contradictory.	 Liz	 is	 bound	 to	
intentional	 stance	 level	 explanations	 of	 herself	 so	 must	 reject	 accounts	 that	 impugn	 her	
rationality.	While	personhood	is	not	withdrawn	wholesale	friends	and	family	evidently	mock	
Liz,	from	her	description	of	their	interactions.	She	has	withdrawn	and	compares	herself	with	
mentally	 ill	 people	 she	 has	 met.	 Although	 the	 comparison	 seeks	 to	 highlight	 differences	
between	 her	 and	 those	 who	 are	 “off	 [their]	 rocket…	 mental”	 (264),	 still,	 it	 is	 not	 a	
comparison	she	would	have	entertained	previously.		
	
The	 intentional	 stance	 signals	 that	 hallucinations	 are	 pathological	 while	 allowing	 the	
resulting	false-beliefs	to	be	readily	communicable.	It	even	points	to	the	hallucinated	content	
being	psychologically	significant	without	clarifying	how	these	concerns	might	be	symbolised	











symbolic,	one	cannot	but	 interpret.	Wittgenstein	however	 suspected	 there	could	be	many	
other	 psychological	 reasons	 for	 that	 particular	 content	 having	 arisen,	 or	 none.	 So	 the	
hallucination	may	symbolise	anything,	or	nothing.		
	
Suppose	 a	 starving	man	has	 a	hallucination	of	 food.	 Freud	wants	 to	 say	 the	hallucination	of	
anything	requires	tremendous	energy:	it	is	not	something	that	could	normally	happen,	but	the	




Freud	would	ask:	 “What	made	you	hallucinate	 that	 situation	at	 all?”	One	might	answer	 that	
there	need	not	have	been	anything	that	made	me	hallucinate	it.51	
	
The	allure	of	 Freudian	analysis,	 he	explained,	 is	 twofold:	 i)	 dreams	and	hallucinations	give	
the	(false)	impression	of	being	a	symbolic	language,	and	ii)	the	subject	accedes	to	the	wish-
fulfilment	 interpretation	 to	 prove	 an	 initial	 prejudice	 in	 thinking	has	 been	overcome.	 	 But	







an	 interpretation	 that	does	damage	 to	 the	original	experience.	Such	an	experience	would,	
for	Wittgenstein,	be	quite	devastating.		
	














the	Wittgensteinian	perspective	 then	one	can	anticipate	 that	 the	hallucinated	content	will	
cry	out	for	interpretation	by	the	sufferer.	Simultaneously,	the	hallucinating	person	will	doubt	
what	was	once	certain	to	the	detriment	of	language-games:	“One	is	not	playing	the	game,	or	



















50)	Whilst	 in	 certain	 respects	 the	hallucinations	 can	be	 taken	as	 contravening	hinges	 they	








The	 interview	with	 Liz	 does	 not	 reveal	 any	 systematic	 problems	 in	 her	 use	 of	 words	 and	
language.	 We,	 and	 one	 presumes	 her	 family,	 can	 understand	 exactly	 what	 she	 says:	 we	
understand	her	 claims.	The	only	potential	problem	 is	her	description	of	what	 can	be	 seen	
from	 the	 hospital	 room.	 “I	 remember	 this	 house,	 it	 had	 a	 black	 street	 door	 and	 as	 you	
opened	this	street	door	you	must	have	been	 in	the	 living	room,	 it	was	all	 red	furniture	and	
she	had	a	black	and	white	cat.	It	was	so	big	I	couldn’t	believe	it.	But	my	family	couldn’t	see	






One	 cannot	 see	 in	 the	 dark	 or	 round	 corners.	 This	 partly	 forms	 the	 concept	 of	 sight	 and	
seeing.		
	
A	 more	 pertinent	 issue	 for	 her	 and	 her	 family,	 however,	 is	 the	 failure	 of	 agreement	
concerning	 perceptual	 judgments.	 This	 is	 rather	 analogous	 to	 Davidson’s	 principle	 of	
correspondence,	 though	 goes	 beyond	 it.	 For	 Davidson	 it	 is	 the	 truth	 of	 perceptual	 beliefs	
that	 is	at	stake	whereas	 for	Wittgenstein	agreement	 in	 judgment	concerns	what	counts	as	
evidence.	The	failure	to	find	agreement	 looks	to	have	destabilised	familial	 trust,	“and	then	
they	 will	 say	 ‘you	 are	 going	 loopy,’	 that	 is	 what	 they	 will	 turn	 around	 and	 say,	 so	 I	 say,	
‘alright,	 forget	 it.’”	 (264)	 Some	 quality	 of	 these	 apparitions	 is	 so	 compelling	 that	 it	
undermines	the	maternal	bond	and	overrules	established	facts.	She	is	now	able	to	confide	in	
only	 one	 friend	who	 had	 a	 similar	 experience	 of	 hallucination	 following	 bereavement.	 Liz	
asserts	 that	 her	 ability	 to	 describe	 the	 figures	 in	 detail	 and	 their	 displays	 of	 agency	 as	





















Liz,	 although	 obviously	 isolated,	 does	 not	 collapse	 into	 doubting	 all	 judgment,	 as	
Wittgenstein	 had	 seemed	 to	 suggest.	 She	 does	 though	 cast	 about	 for	 explanations	 and	
interpretations	 for	 the	 hallucinated	 content:	 “I	 don’t	 know,	 I	 have	 been	 asking	 myself	
“Why?”	 […]	 I	don’t	know,	 it	 is	hard	to	think,	what	 is	 the	 laughter,	why	are	they	 laughing,	 I	
don’t	know.	I	wish	someone	would	tell	me.”	(249)	The	angel-like	apparitions	are	provisionally	
interpreted	as	symbolic	of	her	death:	“I	don’t	know;	perhaps	it	 is	time	for	me	to	go,	I	don’t	
know.”	 (250)	The	 spiritual	 interpretation	by	a	 friend	who	has	had	 similar	experiences	only	
compounds	her	bewilderment,	“So	I	said,	‘That	was	nice,’	but	she	said,	‘It	wasn’t	my	mum,’	
so	I	said,	‘Who	was	it	then?’	She	said,	‘I	don’t	know,	it	didn’t	even	look	like	my	mum.’”	(256)	










The	 principle	 problem	 for	 Liz	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 agreement	 with	 others	 about	 the	 immediate	
environment	and	the	relevance	of	her	evidence.	This	causes	a	rupture	in	relationships	that	
has	 left	her	demoralised	and	angry,	 though	not	 so	doubting	of	everything	as	Wittgenstein	
intimated.	Where	the	stark	choice	is	between	viewing	herself	as	“mad”	or	others	as	lying,	Liz	
displays	a	bias	towards	the	 latter.	Wittgenstein	of	course	criticised	the	Freudian	orthodoxy	
of	 dream	 and	 hallucination	 interpretation.	 They	 may	 sometimes	 be	 wish-fulfilments,	 but	
there	may	be	other	psychological	reasons	for	the	content	and	indeed	for	the	hallucinations	
occurrence.	 This	 purely	 negative	 thesis	 cannot	 help	 us	 understand	why	 Liz	 sees	what	 she	
does.	The	seven-foot-tall	angel-like	apparition	 is	a	case	 in	point.	That	she	be	watched-over	
during	 illness	 and	 adversity,	 something	 she	 did	 not	 experience	 from	 her	 own	mother	 but	
likely	 wished	 for,	 is	 open	 to	 Freudian	 analysis.	 Because	 the	 interpretation	 fits	 –	 	 “Yes,	 of	
course,	 it	 must	 be	 like	 that”55	–	 does	 not	 mean	 it	 is	 correct,	 however.	 But	 the	 allure	 of	
interpretation	can	explain	Liz’s	incessant	quest	for	answers.	The	images	are	so	charged	with	
possibility	yet	obscure	that	there	can	be	no	decisive	interpretation.	Liz	also	seems	to	concur	
with	 Wittgenstein	 that	 physiological	 level	 explanations	 are	 irrelevant	 to	 interpretation	 –	




















Such	errors	 indicate	mental	disorder.	But	why	 is	a	mistake	ruled	out?	What	 is	 it	about	this	
error	that	signals	disorder?	
	
Can	we	 say:	 a	mistake	 doesn’t	 only	 have	 a	 cause,	 it	 also	 has	 a	 ground?	 i.e.,	 roughly:	 when	
someone	makes	a	mistake,	this	can	be	fitted	into	what	he	knows	aright.	§7457	
	
So	 a	mistake	 is	 consistent	with	 and	 supported	 by	 other	 beliefs	 held	 by	 that	 person	 but	 a	







given	 for	holding	 the	belief	are	either	 lacking	or	 inappropriate	by	an	observer’s	 standards.	
















If	 I	 say	 “I	 have	 never	 been	 to	Asia	Minor,”	where	 do	 I	 get	 this	 knowledge	 from?	 I	 have	 not	
worked	it	out,	no	one	told	me;	my	memory	tells	me.-	so	I	cant	be	wrong	about	this?	Is	there	a	
truth	 here	 which	 I	 know?-	 I	 cannot	 depart	 from	 this	 judgment	 without	 toppling	 all	 other	
judgments	with	it.	§41960	
	

































is	 impossible	 to	believe	he	 could	be	 the	 sole	 survivor	of	 a	 sinking	 ship.	While	 improbable,	
this	is	not	logically	impossible	so	does	not	contravene	a	universal	or	local	hinge	belief.	John’s	
actions	 suggest	 he	 does	 now	 doubt	what	would	 once	 have	 been	 certain,	 in	 keeping	with	
hinge	beliefs	being	dislodged	or	disrupted:	“Our	not	doubting	them	all	is	simply	our	manner	





know	 what	 he	 is	 saying…	 but	 the	 problem	 is	 that	 I	 am	 not	 allowed	 to,	 which	 I	 do	 when	
nobody	is	listening,	ask	him	things	about	where	he	has	been	and	all	these	things	he	is	talking	
about.”	 (305)	 His	 words	 are	 not	 hard	 to	 understand	 but	 Cath	 struggles	 to	 know	 why	 he	
makes	 these	 particular	 claims.	 “There	 is	 no	 sense	 in	 what	 he	 says	 in	 this	 last	 while	
whatsoever…	well	he	is	saying	silly	things,	like	he	has	been	to	the	park	today	and	his	kids	are	
small.”	(302-3)	Again,	the	problem	is	more	a	disregard	for	personal	autobiographical	hinges	
than	uninterpretable	speech.	For	 instance,	when	he	declares	his	 sister	 to	be	 the	building’s	
landlady	 she	 recognises	 this	 as	 a	misidentification	 rather	 than	 an	 idiosyncratic	 use	 of	 the	
word,	 “landlady”;	 although	 this	 paraphasic	 slip	 might	 unveil	 some	 aspect	 of	 their	











What	 is	 worse,	 his	 judgments	 about	 identity	 are	 inconsistently	 applied.	 Sometimes	 he	
recognises	correctly,	other	times	not.	There	is	thus	no	obvious	pattern,	further	undermining	
agreement.	 “He	doesn’t	know	me	sometimes	and	 I,	 I	am	so	close	 to	him,	 I	do	everything.”	
(295)	John	is	also	unable	to	reliably	distinguish	the	past	from	the	present.	“He	went	to	the	
park	with	his	kids,	with	his	small	kids	and	they	were	in	the	park,	this	he	just	said	this	to	me	on	











consequence	 that	 nothing	 can	 be	 relied	 upon.	 John	 is	 aware	 others	 disbelieve	 his	 stories,	





dishonesty,	“cos	 I	don’t	 tell	 lies,	 I	don’t	have	to,	other	people	can	tell	 them,	 I	go	away	and	
laugh	because	it	doesn’t	bother	me.”	(272)	But	beneath	such	denouncements	seems	to	lurk	
an	 apprehension	 that	 he	 is	 erring.	 And	 he	 appears	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 if	 he	 is	mistaken	
then	 a	 neurological	 impairment	 is	 implied:	 “But	 um	 I	 mean	 what	 can	 you	 do?	 Um,	 if	
somebody	 tells	you	something	you	 think	 it’s	 true,	or	vice	versa.	 I	mean,	 I	never	bothered,	 I	
was	always	kinda	truthful,	and	she	knows	that	my	sister,	so	the	whole	point	about	is,	I	don’t	
know	what	 is	wrong,	 I	don’t	 think	 that	 there	 is	much	more,	um,	 they	 took	a	 scan	of	 this.	 I	
haven’t	 heard	 the	 result.”	 (272)	 John	 is	 not	 in	 the	 catastrophic	 situation	 Wittgenstein	
predicted	because	he	fails	to	accept,	for	whatever	reason,	that	he	is	in	error.	Nevertheless,	







From	 the	Wittgensteinian	perspective,	 John	displays	disagreement	 in	 judgement.	His	 is	 no	
longer	in	accord	with	others	and	rejects	personal	hinges	that	previously	he	acted	upon	with	
sureness	and	certainty.	John’s	obliviousness	to	these	hinges	leads	Cath	to	doubt	his	sanity,	
just	 as	 Wittgenstein	 worried	 for	 Moore’s	 should	 he	 have	 renounced	 his	 propositions.65	
However,	John’s	hinge	beliefs	have	not	been	replaced	by	others	equally	certain.	Instead,	he	
makes	various	inconsistent	claims	that	provide	an	unreliable	foundation	for	action.	John	is	a	






Davidson	 never	 discussed	 confabulations	 directly,	 however,	 William	 Hirstein	 has	 utilised	
Davidson’s	 work	 on	 self-deception	 to	 draw	 analogies	 between	 the	 two	 phenomena. 66	
Davidson	was	interested	in	self-deception	for	the	principle	of	coherence	implies	a	degree	of	
consistency	not	always	evident	in	people’s	actions	and	beliefs.	Self-deception,	for	example,	
presents	 a	 paradox.67	The	 self-deceiver	 seems	 to	 believe	 both	 that	 p	 and	 its	 negation.	












Confabulation	 is	 analogous	 to	 some	 types	 of	 self-deception	 but	 monitoring	 mechanisms	
malfunction	 in	 the	 former,	while	 the	 latter	 involves	motivated	 avoidance	 of	 disconfirming	
evidence.	Hirstein	then	claims	that	some	forms	of	self-deception,	those	in	which	there	is	no	
tension	between	p	 and	not-p,	 are	 in	 fact	 identical	with	 confabulation.	 Furthermore,	 these	
states	are	necessary	 for	humans’	 survival	 in	a	 threatening	world.	We	are	all	 confabulating	
self-deceivers.	
	




her	discussion	of	 the	epistemic	benefits	of	 confabulating.	She	 remarks	 that	 confabulations	
“exhibit	 an	exaggerated	 self-serving	bias	but	 the	majority	of	people	 reconstruct	memories	
that	 are	 consistent	 with	 their	 desired	 self-image.”70	So	 confabulatory	 content	maintains	 a	
coherent	view	of	self	in	the	face	of	neurological	adversity	by	a	process	similar	to	one	used	by	









Discovering	 confabulation	 and	 self-deception	 to	 be	 similar	 enables	 Hirstein,	 from	 a	
Davidsonian	 perspective,	 to	 view	 confabulations	 as	 meaningful,	 just	 as	 the	 apparent	
irrationality	of	self-deception	is	tolerated	despite	sub-optimal	adherence	to	the	principle	of	










Davidson	 averred	 that	 the	 basic	 rules	 of	 logic,	 such	 as	 the	 law	 of	 non-contradiction,	 be	
adhered	 to	 by	 all	 thinking	 creatures.	 The	 paradox	 of	 self-deception	 can	 only	 be	 tolerated	
when	the	deceiver	does	not	believe	simultaneously	both	that	p	and	not-p.	John	does	display	
closely	 adjoined	 inconsistency.	 For	 example,	 he	 contradicts	 himself	 regarding	 Cath’s	
opinions:	“My	sister	doesn’t	think	I’m	sick…	She	says,	‘Maybe	there	is	something	wrong	with	
you.’”	 (269)	 And	 then,	 “My	 sister	 says,	 ‘There	 is	 not	 a	 thing	wrong	with	 you.’”	 (270)	 One	
detects	 anxiety	 in	 John’s	 vacillations	 and	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 provide	 a	Davidsonian	picture	 in	
which	John’s	fear	of	illness	(p)	is	the	cause	for	his	claims	to	rude	health	(not-p).	When	John	
was	asked	whether	others	always	believe	him	he	seemed	able	to	recognise	the	unlikeliness	
of	 his	 stories:	 “sometimes	 I	 find	 it	 bloody	 funny	 [laughs]	myself,	 you	 know,	 things	 happen	
that	 you	wouldn’t	 think	would	happen	and	people	won’t,	 people	won’t	believe	 you.”	 (284)	
This	comment	suggests	that	John	can	and	does	consider	the	plausibility	of	his	confabulated	






things:	 “Now	 I	 don’t	 understand	 why	 he	 is	 saying	 things.”	 (296)	 However,	 revoking	
rationality	 is	 not	 an	 option	 for	 Cath:	 “No,	 no,	 I	 go	 down	 and	 sit	 with	 him	 to	 keep	 him	
company	 and	 things,	 no	 I	 never,	 I	 never	 give	 up,	 no	 I	 just	 let	 him	 say	 them,	 they	 are	
interesting	 sometimes	 [laughs].”	 (307)	 For	 her	 part,	 Cath	 seeks	 to	 optimise	 coherence	 in	
John’s	 assertions:	 “I	 can’t	 say	 that	 things	 haven’t	 happened	 to	 him	 in	 his	 life,	 that	 he	 got	
locked	in	a	room	in	the	West	End	when	he	was	working	or	something,	or	maybe	not	 in	the	
West,	maybe	 not	 even	working,	 but	 he	 did	work	 in…	 he	was	 a	 security	 guard.”	 (293)	 She	
discerns	 a	 redemptive	 quality	 in	 his	 stories,	 which	 she	 enjoys	 listening	 to:	 “when	 he	 was	









Davidson	 thought	 false-beliefs	 were	 less	 problematic	 for	 an	 interpreter	 than	 logical	
inconsistency.	 When	 confronted	 by	 a	 speaker	 with	 false-beliefs	 about	 the	 immediate	
environment	 there	 is	 the	 possibility	 to	 revise	 word	 meaning	 to	 “preserve	 a	 reasonable	
theory	of	belief.”72	This	however	does	not	hold	 in	 John’s	case.	His	many	 false-belief	claims	
are	 taken	 as	 genuine	 rather	 than	 his	meaning	 being	 reinterpreted.	 For	 example,	when	he	
cannot	 recognise	 his	 adult	 children,	 Cath	 considers	 it	 indicative	 of	 illness:	 “He	 didn’t	 even	
know	her,	 he	 didn’t	 know	his	 own	 daughter.”	 (299)	 Likewise,	 his	 assertions	 that	 the	ward	
HCA	is	a	farmer	does	not	cause	one	to	wonder	whether	this	is	his	preferred	term	for	an	HCA.	
Rather,	 we	 immediately	 attribute	 to	 him	 the	 false-belief	 he	met	 a	 farmer.	Where	 radical	
interpretation	falters,	explanations	proliferate	and	then	finally	cease.	Cath	clearly	generates	
a	number	of	 related	and	overlapping	 interpretations	and	explanations	 for	 John,	as	her	 IPA	
interview	 illustrates.	 There	 is	 mounting	 uncertainty	 but	 she	 never	 gives	 up	 talking	 and	
attempting	 to	understand,	 “cos	 I	want	 to	know,	 to	get	him,	 trying	 to	get	him	back.”	 (303)	
Cath	 continues	 to	 respect	 John’s	 personhood	 but	 calls	 into	 question	 his	 autonomy	 and	
independence	due	to	the	illness.	
	
From	 the	 perspective	 of	 radical	 interpretation	 confabulations	 violate	 the	 principles	 of	
coherence	 and	 correspondence.	 These	 violations	 do	 not	 necessarily	 render	 John	
uninterpretable,	however,	because	a	degree	of	self-deception	is	compatible	with	rationality	
and	 false-beliefs	 can	 be	 tolerated	 so	 long	 as	 they	 occur	 within	 a	 background	 of	 mostly	
shared	 beliefs.	 Cath	 seems	 better	 able	 to	 adjust	 for	 the	 sub-optimal	 coherence	 than	
correspondence,	which	is	against	what	Davidson	expected.	And	the	incoherence	can	be,	at	











has	 no	 privileged	 access	 to	 her	 own	motivations	 or	 beliefs	 so,	 according	 to	 Dennett,	 will	
produce	 “approximating	 confabulations”	 to	 account	 for	 her	 acts.	 Thus,	 confabulation	 is	
actually	 describes	 all	 our	 claims	 to	 self-knowledge.	 In	 Dennett’s	 famous	 multiple-drafts	
vision	of	consciousness	a	multitude	of	mini-selves	constantly	produce	competing	narratives,	
only	one	of	which	enters	 conscious	awareness.	 The	narrative	 is	not	 selected	or	 composed	
consciously,	nor	does	it	arise	from	an	illusory	single	cohesive	self;	yet	it	sustains	that	illusion.	
	
The	 agent	 comes	 to	 label	 its	 tendencies	 as	 if	 they	 were	 governed	 by	 explicitly	 represented	
goals	–	blueprints	 for	actions	–	 instead	of	trends	of	action	that	emerge	from	the	 interplay	of	
the	various	candidates…	Their	effect	on	any	audience	is	to	encourage	them	to	(try	to)	posit	a	
unified	 agent	 whose	 words	 they	 are,	 about	 whom	 they	 are:	 in	 short,	 to	 posit	 a	 centre	 of	
narrative	gravity.73	
	
“Pathological	 confabulation	 is	 unwitting	 fiction	 of	 an	 entirely	 different	 order,”74	however.	
Described	 as	 “verbiage”	 that	 “sounds	 virtually	 normal…	 so	 natural	 and	 ‘sincere’	 are	 the	
reminiscences	and	the	ready	answers	to	questions,”	pathological	confabulation	exposes	this	
inherent	 propensity	 for	 self-narration.	 The	 confabulations	 are	 entirely	 interpretable;	 the	
person	who	utters	them	certainly	means	what	he	says	and	they	may	be	rather	revealing	of	
his	personality	and	concerns.	But	for	Dennett	pathological	confabulations	are	epistemically	
dubious	 as	 they	 are	 neither	 justified	 nor	 true.	 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 conclude	 whether	
confabulations	are	meaningful	or	not	from	the	intentional	stance.	On	the	one	hand,	they	are	
psychologically	 revealing,	 but	 epistemically	 irrational	 on	 the	other.	Given	 that	 for	Dennett	















Titanic	 it	 is	 in	his	mind,	you	know	him	thinking	 it’s	 the	Titanic	 […]	 I	 can’t	 say	 that	 it	hasn’t	
happened,	because	I	haven’t	been	in	England	as	long	as	him	you	know.”	(293)	Nevertheless,	
she	 denies	 that	 his	 claim	 someone	 was	 shot	 to	 death	 on	 the	 ward	 can	 be	 so	 explained,	
musing:	 “Now	where	did	he	get	 that	 from	 in	 the	hospital?”	 (307)	Cath	attempts	 to	 reduce	






that	 is	not	true	[laughs]”	(297)	“[W]ell	 I	 thought	 it	 is	not	true,	you	can’t	think	that	 is	true.”	
(300)	 John	 is	 not	 wrong	 about	 everything	 he	 ought	 to	 believe	 but	 if	 one	 produced	 a	
catalogue	 of	 the	 beliefs	 he	 should	 hold	 given	 his	 “perceptual	 capacities,	 epistemic	 needs,	
and	 biography,”75	it	 would	 tally	 poorly	 with	 his	 explicit	 statements.	 John’s	 desires	 do,	
however,	 seem	 to	 accord	 with	 what	 he	 ought	 to	 want.	 “I	 don’t	 want	 to	 stay	 there	
[unidentified	lodgings]	long,	I	want	to	go	to	my	sisters.”	“I	don’t	know	what	the	situation	is	
but	he	 [HCA],	he,	me	and	him	had	an	argument	out	at	 the	house	and	 I	 said,	 ‘I	want	 to	go	
home.’”	 (274)	He	wants	 to	be	well,	 at	 home	with	his	 family,	 honest	 and	 trustworthy.	 This	
agrees	 with	 what	 we	 know	 of	 his	 earlier	 life	 as	 an	 industrious	 family	 man.	 The	 first	
assumption	 that	 underpins	 interpretation,	 therefore,	 fails	 to	 hold	 for	 beliefs	 but	 not	












type	of	person,	 I	 tell	 the	 truth	and	 if	 something	happens	 I	 tell	 it.”	 (284)	A	construal	of	 this	
inconsistency	 is	 self-deception.	 This	 folk	 psychological	 concept 76 	preserves	 the	 surface	



















Asked	 whether	 she	 thinks	 his	 altered	 behaviour	 and	 talk	 relate	 to	 the	 psychological	
(unresolved	grief)	or	biological	(dementia)	factors	she	had	identified,	Cath	replies,	“It	is	both,	
it	 is	both.”	(296)	However,	interpretative	difficulties	recognised	from	the	intentional	stance	
were	 confirmed	 subsequently	 by	 the	 CT	 head	 scan.	 “Yeah,	 when	 I	 found	 out	 he	 was	 in	
hospital	and	they	done	this	scan	on	his	head,	I	knew	that	he	wasn’t	quite	well	then,	he	was	
lapsing.”	 (304)	Cath	does	not	 revoke	personhood	 from	 John	and	 she	 insists	he	be	 treated	
with	dignity,	his	preferences	 respected,	and	he	 is	encouraged	 to	 remain	 independent.	She	






According	 to	 Dennett,	 confabulations	 are	 false-narratives	 that	 reveal	 something	 of	 their	
creator’s	personality.	They	defy	intentional	stance	ascription	and	prediction	while	exposing	
the	multitude	 of	 “semi-independent	 semi-intelligences”	 that	 compete	 to	 narrate	 on-going	
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4	Dennett,	2013,	op.	cit.,	p.	303.	
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Turning	 to	 the	 final	 discussion	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 issues	 to	 be	 addressed.	 The	 most	
important	is,	of	course,	has	the	main	study	question	been	answered?	This,	it	will	be	recalled,	
can	be	summarised	thus:	Does	meaning	falter	or	fail	in	neuropsychiatric	symptoms?	This	will	
be	 tackled	 in	 the	 section	 that	 immediately	 follows	 and	 naturally	 leads	 on	 to	 discussions	
about	the	relevance	for,	first	neuropsychiatry	as	a	sub-speciality,	then	considering	the	same	
question	 for	psychiatry	as	a	whole.	 The	discussion	ends	with	 reflections	on	 the	 success	or	






considerations	 that	 justify	 this	 response.	 The	 first	 concerns	 the	 overall	 coherence	 of	 the	
patients’	statements.	Although	each	revealed	a	sub-optimally	coherent	belief	structure	none	
demonstrated	 flagrant	 negation	 of	 the	 sort	 that	 Davidson	 claimed	 undermines	
interpretation	 and	 even	 the	 assumption	 one	 is	 dealing	 with	 a	 “thinking	 creature.”1	The	
inconsistency	 was	 worse	 than	 Dennett’s	 fictional	 lemonade	 seller, 2 	but	 resembled	 the	
“cognitive	 dissonance”	3	he	 sometimes	 says	 is	 permissible	 and	 had	 been	 anticipated	 by	
Davidson.	Just	as	the	latter	proposed	that	beliefs	could	be	caused	by	mental	states	that	are	
not	 their	 reason, 4 	the	 carers,	 and	 perhaps	 the	 reader,	 posited	 emotional	 states	 and	
unconscious	desires	as	ad	hoc	conjectures	that	optimized	coherence,	vouchsafing	a	degree	
of	meaning.	Dennett,	however,	may	consider	this	a	“gratuitous	and	incautious	overextension	
of	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 intentional.”5	But	 frank	 inconsistency	 tended	 to	 be	 eradicated	 by	
hypothesizing	 these	 folk	 psychological	 type	 mechanisms;	 the	 sort	 of	 “parochial” 6	
refinements	that	become	inductively	learned,	which	he	intermittently	sanctioned.	The	most	
pessimistic	 predictions	 made	 about	 what	 happens	 when	 meaning	 fails	 did	 not	 happen.	
Dennett	advocates	a	drop	to	the	physical	stance,	which	while	entertained	is	not	a	move	that	




embrace	 both	 intentional	 and	 physical	 type	 explanations.	 Similarly,	 rationality	 and	
autonomy	were	 not	 revoked	wholesale	 and	 the	 patients	 continued	 to	 act	 by-and-large	 in	
accordance	with	 those	around	 them.	There	was	preservation	of	 too	much	complementary	
behaviour	 to	 warrant	 the	 most	 cynical	 predictions	 of	 non-personhood	 or	 an	




in	 preference	 to	 admitting	 ignorance	of	 complexity.	 The	 greater	 the	 ignorance,	 the	better	
the	 story	 that	must	be	 told:	 “Yes,	of	 course,	 it	must	be	 like	 that,”8	as	Wittgenstein	 said	of	
Freudian	 interpretations.	 The	parallel	 here	 is	 obvious;	 it	 could	be	 argued	 that	 participants	
produced	meaningful	narratives	that	just	mask	their	shortcomings	just	as	Nisbett	&	Wilson9	
demonstrated	how	 subjectively	 unaware	we	 are	 of	 the	processes	 underpinning	belief	 and	
the	like	in	their	famous	paper.	In	the	renowned	supermarket-stocking	test	described	in	the	
Introduction,	 one	 is	 aware	 of	which	pair	 of	 stockings	was	 chosen	but	 the	 decision-making	
process	 is	 opaque.	 Nevertheless,	 a	 narrative	 is	 offered	 –	 “these	 ones	 felt	 nicest”	 –	 while	
explanations	in	terms	of	subconscious	processes	were	explicitly	refuted.	Why	is	this	a	reason	
for	 supposing	meaning	does	not	 fail	 completely?	Because	 it	 shows	 that	 there	 is	 continuity	
here	with	non-pathological	processes	and	we	would	not	wish	to	say	of	the	stocking-choosers	
or	 Kahneman’s	 subjects	 that	 what	 they	 say	 is	 meaningless.	 If	 we	 prohibit	 it	 in	 the	
psychopathological	cases,	then	it	should	be	universally	prohibited.	Also,	the	overt	tendency	
to	 find	 reason	explanations	 for	 the	unusual	experiences	and	utterances	will	 in	 itself	 reveal	
concerns	 and	 preoccupations	 of	 patient	 and	 carer	 respectively.	 That	 is,	 even	 if	 their	




symptoms.	 The	 IPA	 methodology	 seems	 to	 recover	 a	 great	 deal	 that	 is	 coherent	 and	
comprehensible	when	the	patients	are	viewed	in	the	round.	Each	analysis	disclosed	themes	
such	 as	 fear	 of	 disintegration,	 death,	 and	 incipient	 madness.	 Identities	 were	 being	
questioned	 and	 sanctuary	 sought.	 The	 actual	 content	 of	 symptoms	 was	 linked,	 at	 least	
tentatively,	 to	 significant	 life	 events	 from	 the	 distant	 past.	 Connections	 were	 made	 and	





interpretations	 can	 be	 discerned.	 Both	 Dave	 and	 Jane	 recognised	 a	 long-standing	 fear	 of	
rejection	and	abandonment	in	his	Capgras’	delusion	while	grief	and	loneliness	was	explicitly	
recognised	by	Cath	and	emerged	in	the	IPA	analysis	of	John’s	confabulations.	The	symptom’s	
meaning	 was	 not	 totally	 obscure	 to	 any	 of	 them	 even	 as	 it	 was	 not	 fully	 transparent.	
Interviewing	 patients	 about	 their	 symptoms	 was	 a	 novel	 experience	 for	 the	 author.	 It	 is	
usual	practice	to	explore	a	symptom	just	 long	enough	to	sketch	 its	contours	and	define	 its	
features	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 diagnosis.	 Clinicians	 tend	 not	 to	 dwell	 on	 the	 personal	
significance	of	neuropsychiatric	 symptoms	hence	spending	an	hour	discussing	nothing	else	
felt	 shockingly	 new.	 And	 there	 was	 a	 great	 deal	 more	 sense	 and	 coherence	 than	 the	
standard	mental	 state	 examination	 uncovers.	 Recall	 Jaspers	 worry	 the	 un-understandable	
might	be	overextended	through	the	clinician’s	own	limitations:	“it	 is	a	matter	of	his	human	
stature	 as	 to	 what	 he	 understands	 and	 how	 far	 his	 understanding	 reaches.”11	While	 the	
human	predisposition	to	interpret	finds	meaning	everywhere,	clinicians	view	the	symptoms	
through	the	prism	of	their	own	theories,	which	is	itself	a	system	of	interpretation.	It	may	be	
clinicians	 cannot	 but	 perceive	 a	 symptom	 as	meaningless	 if	 they	 stick	 too	 rigidly	 to	 their	
models,	 thereby	 ignoring	 the	meaning	 that	 is	 there.	 This	 supports	 Jaspers’	 view	 that	 the	
empathic/understanding	 approach	 must	 be	 actively	 chosen	 and	 pursued.	 In	 light	 of	 the	
above	then,	we	conclude	that	meaning	does	not	fail	in	neuropsychiatric	symptoms,	but	does	
it	 falter?	 Here	 the	 answer	 must	 be	 in	 the	 affirmative	 and	 is	 supported	 by	 two	 lines	 of	
reasoning.	
	
To	 begin,	 the	 carer	 interviews	 clearly	 reveal	 that	 there	 is	 no	 difficulty	 appreciating	 that	
something	 is	 wrong.	 That	 is,	 the	 problematic	 communication	 and	 behaviour	 was	 readily	
apparent	 to	 the	 layperson	 just	 as	 it	 is	 to	 the	 clinician.	 This	 accords	 with	 the	 finding	 that	
laypeople	are	highly	adept	at	identifying	the	presence	of	mental	disorder	even	if	they	fail	to	
correctly	 classify	 the	condition.12	Neither	Cath	nor	 Jane	 required	coaxing	or	explanation	 to	
pinpoint	the	psychopathological	terrain	of	 interest	–	they	understood	there	was	a	problem	
even	 as	 they	 attempted	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 it.	 This	 stood	 out	 precisely	 because	 they	 had	
trouble	knowing	exactly	what	 the	patients’	 claims	amounted	 to,	whereas	non-problematic	
communication	 remained	 invisible,	 so	 to	 speak.	 This,	 recall,	 is	 true	 for	 both	 psychological	
and	neurobiological	models	of	 psychopathology;	 each	agrees	 that	 something	 is	 in	want	of	
explanation.	 As	with	 theoretical	models,	 the	 carers	 reach	 for	 a	 special	 story	 that	 involves	





others	 as	 mentally	 disordered. 13 	When	 laypeople	 “pathologise” § 	behaviour	 it	 is	 then	
attributed	to	one	of	three	potential	causes:	moral,	medical,	or	psychological.	Haslam	argues	
that	 judging	 behaviour	 to	 be	 pathological	 involves	 at	 least	 four	 elements:	 i)	 infrequently	
encountered	 behaviour	 is	 by	 definition	 unfamiliar,	 hence	 puzzling;	 ii)	 pathologising	 occurs	
where	it	is	difficult	for	an	observer	to	provide	a	coherent	explanation	for	particular	acts,	iii)	a	
behaviour	 that	 is	 deemed	 unusual	 or	 distinctive	 tends	 to	 be	 attributed	 internally	 to	 the	
person.	Such	an	attribution	is	reinforced	where	the	behaviour	is	stable	across	contexts;	and	






hence	 outside	 the	 person’s	 control.	 Haslam	 describes	 a	 third	 explanatory	 style	 –	
psychologising	–	 that	 lies	between	the	moralising	and	medicalising	poles:	“To	psychologize	
abnormality	is	to	make	sense	of	it	using	psychological	concepts	that	have	causal	rather	than	
intentional	 force.”14	These	 explanations	 invoke	 mechanistic	 and	 functional	 concepts	 (e.g.	
absence	of	Theory	of	Mind	in	psychopathic	disregard	for	others);	challenge	the	principle	that	
actors	are	aware	of	their	own	reasons/motivations;	involve	causal	histories	that	incorporate	
psychological	 factors,	 such	as	 the	actor’s	 personality	 traits	 and	psychosocial	 development;	
and	appeal	 to	emotions	and	 their	physical	correlates.	This	partly	causal	 story	of	which	 the	
actor	is	only	partially	aware	is	unique	to	psychological	explanations	and	marks	it	as	distinct	
from	 fully	 “intentional”	 accounts	 and	 medical	 explanations,	 which	 exclusively	 involve	
biological	causation.	It	is	also	what	we	see	with	our	cases.	The	carers	blend	knowledge	of	a	
disease	 process	 with	 details	 from	 the	 personal	 history,	 unconscious	 motivations,	 and	
unacknowledged	desires	 to	make	best	 sense	of	 their	 loved	one.	Meaning	 falters	 but	 does	
not	 fail.	 It	 falters	 for	 all	 to	 see,	 hence	 comprehension’s	 “shock…	 in	 the	 face	 of” 15	
psychopathology,	 but	 retains	 a	 degree	 of	 continuity	 with	 premorbid	 characteristics	 and	








Liz,	 John,	 and	 Dave	 all	 held	 beliefs	 about	 their	 immediate	 environment	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	
degree,	 non-perceptual	 beliefs	 that	 Dennett	 would	 say	 they	 ought	 not	 hold.	 But	 he	 also	
allows	special	 stories	such	as	hallucination	and	 imperfect	memory	to	salvage	our	ability	 to	
interpret;	 so	 intentional	 stance	 interpretation	 is	 not	 fatally	 undermined	 by	 these	 false-
beliefs,	which	are,	 in	any	case,	held	alongside	a	store	of	accurate	ones.	This	component	of	
the	 intentional	 stance	 is	 similar	 to	 Davidson’s	 principle	 of	 correspondence	 and	
Wittgenstein’s	 agreement	 in	 judgment.	 A	 shared	 culture,	 evolutionary	 history	 and	
neurobiological	 structure	 license	 an	 interpreter’s	 assumption	 that	 others	 concur	 with	 her	
own	 beliefs	 about	 the	 environment.	 This	 assumption	 failed	 in	 our	 cases.	 The	 carers	were	
disconcerted	by	what	they	perceived	as	false	beliefs	about	fundamental	matters,	such	as	this	
being	a	hospital	and	that	being	and	inanimate	doll.	There	were	no	restorative	special	stories	
or	 re-descriptions	 to	 be	 told.	 Similarly,	 agreement	 in	 judgment	 means	 to	 broadly	 agree	
about	the	truth	or	falsity	of	a	 large	number	statements	about	the	shared	world	–	“this	 is	a	
hand”	 etc.;	 exactly	 the	 type	 of	 statements	 being	 disputed.	 And	 this	 cut	 both	 ways.	 The	
patients,	 including	 Liz,	 were	 as	 frustrated	 as	 the	 carers.	 All	 three	 found	 the	 discrepancy	
between	their	basic	perceptual	experiences	and	those	of	others	hard	to	bear.	They	spoke	of	
anger,	 distress,	 distrust,	 rejection,	 and	 self-doubt:	 each	 one	 mooting	 the	 possibility	 of	
mental	disorder	only	to	rebuff	it.	The	patients’	most	disputed	judgments	concerned	ordinary	
states	of	affairs	like	those	listed	by	Moore	as	being	beyond	doubt.	Each	symptom	could	be	
said	 to	 contravene	 a	 personal,	 local,	 or	 universal	 hinge	 belief,	 to	 some	 degree,	 with	 the	
patient	 accepting	 as	 true	what	 others	 regard	 as	 impossible	 and,	moreover,	 now	 doubting	
what	 others	 hold	 to	 be	 certain.	 Rhodes	&	Gipps16	have	 argued	 that	 delusions	 represent	 a	





counted	 as	 evidence.	 Nonetheless,	 surely	 the	 most	 important	 feature	 is	 whether	 the	
patients	act	on	these	beliefs	with	certainty,	whether	they	provide	a	new	foundation.	But	 it	
would	 appear	 that	 they	 do	 not.	 The	 patients	 express	 doubts,	misgivings,	 and	 inconsistent	
responses.	 Relatedly,	 patients	 with	 insight	 for	 their	 psychotic	 symptoms	 are	 known	 to	
																																								 																				












to	undermine	all	meaning	and	 communication	given	 there	 is	 so	much	agreement	 in	other	
matters,	 which	 echoes	 Bolton’s	 claim	 that	 there	 is	 often	 more	 meaning	 and	 sense	 than	





paradigmatic	 neuropsychiatric	 symptoms.20	When	 present	 they	 are	 strongly	 suggestive	 of	
neurological	 disease.	 Even	 here,	 however,	 we	 find	 that	 meaning	 is	 implicated	 in	 the	
expression	 of	 the	 symptom;	 they	 do	 not	 conform	 to	 the	 picture	 of	 the	 myoclonic	 jerk	
described	in	the	introductory	chapter,	a	reminder	that	clinicians	must	attend	to	the	meaning	










author	 or	 a	 more	 systematic	 failure	 in	 our	 approach	 to	 patients.	 The	 neuropsychiatrist	
should	pause,	as	the	author	was	forced	to	do	in	these	interviews,	to	reflect	on	what	is	really	




purpose	 of	 diagnosis.	 	 Patients	 want	 their	 psychiatrist	 to	 acknowledge	 and	 address	 the	
content	and	personal	significance	of	symptoms21	while	adept	communication	improves	their	
satisfaction	 and	 outcomes. 22 	The	 sensitive	 clinician	 might	 also	 endorse	 provisional	
interpretations	 proposed	 by	 carers,	 which	 could	 reduce	 carer	 burden,	 enhance	 empathy,	
and	 support	 effective	 communication.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 known	 that	 predominantly	
biological	models	of	mental	disorder	are	more	stigmatizing	and	alienating	than	psychosocial	
explanations.23,	24	Efforts	 to	 augment	 continuity	 and	 coherence	 with	 the	 patient’s	 lived	
experiences	will	mitigate	overly	medicalising	attributions	and	improve	understanding.25			
	




developing	 a	 highly	 specific	 perceptual	 deficit	 then	 reasoning,	 using	 perfectly	 adequate	
Bayesian	inferences,	that	his	or	her	partner	must	be	an	imposter.	Both	the	perceptual	deficit	
and	reasoning	occur	outwith	conscious	awareness.	Coltheart	et	al’s	Bayesian	calculations	are	
based	 on	 two	 rival	 hypotheses	 for	 the	 altered	 perceptual	 experience:	 “that	 person	 is	my	
wife”	and	“that	person	is	an	imposter.”	While	restricting	the	competition	to	two	hypotheses	
simplifies	the	maths	it	multiplies	the	questions.	Why	only	two	and	why	these	two?	Why	not	
hypothesise,	 “she	 must	 be	 wearing	 a	 different	 perfume”	 or	 “I	 feel	 odd	 today.”	 Personal	
history	surely	has	a	bearing	on	the	hypotheses	someone,	even	subconsciously,	generates	to	
account	 for	an	altered	experience.	Further,	 there	 is	 reason	to	doubt	 the	perceptual	deficit	




looked	 like	 this	 Jane”	 (217)	 –	 but	 also	 spoke	 of	 experiences	 quite	 at	 odds	 with	 the	









the	 face	 of	 arguments	 to	 the	 contrary.	 The	 deficit	 is	 inferred	 because	 the	 delusion	 is	
incoherent	 and	 irrational,	 which	 brings	 us	 to	 the	 same	 terrain	 as	 the	 discussions	 on	
meaningfulness	 above.	 Yet	 there	 was	 more	 coherence	 and	 rationality	 than	 their	 model	
allows.	
	




neuropsychological	 models	 are	 composed	 of	 a	meaningless	 causal	 part	 and	 an	 additional	
element.	The	cognitive	neuropsychiatrists	infer	a	further	deficit	from	what	they	perceive	as	
too	 much	 incoherence	 –	 too	 little	 meaning	 –	 while	 the	 phenomenologists	 repudiate	 the	
deficit	account	for	inverse	reasons.	We	might	call	them	“deficit	plus”	models	for	they	add	a	
meaningful	 stratum	 over	 and	 above	 the	 neuropsychological	 impairment.	 The	
phenomenologists	 such	 as	 Radcliffe	 say	 that	 standard	 folk	 psychological	 reasoning	 is	
adequate	to	get	from	anomalous	experience	to	delusion.	Dave	though	would	seem	to	belie	
that	assertion.	There	is	something	we	do	not	quite	get;	but	it	is	not	sufficient	to	undermine	
meaning	 completely.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 commonsensical	 approach	 to	 interpreting	 him	
does	 get	 one	 quite	 far.	 There	 is	 little	 need	 for	 the	 tortuous	 philosophically	 inspired	
interpretations	Sass	proposes	that	alienate	as	they	explain	and	amount	to	a	hermeneutics	of	
suspicion.31	The	 same	 situation	 pertains	 for	 models	 of	 confabulation.	 Source	 monitoring	
deficits	 and	 failures	 of	 strategic	 retrieval	 are	 hypothesised	 as	 explanatory	 causes	 and	 the	
content	dismissed	as	 inappropriate	and	 inconsistent	with	other	utterances	and	behaviour.	




account	 for	 the	 continuity	 and	 appropriateness	 of	 the	 themes	 revealed	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	
John’s	 confabulations?	 Fotopoulou	 for	 her	 part	 finds	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 coherence	 in	
confabulations	that	 function	to	preserve	 identity	and	self-esteem	 in	 the	 face	of	 illness	and	
impairment.34	John	 too	 demonstrates	 the	 disadvantageous	 loss	 of	 accord	with	 others	 that	
accompanies	this	strategy,	illustrating	that	meaning	falters	but	does	not	fail	completely.	This	












has	not	been	 included	 in	 this	 study	but	 is	 a	 common	presentation	 to	neuropsychiatrists.35	
While	there	are	positive	physical	markers	of	conversion	disorders,	such	as	Hoover’s	sign	 in	
the	 identification	of	 functional	 leg	weakness,36	these	are	neither	 fully	reliable	nor	available	
for	 the	whole	 gamut	 of	 conversion	 symptoms.	 Instead,	 clinicians	 utilise	 psychological	 and	
moral	concepts	such	as	deception,	psycho-trauma,	and	distress	as	part	of	the	diagnostic	and	
explanatory	 framework	 for	 this	 range	of	 disorders37	while	 the	manner	 in	which	 symptoms	
present	 reflect,	 “reasonable	 lay	 beliefs	 about	 brain	 function.”38	Also,	 the	 neuropsychiatric	
assessment	 involves	 objective	 investigations	 such	 as	 neuroimaging,	 blood	 tests,	 and	
neuropsychology	 to	 a	 greater	 degree	 than	 other	 psychiatric	 sub-specialities	 but	 the	






old	 man	 who	 suffered	 a	 mild	 head	 injury	 but	 developed	 memory	 impairment	 suggesting	
“organic	brain	damage.”39	Ultimately	it	was	concluded	a	depressive	disorder	had	developed	
following	 the	 accident	 and	 that	 “his	 wife	 had	 colluded	 and	 reinforced	 this	 aspect	 of	 the	
situation.”	In	other	words,	reasons	and	motivations	were	invoked	that	excluded	neurological	
injury	as	an	explanation.	The	point	 is	not	 that	 reason-type	explanations	 took	primacy	over	
physical	 investigations,	 or	 vice	 versa,	 but	 rather	 to	 show	 that	 the	 former	 are	 implicit	 in	
clinical	decision-making	even	though	their	character	remains	relatively	obscure.	Meaning	it	
seems	 is	 endemic	 to	 the	 clinical	 encounter,	 neuropsychiatric	models	 of	 symptoms,	 and	 in	
clinical	 reasoning.	 These	 reflections	will	 hopefully	 serve	 to	 undermine	 Jaspers’	 pessimistic	














are	 assessable	 directly	 through	 language.	 It	 cannot	 be	 inferred	 that	 each	 and	 every	
psychiatric	or	neuropsychiatric	 symptom	can	be	 conceived	as	meaningful.	Apathy,	 fatigue,	




also	 be	 informative	 with	 regards	 neurological	 symptoms.	 Even	 sophisticated	 psychiatrists	
such	 as	 Jaspers	 and	 Arthur	 Kleinman41	assumed	 that	 the	 symptoms	 in	 so-called	 “organic”	
psychiatric	 disorder	 conveyed	 little	 if	 any	 meaning.	 Jaspers	 in	 the	 quote	 above	 was	
unflatteringly	 contrasting	 psychiatric	 symptoms	 of	 neurological	 disorder	 to	 those	 found	 in	
the	 rest	 of	 psychiatry.	 “Organic”	 conditions	were	 reckoned	 to	 sit	 between	 psychiatry	 and	
neurology,	marking	the	boundary	between	the	two	fields.	This	is	based	on	a	false	opposition	
of	 the	 two	domains,	which	has	been	questioned	 for	 some	 time42	with	 increasing	empirical	
justification.	Neurological	and	psychiatric	disorders	share	similarities	both	in	terms	of	gross	
structural	 changes	 in	 the	 brain 43 	and	 social	 determinants. 44 	The	 manifest	 meaning	 in	








Just	 as	 meaning	 is	 a	 poor	 marker	 of	 the	 boundary	 between	 neurology	 and	 psychiatry	 it	
similarly	cannot	function	as	the	limit	between	illness	and	normality	that	some	have	hoped.	
To	 see	 this,	 recollect	 the	 arguments	 in	 The	 Loss	 of	 Sadness45 	about	 whether	 a	 mildly	
depressed	 mood	 is	 best	 considered	 an	 illness	 or	 a	 psychological	 reaction	 to	 adversity.	 A	
lowered	mood	can	be	conceived	in	terms	of	recent	loses	and	a	tendency	to	withdraw	from	
conflict,	 a	 neurotransmitter	 deficit,	 or	 faulty	 information	 processing.	 This	 amounts	 to	 the	
difference	between	finding	the	condition	a	normal	response	to	adversity	or	a	disorder,	say	
Horowitz	 and	 Wakefield.	 They	 advise	 that	 discriminating	 between	 these	 depends	 on	
whether	 one	 can	 find	 an	 “appropriate	 reason”	46	for	 the	 depressed	 mood.	 But	 this	 is	 an	
empty	claim.	For	one,	we	know	that	patients	and	carers	have	a	tendency	towards	coherent	
narratives	 so	 will	 cast	 about	 for	 reasons	 for	 an	 event,	 even	 where	 there	 is	 none.	 This	
exemplifies	the	well-known	recall	bias	that	confounds	research	in	the	social	sciences	where	
a	 respondent	 actively	 searches	 for	 meaning.	 It	 is	 near	 impossible	 to	 tell	 the	 difference	





the	 deficit	 component	 found	 in	 each	 of	 the	 models	 discussed	 as	 lacking	 an	 appropriate	
reason.	But	it	should	not	be	supposed	that	all	psychiatric	symptoms	will	be	best	accounted	
for	 by	 the	 “deficit	 plus”	 type	 model.	 Relatedly,	 the	 Diagnostic	 and	 Statistical	 Manual	 of	
Mental	 Disorders,	 5th	 edition 47 	proposes	 that	 a	 pattern	 of	 psychological/behavioural	
phenomena	cannot	be	considered	a	mental	disorder	if	it	is	an	expectable	response	to	stress	
or	loss.	While	frequency	of	response	is	cited,	there	is	no	mention	of	specific	rates	implying	it	
is	 clinicians’	 intuitions	 about	 how	 people	 should	 respond	 that	 carries	 the	 load.	 This	 again	
shows	 that	 failure	 to	 identify	 reasons	 for	 psychological	 phenomena	 is	 implicated	 in	 the	
attribution	 of	mental	 disorders.	 As	meaning	 is	 found	wherever	 one	 looks	 in	 psychiatry,	 it	
become	impossible	to	defend	boundaries	based	on	the	absence	of	meaning.		
	
As	 meaning	 falters	 but	 does	 not	 fail	 in	 psychiatry	 we	 can	 now	 question	 whether	 it	 is	
sufficiently	 addressed	 in	 both	 clinical	 practice	 and	 research.	 Clinicians	 reportedly	 value	
formulation	with	its	emphasis	on	personal	meaning,	individuality,	conflicts,	and	motivations	




Indeed,	 there	 is	 widespread	 dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 current	 “technologizing”	 of	 the	
profession	that	views	psychiatry	as	simply	a	form	of	neuroscience.49	While	this	study	did	not	
examine	formulation	the	findings	accord	with	these	concerns.	Being	forced	to	engage	with	
the	 significance	 of	 symptoms	 for	 both	 patient	 and	 carer	 enabled	 the	 author	 to	 perceive	
more	 sense	 and	meaning	 than	 had	 hitherto	 been	 expected.	 This	 is	 not	 identical	 with	 the	
assessment	 of	 insight	 and	 illness	 belief	 because	 these	 primarily	 appraise	 the	 patient’s	
agreement	with	a	medical	 interpretation	of	 their	presentation.	Nonetheless,	 it	would	be	a	
good	 point	 in	 the	 mental	 state	 examination	 to	 ask	 about	 the	 patient	 and	 carer’s	 own	
interpretation	of	the	symptoms.	This	may	improve	engagement	and	expose	concordant	and	
discordant	 views,	which	 could	 be	 addressed	 directly	 and	 assist	mutual	 comprehension.	 In	
the	 longer	 term,	 this	 may	 have	 positive	 impact	 upon	 carer	 burden	 and	 the	 negative	
consequences50	that	go	along	with	 it.	Admittedly,	 this	 is	 speculative	but	 feeling	 listened	 to	
and	 understood	 is	 associated	 with	 better	 engagement	 and	 outcomes.46	 Likewise,	 there	 is	
increasing	realization	that	the	meaning	and	significance	of	 life	events	for	patients	needs	to	
be	 included	 in	research	studies.	The	famous	Caspi	et	al	 study	demonstrated	an	 interaction	




The	 fusing	 of	 life	 events,	 psychological	 theorizing,	 and	 neuroimaging	 is	 most	 evident	 in	
modern	 research	 on	 conversion	 disorder,	 a	 classic	 neuropsychiatric	 condition	 and	
considered	 by	 Freud	 the	 paradigmatic	 mental	 disorder.	 The	 recent	 handbook	 Functional	
Neurological	 Disorders52	is	 a	 good	 illustration:	 life	 events,	 illness	 beliefs,	 personality	 traits,	
and	 functional	 neuroimaging	are	 all	 covered.	However,	 these	advances	 involve	a	denuded	
conception	 of	 meaning.	 They	 fail	 to	 include	 patient	 and	 carer’s	 subjective	 appraisals	 and	





It	 has	been	emphasized	 repeatedly	 that	 the	present	 study	 involved	a	non-standard	use	of	




converse	 of	 usual	 practice	where	 the	 subjects’	 challenging	 experiences	 take	 centre	 stage.	
Nevertheless,	 the	relationship	between	the	primary	and	secondary	analyses	requires	some	
discussion,	 given	 the	 empirical,	 albeit	 qualitative,	 nature	 of	 the	 former	 while	 the	 latter	 is	
conceptual.	 Findings	 from	 the	 primary	 analyses	 have	 been	 deployed	 to	 argue	 for	 the	
continuance	of	meaning	in	the	symptoms	studied.	Is	this	line	of	reasoning	legitimate?	Firstly,	
the	 carers’	 subjective	 experience	 of	 attempting	 to	 understand	 their	 loved	 one	 does	 sit	
comfortably	within	the	IPA	sphere.	Unfortunately	we	were	restricted	to	just	two	carers,	both	
of	 whom,	 nevertheless,	 reported	 difficulty	 understanding	 specific	 aspects	 of	 the	 patient’s	
utterances	 and	 behaviour,	 providing	 some	 limited	 support	 for	 the	 study	 aims.	 Cath	 for	
instance	 said,	 “there	 is	 no	 sense	 in	 what	 he	 says	 in	 this	 last	 while	 whatsoever.”	 (302)	




loud.”	 (239)	Thus,	 the	primary	analysis	provides	encouragement	 for	 further	 inquiry;	 carers	
experience	difficulties	with	interpretation.	The	originators	of	IPA	recommend	presenting	the	
two	 types	 of	 analysis	 separately,	 as	 here,	 so	 the	 reader	 can	 see	 the	 different	 results	 for	
herself.53	The	problem	 is	whether	 the	primary	 analysis	 has	 any	 traction	on	 the	 secondary.	
IPA	 was	 designed	 to	 identify	 and	 expound	meaningful	 interpretations	 whereas	 this	 study	
was	 explicitly	 concerned	 with	 whether	 meaning	 falters	 or	 fails	 in	 neuropsychiatric	
symptoms.	 It	 is	 not	 obvious	 that	 an	 analytic	method	 based	 in	 the	 phenomenological	 and	
hermeneutic	tradition	has	a	role	to	play	in	the	investigation	of	meaning	in	psychopathology?	
Or,	as	Wittgenstein	would	have	said,	“problems	and	methods	pass	one	another	by.”54	This	
very	 pessimistic	 reading	 is	moderated	by	 the	 similarity	 in	 the	 results	 obtained	by	 the	 two	
types	of	 analysis.	 Yes,	 the	primary	analysis	does	 search	after	meaning	and,	 lo-and-behold,	
found	a	great	deal	of	it	in	the	patient	and	carer	interviews.	But	the	secondary	analysis	aimed	




finding	 of	 meaning	 in	 the	 primary	 analyses.	 Conversely,	 the	 themes	 that	 emerged	 in	 the	
latter	 contributed	 to	 our	 discovering	 enough	 coherence	 and	 rationality	 for	 the	 formal	




number	 of	 practical	 and	 exegetical	 hazards	 that	may	 undermine	 this	 sanguine	 conclusion,	
however.			
	
For	one,	 there	are	 insufficient	 interviews	 from	which	 to	draw	reliable	conclusions.	 IPA	 is	a	
qualitative	 methodology	 that	 venerates	 depth	 of	 analysis	 over	 quantity	 and	 given	 the	
complexity	of	studying	meaningfulness	in	psychopathology	it	seemed	prudent	to	err	on	the	
side	 of	 quality	 over	 quantity.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 opens	 the	 study	 to	 the	 criticism	 that	 the	
cases	 are	 un-representative	 or,	 worse,	 misleadingly	 selective.	 Certainly,	 the	 difficulty	
locating	English-speaking	neuropsychiatric	cases	with	minimal	cognitive	impairment	and	the	
richness	 of	 the	 interviews	 suggests	 exceptional	 individuals.	 However,	 they	were	 recruited	
sequentially	over	a	few	months	without	further	selection	and	none	stood	out	to	the	author	
as	 different	 in	 kind	 from	 those	 seen	 in	 routine	 clinical	work.	Another	problem	 is	 a	 lack	of	
homogeneity	 in	 the	 sample,	 as	 required	 for	 IPA.	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 all	 interviewees	










by	 a	 preoccupation	 of	 the	 author	 rather	 than	 a	 true	 reflection	 of	 the	 participants’	
experiences.	 It	 is	 certainly	 correct	 that	 IPA	 is	 susceptible	 to	 bias	 as	 all	 interpretations	 are	
founded	in	theory.	However,	it	is	not	surprising	that	this	theme	emerged	so	frequently.	The	
participants	 were	 all	 relatively	 old	 and	 so	 quite	 naturally	 were	 beginning	 to	 contemplate	
their	own	demise.	Illness	is	always	a	bodily	threat	that	raises	the	possibility	of	death	or	loss	
of	 identity.	 Indeed,	 death	 is	 an	 unending	metaphor	 for	 loss	 of	 various	 kinds,	 such	 as	 the	
spiritual	decay	of	Death	in	Venice.	Appendix	F	contains	the	first	five	pages	of	the	annotated	
interview	 and	 it	 clearly	 shows	 how	 Dave’s	 opening	 sentences	 communicate	 an	
acknowledgement	and	fear	of	death:	“well	I	am	here	for,	er,	it’s	an	illness	a	funny	illness,	well	






are	 not	 incontestable.	 Each	 philosophical	 position	 has	 generated	 a	 substantial	 secondary	
literature	 and	 counter-arguments	 that	 have	 been	 largely	 ignored.	 While	 Dennett	 and	
Davidson	have	been	able	to	answer	their	critics,	and	such	papers	have	been	utilised	 in	the	
explications	above,	the	interpretation	of	Wittgenstein	is	a	parlous	task.	His	writing	is	rather	
cryptic	 in	 form	 and	 he	 was	 known	 to	 accuse	 commentators	 of	 misrepresenting	 and	
contradicting	 his	 unpublished	 work,56	which	 constitutes	 the	 vast	 majority.	 As	 such,	 each	
“theory”	 has	 been	 presented	 with	 textual	 support	 from	 the	 primary	 sources;	 clarity	 of	
exposition	 has	 been	 prioritised	 over	 philosophical	 dispute;	 and	 interpretative	 errors	 are	





are	 so	 entwined	 that	 it	 felt	 awkward	 to	 examine	 them	 in	 isolation	 yet	 also	 impossible	 to	
apply	as	a	whole.	There	has	been	nothing	to	suggest	a	productive	research	programme	will	
emerge,	 as	 can	 sometimes	 be	 the	 case	 when	 Dennett	 hurls	 testable	 hypotheses	 to	 his	








Psychiatric	 disorder	 can	make	people	 in	 some	ways	 radically	 strange	without	obliterating	 all	
the	 human	psychology	 they	 share	with	 others…	 Seeing	 things	 from	 apparently	 incompatible	
standpoints	 gives	 a	 metaphor	 for	 psychiatry	 as	 a	 whole…	 We	 need	 the	 external	 scientific	






Future	 research	 in	 this	 area	 could	 usefully	 focus	 on	 the	 carers	 and	 their	 attempts	 to	
understand	those	with	mental	disorder,	of	all	types.	IPA	can	be	commended	as	a	robust	and	
replicable	method	for	examining	lived	experience	from	a	(relatively)	neutral	perspective.	So	
much	 work	 on	 insight	 and	 illness	 beliefs	 seems	 concerned	 with	 bending	 subjects	 to	 the	
worldview	of	the	clinician	that	listening	to	the	carers’	interpretations	would	serve	as	useful	
corrective.	Ultimately,	work	on	interpreting	patients	by	carers	should	begin	to	address	carer	
burden	 and	 whether	 optimising	 shared	 understanding	 can	 ameliorate	 the	 worst	
consequences	for	patient	and	carer.	Fotopoulou	has	already	taken	the	first	steps	in	methods	






harder	 to	 specify	 but	 incoherence	 appears	 less	 problematic	 than	 difficulty	 with	
intersubjective	agreement,	whatever	that	means	exactly.	Although	the	study	could	not	give	
a	 clear	 and	 unambiguous	 answer,	 the	 conclusions	 presented	 do	 offer	 a	 vindication	 of	 the	
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Understanding psychological symptoms 
We would like to invite you to take part in our research 
study. Before you decide we would like you to understand 
why the research is being done and what it would involve 
for you. One of our team will go through the information 
sheet with you and answer any questions you have. We‘d 
suggest this should take about 20 minutes. Talk to others 
about the study if you wish.  
 
Part 1 tells you the purpose of this study and what will 
happen to you if you take part. Part 2 gives you more 
detailed information about the conduct of the study. Ask 
us if there is anything that is not clear.  
 
The study involves being interviewed on one or more 
occasions (maximum three times) by Dr Norman Poole, 
consultant psychiatrist.  
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
The study seeks to explore how patients and their carers 
understand psychological symptoms caused by changes 
in the brain. Sometimes these symptoms can be difficult 
for others to understand and we want to know why. 
Hopefully this research will make it easier for professionals 
and carers to know why patients with changes to the brain 
do and say what they do.  
 
This research is being conducted by Dr Poole as part of 
his Medical Doctorate degree. This is an advanced 





Why have I been invited?  
You have been approached because you have a 
psychological symptom as a result of change in the brain 
caused by illness. A few patients with similar symptoms 
and/ or their carers are being asked to take part in this 
research.  
 
Do I have to take part?  
It is up to you to decide to join the study. Deciding not to 
participate will not affect the standard of care you receive. 
We will describe the study and go through this information 
sheet. If you agree to take part, we will then ask you to 
sign a consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving a reason. This would not affect the standard 
of care you receive.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
If you agree to be part of this study Dr Poole will interview 
you about your symptoms. Interviews will be conducted in 
the Department of Psychological Medicine at the Royal 
London Hospital. The interview will take up to one hour. If 
more information is needed, Dr Poole may want to 
interview you again. You will not be interviewed more than 
three times. You can choose to be interviewed alone or in 
the company of a friend or carer.  
 
The interview will be recorded on an electronic dictaphone. 
Dr Poole will later write up the interview. The audio files 
and written interviews will be kept on a password-
protected computer in the hospital. Only Dr Poole will 
have access to these files. Some words and phrases you 
say might be included in the final Doctoral thesis. However, 
this will be fully anonymised meaning you and your family 




Being involved in the research will not affect your 
treatment in any way. If you do not wish to be involved in 
the research your treatment and care will also not be 
affected.  
 
Once the interviews have been completed your part in the 
research will come to an end. After this, you will not be 
asked to do anything more. 
 
How many people will be part of this research? 
We expect up to six patients and six carers will be 
recruited into the research study. 
 
Will I be paid for taking part? 
We cannot pay any fees or expenses but we can arrange 
for a taxi to bring you to and from the hospital for the 
interview.   
 
What will I have to do?  
All you need to do is talk with Dr Poole about your 
experience of living with psychological symptoms caused 
by changes in the way the brain works. In particular, Dr 
Poole will be interested in how you make sense of the 
symptoms. You will not be expected to do anything else 
as part of the research.  
 
The symptoms of interest can improve quite quickly so it 
will be important to attend for an interview as soon as 
practical after you have agreed to take part in the study. 
 
Participants in the research will be expected to attend the 
interviews on time and stay for up to one hour. There 




information has been gathered Dr Poole will end the 
interview. Dr Poole will inform you when your involvement 
in the research is finished. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking 
part?  
Sometimes talking about psychological symptoms can be 
upsetting. Dr Poole is an experienced psychiatrist who has 
interviewed many patients and carers over the course of 
his career. If he notices that you are becoming distressed 
the interview can be stopped for a brief period or 
rearranged for another day. Alternatively, you can choose 
to withdraw from the research completely. This will not 
affect the care you receive from our services.  
 
Interviews about patients' and carers' experiences are 
often conducted as part of research. The vast majority of 
participants do not find it distressing or upsetting.  
 
Attending an interview for up to one hour can be 
inconvenient. We will arrange the interviews to be as 
convenient for you and your family as possible.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
People who participate in research often find it of benefit. 
Talking about your experiences of living with psychological 
symptoms can help you to understand them better.  
 
We cannot promise the study will help you but the results 
of this study may help improve the care people with 
psychological symptoms caused by changes in the brain 






What if there is a problem?  
If information becomes available that we think is relevant 
to your continued participation in the research we will 
inform you of this as soon as practically possible. 
 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with 
during the study or any possible harm you might suffer will 
be addressed. The detailed information on this is given in 
Part 2.  
 
Could I be asked to leave the study? 
If the research interviews are very distressing to you then 
your involvement in the research should end. Dr Poole will 
advise you if this is his recommendation 
 
If the symptoms and experiences of interest to the 
research have resolved then your involvement in the 
research will come to an end. Dr Poole will tell you if this 
happens. 
Care after the research ends 
Your involvement in the research ends after the 
interview(s) have been completed. You will no longer need 
to be seen by the research team. Involvement in the 
research will not affect your future treatment or care. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
Yes. We will follow ethical and legal practice and all 
information about you will be handled in confidence. The 
details are included in Part 2.  
 
If the information in Part 1 has interested you and you are 
considering participation, please read the additional 




Part 2 of the information sheet 
 
What will happen if I don't want to carry on with the study?  
If you want to withdraw from the study you are free to do 
so. The care you receive from services will not be affected 
in any way.  
 
Dr Poole may still wish to use some of the information you 
have provided as part of his research. This will remain 
anonymous, so you cannot be identified. If you do not 
wish any of the information you have provided in the 
research to be used then it will all be destroyed.  
 
What if there is a problem?  
Complaints 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you 
should ask to speak to Dr Poole who will do their best to 
answer your questions [Dr Poole is available on 020 3594 
6695]. If you remain unhappy and wish to complain 
formally, you can do this through the East London NHS 
Foundation Trust's Patient Advice and Liaison Service 
(PALS). You can call them freephone on 0800 085 8354 
or by writing to Consumer Relations, FREEPOST RLSH-
BBHX-ZRRU, Trust Headquarters, EastONE, 22 
Commercial St., London E1 6LP. 
 
Harm  
In the event that something does go wrong and you are 
harmed during the research and this is due to someone's 
negligence then you may have grounds for a legal action 
for compensation against the sponsor, King’s College 
London. However, you may have to pay your legal costs. 
The normal National Health Service complaints 





Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?  
All information which is collected about you during the 
course of the research will be kept strictly confidential, and 
any information about you which leaves the 
hospital/surgery will have your name and address 
removed so that you cannot be recognised. 
 
Confidentiality can in certain exceptional circumstances be 
broken. When, for instance, the research team think 
someone might be hurt. If so, we will talk to you first about 
the best thing to do. 
 
The interview(s) will be recorded onto a digital dictaphone. 
The audio file will be uploaded onto a password protected 
East London NHS Foundation Trust computer. The 
original audio file will then be destroyed. Only Dr Poole will 
have access to the password. No one other than Dr Poole 
will have access to identifiable information.  
 
The audio files will be transcribed by Dr Poole. Identifying 
information will be removed so participants will be known 
by a code. All patient and carer identifiable information will 
be destroyed within 3 months of the completion of the 
research. 
 
The handling of identifiable information will be in keeping 
with the Caldecott principles (see the Caldecott Report, 
Department of Health, 1997). 
 
Involvement of the General Practitioner/Family doctor (GP)  
It will not be necessary to inform your GP of your 





What will happen to the results of the research study?  
The study is mainly being conducted as part of Dr Poole's 
Doctoral research. The results of the research will be 
written up as part of the Doctoral thesis. Some of the 
results may be published in research papers for relevant 
medical journals. No identifiable information will be 
published in either the thesis or research papers. Papers 
and the final completed thesis will be made available to 
study participants, if requested. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
The research is not being funded by a charity, 
pharmaceutical company or academic institution. East 
London NHS Foundation 
Trust will cover the cost of 
taxis, where necessary. Dr Poole is self-funding the 
Medical Doctorate.  
 
Who has reviewed the study?  
All research in the NHS is looked at by independent group 
of people, called a Research Ethics Committee, to protect 
your interests. This study has been reviewed and given 
favourable opinion by the NHS Health Research Authority 
NRES Committee London – Queen Square and the 
Research and Development Office at South London and 
the Maudsley NHS Foundation Trust.  
 
 
Further information and contact details  
General information about research. 
More information about research at East London NHS 






Specific information about this research project.  
Please contact Dr Norman Poole on 020 3564 6695 or 
email norman.poole@eastlondon.nhs.uk for further 
information on this research study. 
 
Advice on whether to participate.  
Please talk this over with someone who knows you well. 
Alternatively, you may wish to discuss it with a health 
professional involved in your care.  
 
Who should I approach if I'm unhappy with the study? 
In the first instance contact Dr Norman Poole. Alternatively, 
or if you are unhappy with the response you receive, you 
can contact East London NHS Foundation Trust's Patient 
Advice and Liaison Service on 0800 085 8354 or by 
writing to Consumer Relations, FREEPOST RLSH-BBHX-
ZRRU, Trust Headquarters, EastONE, 22 Commercial St., 



























5. I	agree	to	take	part	in	the	above	study.	 	 	 	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Name	of	Participant	 	 	 Date	 	 	 	 Signature	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	












































































































































































NRES Committee London - Queen Square 
HRA Head Office 
Skipton House  
80 London Road  
London 
SE1 6LH  
 
Telephone:   
Facsimile:  
13 January 2014 
 
Dr Norman Poole 
Department of Psychology, Henry Wellcome Building 
King's College London, Institute of Psychiatry 




Dear Dr Poole 
 
Study title: Meaning and Meaninglessness in Neuropsychiatry: 
Understanding Psychological Symptoms 
REC reference: 13/LO/1735 
IRAS project ID: 123514 
 
Thank you for your letter of 02 January 2014, responding to the Committee’s request for further 
information on the above research and submitting revised documentation. 
 
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the Chair. 
 
We plan to publish your research summary wording for the above study on the NRES website, 
together with your contact details, unless you expressly withhold permission to do so.  
Publication will be no earlier than three months from the date of this favourable opinion letter.  
Should you wish to provide a substitute contact point, require further information, or wish to 
withhold permission to publish, please contact the Co-ordinator at 
NRESCommittee.London-Westminster@nhs.net. 
 
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the above 
research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation 
[as revised], subject to the conditions specified below. 
 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 
 
I confirm that the committee has approved this research project for the purposes of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005. The committee is satisfied that the requirements of section 31 of the Act will 











who lacks capacity to consent to taking part in the project.  
 




The favourable opinion applies to all NHS sites taking part in the study, subject to management 
permission being obtained from the NHS/HSC R&D office prior to the start of the study (see 




Conditions of the favourable opinion 
 
The favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met prior to the start of the 
study. 
 
Management permission or approval must be obtained from each host organisation prior to the 
start of the study at the site concerned. 
 
Management permission ("R&D approval") should be sought from all NHS organisations 
involved in the study in accordance with NHS research governance arrangements. 
 
Guidance on applying for NHS permission for research is available in the Integrated Research 
Application System or at http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk.   
 
Where a NHS organisation’s role in the study is limited to identifying and referring potential 
participants to research sites ("participant identification centre"), guidance should be sought 
from the R&D office on the information it requires to give permission for this activity. 
 
For non-NHS sites, site management permission should be obtained in accordance with the 
procedures of the relevant host organisation.  
 
Sponsors are not required to notify the Committee of approvals from host organisations 
 
Registration of Clinical Trials 
 
All clinical trials (defined as the first four categories on the IRAS filter page) must be registered 
on a publically accessible database within 6 weeks of recruitment of the first participant (for 
medical device studies, within the timeline determined by the current registration and publication 
trees).   
 
There is no requirement to separately notify the REC but you should do so at the earliest 
opportunity e.g when submitting an amendment.  We will audit the registration details as part of 
the annual progress reporting process. 
 
To ensure transparency in research, we strongly recommend that all research is registered but 












If a sponsor wishes to contest the need for registration they should contact Catherine Blewett 
(catherineblewett@nhs.net), the HRA does not, however, expect exceptions to be made. 




It is the responsibility of the sponsor to ensure that all the conditions are complied with 




The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows: 
  
Document    Version    Date    
Covering Letter    02 January 2014  
Evidence of insurance or indemnity  RSA  01 August 2013  
Interview Schedules/Topic Guides  Schedule for 
semi 
structured 
IPA interview  
   
Investigator CV  Norman 
Poole   
23 October 2013  
Other: Supervisor CV  Derek Bolton  12 January 2013  
Other: CV Dr Michael D Kopelman  1  23 October 2013  
Other: Personal Consultee Declaration Form - Adult  2  24 December 2013  
Participant Consent Form: Patient  2  30 December 2013  
Participant Consent Form: Carer  2  30 December 2013  
Participant Consent Form: Personal Consultee Assent form - Adult  2  24 December 2013  
Participant Information Sheet: Carer  1  23 October 2013  
Participant Information Sheet: Consultee  1  23 October 2013  
Participant Information Sheet: Carer  2  24 December 2013  
Participant Information Sheet: Patient  2  24 December 2013  
Participant Information Sheet: x       
Protocol  1  23 October 2013  
REC application  123514/5182
38/1/573  
24 October 2013  
Response to Request for Further Information    02 January 2014  
 
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for Research 
Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for Research 
Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 








The attached document “After ethical review – guidance for researchers” gives detailed 
guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, including: 
 
x Notifying substantial amendments 
x Adding new sites and investigators 
x Notification of serious breaches of the protocol 
x Progress and safety reports 
x Notifying the end of the study 
 
The NRES website also provides guidance on these topics, which is updated in the light of 




You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the National 
Research Ethics Service and the application procedure.  If you wish to make your views known 
please use the feedback form available on the website. 
 
Further information is available at National Research Ethics Service website > After Review 
 
13/LO/1735                          Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
We are pleased to welcome researchers and R & D staff at our NRES committee members’ 
training days – see details at http://www.hra.nhs.uk/hra-training/  
 






Dr Yogi Amin 
Chair 
 
Enclosures:  “After ethical review – guidance for 
   researchers 
 
Copy to:  Mr Keith Brennan 



















































Dave:	 on	earth	 things	did	not	go	well	 there	 is	only	one	other	way	 to	go	and	
that	is	to	go	even	worse	that	what	you	have	now	
NP:	 right,	and	what	is	going	on	for	you	now	that	is	difficult	




it	 is	 frightening	because	all	 the	 things	 I	used	 to	have,	 I	used	 to	have	a	
fabulous,	fabulous	memory	
NP:	 mmm	
Dave:	 fabulous,	 I	 couldn’t	 go	 wrong	 with	 anybody,	 anything,	 with	 any	
competition,	 I	 couldn’t	 go	 wrong	 with	 it	 and	 it	 was	 a	 brilliant	 feeling	
when	I	was	like	that	
NP:	 mmm	huh	






















Dave:	 I	 knew	 it	 was,	 but	 I	 just	 couldn’t	 fight	 back	 against	 it	 because	 it	 just	
wasn’t	there	
NP:	 and	what	did	it	feel	like,	when	you	said	it	crept	up	what	was	that	like?	









NP:	 er	 yeah	 I	 think	 so,	 sorry	 I	 am	 not,	 because	 I	 haven’t	 spoken	 to	 him	





















Dave:	 um			Jane	was	in	the,	 it	wasn’t	an	association	or	anything,	 it	was	just	a	
thing	where	we	all	seemed	to	get	together	in	various,	not	various	places	
they	were	 in	houses	and	things	 like	that,	but	 it	wasn’t	alcohol	or	other	
stuff		
NP:	 mmm	
Dave:	 we	 don’t	 do	 anything	 like	 that	 and	 just	 things	 um	 there	 was	 a	 lot	 of	



































dinner	 and	 I	 would	 go	 into	 the	 kitchen	 and	 he	 would	 come	 into	 the	











































NP:	 and	can	you	remember	what	 it	was	 like	before	 the	 last	couple	of	days	
when	you,	when	it	really	felt	like	you	were	unsure	who	Jane	was?	























couldn’t	 imagine	 them	 doing	 anything,	 you	 know	 sort	 of,	 um	 I	 don’t	
know	 um	 together.	 I	 never	 tried	 to	 get	 any	 knowledge	 from	 one	 of	









treating	 me	 like	 this,	 why?	 Why	 won’t	 they	 tell	 me,	 are	 they	 hiding	
something	from	me,	what?	Is	there	something	going	on?	
NP:		 and	what	do	you	think	is	causing	you	to	feel	this	way?	
Dave:	 I	don’t	know,	 it	could	be	things	 in	my	brain	perhaps	that	were	pushing	
me	 another	way,	 perhaps,	 as	 far	 as	 Jane	was	 concerned	 I	 think	 I	 was	




Dave:	 to	 begin	 with,	 no	 I	 don’t	 think	 so,	 I	 suppose	 most	 men	 go	 into,	 go	
through	 something	 like	 this,	 they	 must	 do,	 otherwise	 they’re,	 they’re	
not	right.	I	just	don’t	know	it	was	a	terrible,	terrible,	terrible	experience,	













NP:	 what	 I	 mean,	 with	 these	 experiences	 going	 on	 for	 the	 last	 6	months,	
what	was	 the	 first	 thing	you	noticed,	when	did	you	 first	 get	an	 inkling	
that	you	were	having	these	troubles?	
Dave:	 there	must	a	been	a	 little	something	previous	to	that,	 that	might	have	
been	going	on	in	my	head	and	maybe,	and	I	am	sure	this	happens	with	
everyone,	maybe	Jane	could	be	having	other	thoughts	about	her	life	you	




















NP:	 sorry	 Dave,	 yeah	 so	 the	 first	 thing	 you	 noticed	was	 a	worry	 that	 Jane	
might	leave	you		
Dave:	 mmm	 yeah	 and	 of	 course	 there	 is	 a	 loneliness	 even	 before	 anything	
happened	and	it	didn’t	happen,	but	there	was	such	a	loneliness	that	was	

















Dave:	 [laughs]	didn’t	 last	 long	with	him	 [laughs]	 sorry.	Yeah	 that	was	my	 life	
and	 thinking	 that	 you	 are	 never	 going	 to	 be	 with	 another	 woman	
seriously	again,	I	was	going	to	wash	my	hands	of	my	wife	but	it	took	me	
so	long	to	get	over	it	and	the	girls,	 it	was	awful,	 it	was	awful	especially	
the	girls.	 	After	a	while	 it’s	 the	wife	 first,	 if	you	put	your	wife	then	the	
children	 will	 be	 there	 and	 it	 didn’t	 work	 like	 that	 and	 I	 am	 quite	




















because	 I	 knew	 that	 she	 was	 going	 to	 clubs	 and	 things	 but	 she	must	
have	had	someone	looking	after	children,	and	I	knew	that	was	going	on	
so	I	didn’t	know,	I	didn’t	know	where	to	go.	









Dave:	 his	 explanations,	well	 there	must	have	been	 reasons	why	my	wife	 left	
but	 I	 think	the	answer	was	that	 I	wasn’t	a	very	go-get	guy,	you	know	I	






















































Dave:	 and	 the	 big	 lad	 he	 started	 talking	 about,	 but	 nobody	 had	 mentioned	
dementia	here	before,	but	it	is	connected	with…	
























Dave:	 yeah	when	we	 got	 together	 to	 sort	 of,	when	we	 got	 to	 the	 end	 to	 go	























Dave:	 the	memory	thing,	the	dementia	to	me	 is	 just	something	that	happens	
to	people	
NP:	 mmm	
Dave:	 even	when	 someone	 says	 to	me	well	 it’s	 a	 sickness,	 you	 know	 once	 I	
heard	that	I	had	it,	it’s	a	sickness,	and	it’s	an	illness.		I	thought	it’s	not	an	
illness	for	God’s	sake	an	illness	is	when	something	they	give	you	makes	





NP:	 when	 you	 told	people	 about	 Jane	 and	 Jane	not	being	 there	 and	other	




um	 where	 is	 Jane?	 where	 is	 Jane	 gone?	 and	 I	 haven’t	 seen	 her.	 Of	
course	you	have	seen	her;	you	were	standing	there	beside	her	talking	to	
her,	what	is	this,	did	you	see	her	at	all,	no	I	didn’t	see	her.	And	then	it	








and	 that	makes	 you	 really	 angry	 because	 you	 can’t	 get	 the	words	 out	
that	 you	 want	 to	 say,	 it	 won’t	 come	 out.	 You	 feel	 as	 though	 you	 are	
definitely	a	no-no	with	them,	a	nothing,	because	you	are	going	around	
asking	people	and	they	are	looking	at	you	know,	as	though	somebody	is	











Dave:	 I	 don’t	 know,	 they	were	 just	 looking	 at	me	 saying	 like,	 for	God’s	 sake	
who	is	he?	who	is	he?	and	I	knew	myself	that	they	were	doing	that	but	









Dave:	 mmmm,	 I	 don’t	 know	 but	 I	 know	 something	 for	 sure	 they	 weren’t	
worrying	and	they	weren’t	caring	




Dave:	 you	 know	 going	 up	 to	 them	 and	 saying,	 look	 for	 God’s	 sake	 you’re	





they	 just	 treated	me	 like	an	 imbecile.	 	 Like,	what	 is	he	doing?	 I	wasn’t	
overdressed	 or	 underdressed	 or	 any	 other	way,	 it	was	 just	what	 I	 got	
from	them.	




NP:	 was	 the	 difficulty	 with	 them	 understanding	 or	 with	 you	 sort	 of	
communicating?	
Dave:	 I	would	say	communicating	because	 I	wanted	at	 least	 for	them	to	take	
that	sort	of	scornful	look	off	their	face	when	they	were	sort	of	telling	me	
to	go	somewhere	else,	yeah	that	wasn’t	good.	






them	but	 in	my	head	at	 the	same	time	 the	 fact	 that	 they	did	 look	 like	
Jane,	they	more	or	less	spoke	in	the	same	kind	of	manner	as	these	other	
people	spoke,	like	Jane	did	and	things	like	that	









Dave:	 because	 Jane	 had	 been	 speaking	 to	 them	 throughout	 the	 amount	 of	
time	they	had	all	spent	together	because	she	knew	them	all	and	there	




NP:	 when	 you	 had	 said	 Jane	 had	 gone	 away,	 did	 you	 mean	 that	 in	 a	
metaphorical	way	or	that	she	had	actually	gone?	
Dave:	 I	thought	then	that	that’s	what	had	happened,	that	Jane	had	skipped…	
you	 know…	 and	when	 that	 had	 happened,	 I	 realised	 that	 Jane	wasn’t	














NP:	 when	 you	 were	 talking	 to	 people	 about	 these	 experiences	 were	 you,	
were	you	trying	to,	were	you	using	words	 in	a	different	way	from	how	





NP:	 were	 you	 trying	 to	 convey	 something,	 a	 very	 difficult	 to	 describe	
experience	and	the	words	weren’t	just	quite	up	to	it?	
Dave:	 [pause]	um,	I	don’t	think	so	no.	
NP:	 so	 when	 you	 were	 describing	 these	 things	 to	 the	 people	 you	 wanted	
them	to	understand	it	exactly	as	you	were	saying	it?	





















Dave:	 yes,	 they	weren’t	 absolutely	 Jane,	 but	 the	 features	 and	 the	 actions	 of	
the	 face,	 that	was	 Jane,	with	 these	other	 girls	 and	one	 lad	 I	 think.	He	
even	looked	like	her.	







NP:	 so	 is	 it	 slightly	 different	 to	when	 you	 see	 Jane	 and	 it	 is	 the	 real	 Jane,	
could	you	describe	that?	









Dave:	 I	 suppose	 it	 was	 because	 I	 was	 going	 around	 and	maybe,	 but	 I	 don’t	
recall	 at	 any	 time	 being	 a	 nuisance	 to	 any	 of	 them.	 I	 got	 replies,	 I	 do	
know	some	of	the	replies,	they	weren’t	being	nasty	or	anything	like	that		
NP:	 did	people	always	respond	to	what	you	said?	
Dave:	 no	 not	 really,	 they	 were	 the	 type	 that	 were	 turning	 their	 heads	 or	
walking	 a	 few	 strides	 ahead	 or	 stopping	 and	 carrying	 on	 their	 little	 or	
things	like	that.	
NP:	 do	 you	 think	 they	 were	 reacting	 to	 what	 you	 said	 though	 by	 walking	
away	was	that	it?	






walking	 around	 trying	 to	 get	 Jane,	 anybody	who	 had	 saw	me	walking	












NP:	 so	 you	 would	 have	 liked	 them	 to	 respond	 with	 some	 apathy?	 or	
empathy?	
Dave:	 empathy.	
NP:	 empathy,	 what	 would	 that	 have	 looked	 like,	 what	 would	 that	 have	
involved	them	doing?	





Dave:	 well	 if	 it	was	truthful,	[laughs]	oh	yeah	Dave	she	went	straight	through	

















Dave:	 yeah	 I	 am	 sure	 they	 did,	 because	 they	 were	 asking	 because	 they	 all	
understood	that	Jane	had	walked	out	or	gone	out	




Dave:	 I	 am	 sure	 that	 they	 did,	 either	 that	 or	 it	 is	 down	 to	 Jane	 again	 I	 am	
afraid,	 if	 like	um	people	say	 in	 this	 sort	of	 situation,	 they	go	 [whistles]	
gone			
NP:	 they	were	trying	to	keep	Jane	from	you	
Dave:	 they	were	 trying	 to	 keep	me	 from	 Jane	because	 I	 don’t	 think	 that	 um	
Jane	wanted	anything	to	do	with	me	that	time,	that	night	
NP:	 why	would	she	not	want	anything	to	do	with	you	then?	
Dave:	 um	 I	 don’t	 know	maybe	boredom,	 liked	what	 she	was	doing,	 having	 a	
few	drinks,	laughing	with	the	girls	and	all	that	sort	of	stuff	and	then	one	
lonely	cowboy	and	it’s	a	panic	then	for	him	and	it	is	awful	







is	 just,	 I	 don’t	 know	 I	 have	 lost	 the	 trace,	 the	 trace	 then	 of	what	 you	
have	asked	me	
NP:	 um	some	people	have	called	this	a	Misidentification	Syndrome	and	I	am	
just	 wondering	 what	 you	 think	 of	 that,	 whether	 you	 think	 that	 it	 is	 a	
syndrome	that	occurs	in	illness	
Dave:	 um	well	it	wouldn’t	always	be	in	illness,	would	it?	
















































NP:	 what	 is	your	understanding	now	of,	we	have	sort	of	spoken	quite	a	 lot	
about	this	symptom,	what	 is	your	understanding	now	of	the	symptom,	
how	would	you	explain	it,	why	is	it	there?	
Dave:	 it	 is	 just	 um	 I	 don’t	 know,	 how	 could	 I	 explain	 it,	 um	 I	 didn’t	 read	 it	
much,	I	have	just	started	to	read	it	and	think	no	this	isn’t	doing	anything	
for	me,	 so	 I	 lose	 it	 that	way	 and	 then	 there	 is	 a	 sudden	 oh,	 oh	 never	
mind		
NP:	 have	 you	 noticed	 being	 uncertain,	 or	 unsure	 or	 doubting	 things	 now	
that	you	were	previously	sure	of?	
Dave:	 I	am	just	pretty	sure	that	if	I	do	the	right	thing	I	know	that	I	have	to	do	



















NP:	 what	 do	 you	 think	 about	 um	 being	 interviewed	 now	 and	 these	
questions?	
Dave:	 trying,	 yeah	 I	 am	not	a	 fully,	 yeah	well	 I	 am	educated	but	not	 to	 your	
standards,	I	bet	your	glad	on	that	[laughs]	but	all	sorts	of	things	like	that	
have	 happened	 to	 people,	 my	 education	 when	 I	 was	 young	 was	
fabulous,	I	was	always	there	
NP:	 mmm	
























Dave:	 no	it	hasn’t	happened,	you	know,	but	that	 is	not	the	point,	 I	didn’t	ask	










um	 things	 that	 you	don’t	want	 to	 linger	 on,	 like	 your	wife	 running	off	
and	taking	your	kids	
NP:	 mmm	





































Jane	 we	 came	 to	 see	 Professor	 Kopelman	 two	 years	 ago,	 wasn’t	 it	 Dave,	
things	had	started	to	happen	with	your	memory,	but	we	kept	putting	off	
mentioning	 it	 to	 the	 doctor,	 but	 it	 got	 to	 a	 stage	 where	 we	 had	 to	
mention	 it	 to	 the	doctor	and	we	were	 referred	 to	Professor	Kopelman	
and	 they	 done	 a	 series	 of	 tests	 and	 you	 had	 a	 series	 of	 cognitive	
behaviour	therapy,	is	that	what	it	is	called?	
NP:	 mmm	huh	
Jane	 but	 you	were	 top	 5	 in	 the	 class	weren’t	 you	 out	 of	 everybody	 he	 has	
done	the	test	on,	he	said	that	he	was	in	the	top	5	
NP:	 mmm	huh	yeah	
Jane	 and	 then	 things	 gradually,	 they	were	 still	 happening	weren’t	 they	 and	
then	it	gradually	just	got	majorly	worse	so	we	asked	to	be	referred	back,	









we	 were	 waiting	 for	 the	 appointment	 to	 happen	 and	 Professor	
Kopelman	was	saying,	“if	you	don’t	get	round	to	having	the	scan	before	
you	 are	 due	 to	 come	 to	 me,	 we	 are	 going	 to	 have	 to	 put	 my	
appointment	back	until	you	have	the	scan”	
NP:	 right	









Jane	 he	 wanted	 me	 out	 of	 the	 house,	 hiding	 my	 keys	 and	 my	 phone	 and	
talking	total	gibberish	
NP:	 mmm	huh	





































“no,	 it	 has	 to	be	an	ambulance.”	 	 So	 to	 cut	 a	 long	 story	 short	 and	we	
waited	 up	 half	 a	 night	 and	 the	 ambulance	 rang,	 fair	 play,	 to	 say	 that	
they	are	absolutely	so	busy	
NP:	 mmm	
Jane	 and	 I	 said	 OK	 and	 rang	 the	 hospital	 back	 and	 they	 said	 obviously	 if	
anything	happened	to	him	on	the	way	to	hospital	I	would	be	responsible	






Jane	 got	him	back	 into	bed	and	 I	 said	 “right,	 I	will	 be	back	up	 tomorrow,	2	
o’clock”	 or	whatever	 and	 young	 Sarah	 came	up,	 your	 daughter,	 didn’t	
she?	So	when	Sarah	came	night	at	7	I	said	“well	I	am	going	to	go	now”	
and	 he	 was	 still	 talking	 a	 load	 of	 old,	 you	 know,	 about	 people	 were	
watching	him	and	don’t	look	over	there	and	all	this,	so	I	left	him	with	his	
daughter	and	said	 if	there	 is	a	problem	just	ring	me	and	I	only	got	half	















was	really	upset,	 so	anyway	to	cut	a	 long	story	short	 I	 came	back,	so	 I	
stayed	 that	 night	with	 you	 in	 the	 hospital,	 if	 you	 remember,	 that	was	








Jane	 that	 really,	 when	 your	 Johnny	 died	 last	 year	 you	 used	 to	 talk	 to	 me	
sitting	on	the	sofa	sometimes	thinking	you	were	talking	to	Johnny	and	I	






watching	 TV	 and	 you	would	 say	 “do	 you	 remember	when	we	went	 to	
school”	 and	 I	 would	 say	 “well	 I	 am	 not	 from	 Glasgow	 so	 I	 wouldn’t	
know.”	 	So	gradually,	you	know,	you	would	say	to	me	“God	you’re	not	
Johnny,	 that’s	 right	 Johnny’s	 dead,	 yeah	 Johnny’s	 dead.”	 	 Then	 we	
would	go	back	and	you	would	 talk	 to	me	 like	 I	was	your	sister	and	we	




Jane	 and	 this	 is	why	he	 sees	 all	 these	people	 in	 the	 room	because	he	 feels	




NP:	 what	 is	 your	 understanding	 of	 why	 he	 has	 been	 saying	 these	 funny	
things,	it’s	the	funny	things	I	guess	that	I	am	more	interested	in	
Jane	 I,	 I,	 I	 am	 assuming	 that…	 I	 don’t	 know	 whether	 they	 feel	 this	 is	 the	
beginning	of	this,	cos	I	think	that	we	are	further	on	from	the	beginning	
NP:	 mmm	






















you	 have	 always	 felt	 that	 you	 never	 achieved	 what	 you	 should	 have	
achieved	and	 I	know	you	 felt	 like	 that,	um	Sally	kind	of	made	you	 feel	
like	that	too		because	she	wanted	you	to	have	your	own	business	and	all	
















your	 Jane”	 and	 he	 says	 “no	 you	 are	 not	my	 Jane”	 and	 he	 says	 “don’t	







she	 isn’t	 gonna	 stick	 around	 for	 this.”	 I	 mean	 you	 did	 say	 to	 me	 the	
other	day	“why	don’t	you	just	go	and	have	a	life”	and	I	explained	to	you	
that	 you	 are	my	 life	 and	 I	 would	 expect	 you	 to	 do	 the	 same	 for	 me.		
There	 is	 absolutely	 no	 question	 of	 going	 “ahhhhh	 phew,	 I	 am	 not	














orange	 juice	 and	 your	 actimel	 and	 I	 went	 and	 got	 the	 paper”	 and	 he	
goes	“no,	you	have	 just	come	in.”	 	 I	haven’t	actually,	but	 I	never	know	
why	 you	 would	 think	 I	 have	 been	 anywhere	 when	 I	 never,	 ever	 have	
been.	But	this	to	me	is	what	plays	on	his	mind	
NP:	 what	 do	 you	 think	 Dave	 means	 by	 saying	 these	 things,	 what	 do	 you	
think	it	is?	











you	 and	 I	 here”	 and	 he	 will	 say	 “no,	 no,	 no.	 I	 have	 been	 doing	 the	


































I	mean	we	have	had	 it	where	he	has	said	“look	at	 the	girl,	 the	woman	
with	 the	white	skirt	and	the	red	cardigan”	and	 I	will	 say	 to	him	“come	
out	 to	 the	 garden	with	me”	 and	 you	 say	 there	 is	 nobody	on	 the	 seat,	




suffices	 to	 you	 as	 an	 explanation	 or	whatever	 but	 you	 have	 been	 not	






NP:	 mmm	um	 is	 it	 ever	hard	 to	understand	what	he	 is	 actually	 saying,	not	
why	he	is	saying	it	but?	















Jane	 well	we	are	not	 talking	about,	well	we	haven’t	watched	 something	on	
the	TV	where	there	was	a	woman	in	it	and	there	was	a	giraffe	in	it,	you	










Jane	 because	 I	would	 say	 to	 him	 “I	 am	afraid	 to	 put	me	 arms	 around	 you”	
because	 you	 would	 think,	 “well,	 who	 is	 this?”	 Because	 this	 has	
happened	before	and	I	have	to	wait	and	see	how	he	is,	going	to	bed		
NP:	 mmm	
Jane	 as	 to	why	 I	am	going	 to	be	on	any	particular	night,	but	 the	 last,	as	we	




Jane	 um	he	would	go	 looking;	he	will	wander	around	 the	house	 looking	 for	
people.	So	he	will	go	into	the	bathroom	he	will	go	into	um	and	I	will	say	
to	 him	 “who,	what	 are	 you	 looking	 for	 darling?”	 and	he’ll	 say	 nothing	
and	then	he	will	say	um	“where	have	they	gone?”	or	whatever,	and	he’ll	





Jane	 and	he	will	go	blah,	blah,	blah	or	whatever	or	whether	he	 is	 talking	 to	
himself	 or	 he	 is	 kind	 of	 talking	 to	me	 or	 not	 to	me,	 going	 “I	will	 look	
myself”	or	whatever		
NP:	 mmm	



































Jane	 I	 would	 just	 look	 at	 him	 and	 think	 “right,	 it	 is	 about	 to	 kick	 off	 now”	
whatever	it	is	going	to	be	
NP:	 so	you	can	recognise	it	























Jane	 the	scar	on	my	back?	He’ll	say	“you	all	have	 it”	and	 I	would	say	“don’t	




















say	 “ahhhh	 but	 that	 is	 so	 stupid”	 and	 I	 will	 go	 “yeah	 I	 know”	 and	
sometimes	 he	 will	 go	 “no,	 I	 don’t	 believe	 that	 why	 would	 I	 say	
something	 like	 that,”	 I	 don’t	 know.	 	 In	 the	 beginning	 I	 had	 started	 to	
record	some	of	the	conversations	on	the	phone,	but	then	he	would	say	
“that	 is	 not	 me”	 and	 I	 would	 say	 “it	 is	 you	 Dave,	 if	 you	 listen	 to	 the	
conversation.”	 	That	 is	when	you	started	 to	believe	me	that	 there	was	
something	wrong.	Although	I	am	sure	I	don’t	even	know	if	you	are	still	in	
a	bit	of	denial,	it	is	a	lot	to	accept	isn’t	it?	
NP:	 and	when	Dave	 is	 in	 the	middle	 of	 one	 of	 these	 things,	what	 is	 it	 like	
having	a	conversation	with	him?	








of	 “I	 don’t	 know	where	 she	 is”	 and	 I	 go	 off	 into	 another	 room	 to	 do	




Jane	 I	have	sat	down	haven’t	 I	with	you	and	say	 look	how	ridiculous	 this	 is,	
just	 listen	 to	 whatever	 I	 am	 going	 to	 say	 to	 you	 for	 a	 minute.	 We	





















































Jane	 no,	 because	 we	 don’t	 see	 that	 many	 people	 now	 really	 do	 we?	













NP:	 mmm	 does	 he	 ever	 seem	 uncertain	 or	 questioning	 of	 things	 that	 he	
wouldn’t	have	before?	
Jane	 quite	a	 lot	of	 the	time,	 I	 feel	 that,	um	 if	we	are	watching	things	on	TV	
and	 that,	 you	 can’t	 concentrate	 can	 you?	 Or	 we	 put	 a	 movie	 on	 and	
that,	 I	am	thinking	after	about	10	minutes,	“I’ll	 think	 I’ll	 just	change	 it”	
because	I	know	that	he	is	just	not	getting	it,	and	I	find	that	with	lots	of	
movies	 now.	 I	 am	 thinking	 there	 is	 not	 really	much	 point	 in	watching	
them.	I	mean	some	can	be	really	tricky	to	follow	but…	























































door,	 but	 I	 think	 that	 he	 is	 just	 sort	 of	 talking	 out	 loud,	 so	 he	 is	 not	
actually…	
NP:	 mmm	do	 you	 always	 do	 your	 very	 best	 to	 understand	what	 it	 is	 he	 is	
trying	to	say?	
Jane	 and	 then	 I	 dread	 it	 because	 after	 there	will	 be	 a	 question,	 and	 then	 I	
have	to	try	and	decide	how	I	am	going	to	answer	this	question	
NP:	 mmm		





Jane	 I	 am	at	 the	 stage	where	now	 I	 sort	of	 try	 to	distract	 you,	don’t	 I,	 into	
talking	 about	 something	 else	 or	 whatever?	 Or	 sometimes	 because	 he	
has	been,	you	have	been	so	good	 in	 the	 last	couple	of	days	since	 they	
have	doubled	 your	medication,	 if	 he	 says	 I	 am	going	 to	 tell	 Jane	blah,	












Jane	 no,	 I	 mean	 I	 do	 always	 listen	 even	 though	 he	 doesn’t	 think	 that	 I	 do	
listen,	obviously,	because	I	am	not	there	according	to	him	sometimes	
NP:	 mmm	







day	 it	went	on	for	so	 long,	 I	 said	“look,	can	you	do	me	a	 favour,	could	
you	just	stop	talking	for	10	minutes”	
NP:	 mmm	
Jane	 “and	 let	me	 have	 10	minutes	 and	 then	 you	 can	 ask	me	 anything	 you	
want”	
NP:	 mmm	
Jane	 because	 it	was	getting,	we	do	have	days	when	 I	 think	“aghh,”	because	
he	 does	 follow	 you	 all	 around	 the	 house	 and	 I	 think	 “aghh,	 for	 God’s	







Jane	 and	 then	 I	 say	when	he	starts	 talking	normally	about	what	 is	on	TV	or	
whatever	
NP:	 mmm	
Jane	 “the	 reason	 why	 I	 can’t	 give	 you	 that	 answer	 is	 because	 there	 was	
nobody	here”	
NP:	 right,	right		
Jane	 and	 then	 I	 will	 say	 to	 him	 “when	 you	 read	 that	 thing	 about,	 you’ll	
perceive	 something	 else	 but	 it	 will	 be	 true	 to	 what	 you	 think	 has	
happened	which	is	fair	enough,	but	it	is	not	actually	what	I	have	seen”	
NP:	 mmm	


































Jane	 and	he	used	to	get	quite	mad	and	annoyed	and	 I	 really	 thought	 it	was	
his	hearing	
NP:	 mmm	
Jane	 but	 then	 when	 this	 all	 came	 about	 I	 thought	 “I	 wonder	 if	 it	 was	
because?”	especially	if,	we	are	Irish	people	and	we	talk	quite	quickly	
NP:	 mmm	
Jane	 was	 it	 that	he	was	 thinking	 “whoa	God	 this	 is	 going	way	 too	quick	 for	
me”	and	not	being	able	to	um	if	we	are	asking	each	other	questions	and	
talking	about	something,	he	is	thinking	“God	I	can’t	in	on	this	because	I	
didn’t	 even	 get	 half	 the	 question.”	 But	 I	 think	 it	might	maybe	 explain	
some	of	it	and	then	if	we	had	a	big	row	over	the	drink	he	would	say	“I	
don’t	 remember,	 I	 don’t	 remember	 that	 at	 all,	 I	 don’t	 have	 no	






Jane	 it	 can	 be	 difficult	 to	 go	 through	 some	 of	 the	 things,	 you	 know	 they	
[professionals]	say	um	sit	down	and	work	out	a	plan	and	you	know	talk	
about	 things	 for	 the	 future	 and	 that,	 but	 sometimes	we	 hit	 on	 it	 and	
then	you	go	“this	 is	going	to	get	so	upsetting	and	do	we	really	need	to	
do	this	 today,	are	we	going	to	start	off	on	a	bad	day?”	so	 I	kind	of,	 its	
um,	I	don’t	know	um	how	would	I	describe	it	um,	it	would	be	lovely	to	
say	 “OK	 let’s	 be	 logical	 about	 this,	 sit	 down	now	and	work	 everything	
out	while	you	are	reasonably	OK”	
NP:	 mmm	












Jane	 everyone	goes	“I	don’t	want	 to	 talk	about	 it”	but	 I	 really	do	 think	 that	
everybody	should	do	it		





Jane	 I	don’t	 know,	 I	 really	don’t	 know	 if	 this	 is	 a	 stage	 that	 you	go	 through	
with	this	dementia		
NP:	 you	mentioned	denial,	do	you	think	that?	
























Jane	 so	 you	 could	 speak	 to	 her	 on	 your	 own	or	whatever,	 I	 don’t	 know	he	




Jane	 well	 you	 know	 I	 keep,	 we	 have	 started	 to	 do	 this	 jigsaw	 and	 I	 keep	
calling	 it	 a	 crossword,	 and	 all	 the	 time	 I	 keep	 saying	 to	 him	 “shall	we	
have	a	 go	at	 the	 crossword”	and	he	goes	 “it’s	 a	 jigsaw”	 [laughs]	 and	 I	
just	keep	doing	it	
NP:	 mmm	what	do	you	understand	of	the	Misidentification	Syndrome?	
Jane	 I	have	never	um	 it	 really	bugged	me	 in	 the	beginning,	as	 I	 said	 to	him	









does	this	and	 I	used	to	say	to	him	“oh,	 that’s	 it.	Keep	off	of	me”	and	 I	
used	 to	 say	 “it	 is	 like	 you	 are	 putting	 it	 on,”	 but	 I	 think	 that	was	 you	
trying	your	best	to	not	to	say	anything	that	might	alert	them	to,	I	think	
you	were	 trying	 extra	 hard,	 I	 mean	 the	 first	 time	 after	 you	 had	 been	









NP:	 why	do	you	 think	 that	 it	 is	 you	 that	he	has	 this	misidentification	 thing	
for?	
Jane	 probably	because	 I	 am	with	him	24	hours	a	day,	 that	 is	 the	only	 thing	
that	I	can	think	of	




am	sure	 I	don’t	know	if	he	 is	 thinking	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	anyone	to	be	
with	 someone	24	hours	 a	day.	 	 I	 don’t	 know	as	 I	 said,	 are	 these	extra	









Jane	 I	 would	 have	 thought	 so.	 Well	 I	 don’t	 really	 know	 exactly	 what	 it	 is,	
obviously	parts	of	your	brain	dies	gradually	and	information	kind	of	gets	
muddled	up.	I	don’t,	I	don’t	really	know	




Jane	 but	 I	 don’t	 know	 whether	 you	 have	 had	 one	 of	 those	 sort	 of	 life	














Jane	 no,	 I	 am	not	 trying	 to	um	paint	 a	 picture	of	 you	being	 an	 alcoholic	 or	
something	 I	 am	 just	 saying	 you	were	 always,	 how	would	 I	 say	 it,	 you	
















Jane	 no	 not	 really,	 I	 know	when	 Dave	 gets	 to	 a	 point	when	 he	 gets	 really,	








and	over	 again	 but	 obviously	 it	 doesn’t	work	 and	 then	 I	 thought	 “you	
know	what?	As	long	as	he,”	I	said	to	him	“as	long	as	you	are	happy	being	
with	me	and	you’re	safe	and	you’re	washed	and	you’re	looked	after	and	








but	 no	 I	 can’t,	 and	 I	 had	 to	 come	 to	 realise	 that	 no	 I	 am	 not	
superwoman,	 and	 really	 I	 don’t	 have	 to	 be	 superwoman	 and	 if	 the	
washing	doesn’t	get	done	today	 it	doesn’t	get	done	today	and	it	 is	not	
the	 end	 of	 the	 world.	 So	 we	 have	 just,	 we	 have	 just	 kind	 of	 gently	
changed	a	 few	 things,	haven’t	we?	We	 say	 “we	will	 still	 do	everything	
that	we	have	 always	 done,	 but	we	will	 just	 do	 it	much,	much	 slower”	
and	 if	we	are	coming	to	your	house	 for	dinner	and	dinner	 is	at	6	 I	will	
say	“we	will	do	our	best	to	get	there	at	6	but	we	are	not	going	to	stress	
out	about	it”	
NP:	 mmm	have	 you	 found	 it,	 obviously	 dementia	 is	 a	 difficult	 diagnosis	 to	
hear,	 but	 have	 you	 found	 that	 these	 experiences	 sort	 of	 make	 more	
sense	to	you,	having	had	the	diagnosis?	















NP:	 [laughs]	what	do	you	 think	about	being	 interviewed	about	all	of	 these	
things		
Jane	 I	don’t	mind,	 for	me	 I	 find	 it	quite	helpful	 to	actually	 talk	 to	someone,	












































Liz:	 I	was	 being	 seen	because	 I	 had	 a	 severe	 heart	 attack,	 I	 died	 and	 they	


























































































Liz:	 and	 diabetes	 and	 I	 just	 said	 “what	 is	 going	 on?”	 I	 had	 my	 daughter	
staying	 with	 me	 for	 four	 days	 a	 couple	 of	 months	 ago	 and	 she	 said	
“mum	are	you	up”	“yeah	I	said	“I’ll	sleep	 in	the	 living	room.”	That	was	

































































































































































NP:	 you	mean	 is	 it	 that	 the	experiences	make	you	 feel	unwell,	or	 is	 it	 that	
you	think	I	must	be	unwell	to	have	these	experiences?	Do	you	see	what	
I	mean?	








































































































































































































































































NP:	 did	 you	 believe	 the	 doctors	 explanation,	 do	 you	 think	 that	 it	 was	
correct?	
Liz:	 in	 one	 way	 cos	 I	 know	 how	 I	 turned	 round,	 in	 one	 way,	 there	 is	




































Liz:	 why	is	your	brain	still	not	working?	then	you	think	to	yourself	well	 it	 is	
only	on	one	side	what	is	the	matter	with	the	other	side	
NP:	 mmm	


























































Liz:	 so	 I	 said	 “that	 was	 nice,”	 but	 she	 said	 “it	 wasn’t	 my	mum,”	 so	 I	 said	




































































































for	much	 longer	 sort	 of	 thing,	 but	 they	 brought	me	 out	 of	 it,	 I	 didn’t	
know	a	thing	
NP:	 mmm	



















Liz:	 so	what	was	all	 that?	And	 I	 remember	this	house,	 it	had	a	black	street	























































































Liz:	 no	 I	 don’t	mean	 it	 that	way,	 you	 get	 scared	 cos	 you	don’t	 know	what	











Liz:	 that	 is	 a	 question	 that	 I	would	 not	 know.	 Funny	 that	 you	 saying	 that,	
someone	 said	 that	 to	 me	 a	 few	 weeks	 ago,	 is	 it	 the	 people	 that	 you	































































































Liz:	 no	so	 that	 is	why	 I	don’t	 talk	about	 it	 to	outsiders,	 it’s	alright	you’re	a	




























































































































down	 there	 and	 I	 had	 to	 see	 this	other	doctor.	 So	 I	 said	 “I	 have	 got	 a	















































































































































and	sleep	properly,	without	having	all	 these	noise	and	 laughter,	that	 is	
what	it	will	do	to	me	
NP:	 what	 about	 if	 they	 said,	well	we	 think	 it	 is	 to	 do	with	 this	 part	 of	 the	




Liz:	 it	would	 in	 one	way,	 but	 I	would	 like	 to	 know	 if	 they	 could	 give	me	a	
tablet	or	something	to	take	
NP:	 mmm	
Liz:	 to	 stop	 having	 all	 these	 things	 coming	 towards	 me	 or	 dolls	 laughing,	
people	laughing,	yeah		























































Liz:	 cos	 he	 died	 at	 the	 age	 of	 79,	 the	 day	 he	 died	was	 the	 day	 he	 got	 his	
divorce	from	my	mother	
NP:	 mmm	











Liz:	 ooh	 in	 a	 lot	of	ways	 really,	 it	 is	 scary,	 I	mean	you	never	 know	what	 is	















































Liz:	 I’m	not	 going	 to	 see	nothing,	 that	 is	my	understanding	 is	 going	 to	be,	
starting	from	tonight	
NP:	 mmm	














































NP:	 and	what,	what	do	you	mean	 that	 they	 let	 you	out,	when	did	 they	 let	
you	out	and	why?	
John:	 well	 they	 said	 “Mr	M	 you	 can	 go	 home,	 or	 you	 can	 go	 home	 to	 your	
sisters,”	something	like		 that,	 I	 don’t	 know,	 but	 this	 is	 going	 back	 a	
long	time	um	in	London	
NP:	 mmm	huh	

































John:	 I	was	 ok,	 I	was	 near	 um	 I	was	 always	 living	 in	 some	place,	 but	 I	 can’t	
think	what	it	was	[laughs]	
NP:	 right	

































John:	 well	 I	 think	 that	 shouldn’t	 be	done	or	 that’s	 done	and	 this…	you	 see	 I	
should	be	minding	my	own	business	[laughs]	
















be,	and	my	sister	said	you		want	 to	 take	 it	 easy	 and	 this	 and	 that	 and	
whatever,	so	she	said	to	me	that	she	will	come	and	live		 with	me	








John	 and	she	says	come	down,	 I	have	a	home	and	so	 I	 come	down	and	she	
says	you	can	 live	here,	and	do	what	you	want	to	do,	go	to	work	 if	you	






























































John:	 well,	 um,	 um	 I	 think	 I	 must	 have,	 I	 am	 old	 enough	 to	 have	 it	 now	 I	
suppose	but	the	whole	point	about	it	is,		I	know	that	she	said	to	me,	um,	
this	 is	 what	 she	 said	 um	 “you	 come	 to	 me	 whether	 it	 is	 today	 or	
something	and	you	will	have	your	own	room”	that	 is	 it	dah,	dah,	dah	 I	
said	ok	because	I	get	my	money	anyway	
NP:	 mmm	












































John:	 but	 if	 it	 is	 there	 it	doesn’t	affect	my	 life	 really,	 if	 you	 live	 in	a	nice	um	
family	or	whatever	or	your	sister	or	whatever	um	doing	your	thing,	you	








myself	 in	 a	way,	 I	 go	 to	work	 if	 there	 is	work,	 I	 can	 draw	my	money,	
which	I	haven’t	drawn	at	all	now	
NP:	 ah	huh	
















John	 he	 buggered	 it	 up	 [looking	 through	 window	 in	 door	 at	 an	 HCA	 in	
corridor]	
NP:	 right	what,	what	did	he	do?	







































































John:	 dictating	what	 I	 do	 and	he	 said	 “well	 you	 can	 do	 this”	 and	 everything	
and	I	said	“show	me	the	road,”	[laughs]	no	I	wouldn’t		
NP:	 mmm	



























































































John:		 I	retaliate,	 I	hate	people	mocking	me,	and	that	 is	the	way	it	 is.	 I	hate	a	
bloke	like	him	
NP:	 mmm	







John:	 if	 you	 don’t,	 then	 they	will	 walk	 all	 over	 you,	 but	 then	 again	 you	 can	
overdo	it	I	suppose,	but	that	is	the	way	that	life	is	
NP:	 my	 understanding	 is	 that	 the	 doctors	 have	 said	 there	 is	 some	 trouble	







































John:	 my	 sister	 says	 I’m	 alright	 with	 her,	 we	 might	 have	 a	 little	 bit	 of	
arguments,	but	everyone	has	bits		 of	arguments,	what	can	you	do?	





















John:	 and	 can	 read	 your	 mind	 or	 whatever	 it	 is,	 yes	 as	 long	 as	 it	 doesn’t	

















































































John	 what	 the	 fuck	 would	 I	 know	 [laughs]	 one	 is	 the	 same	 as	 the	 other	







































so	I	don’t	remember	them	there,	I	don’t	remember		 them	 talking	 to	
me,	and	they	 landed	me	back,	they	must	have	found	out	where	 I	 lived	











John:	 and	the	drink,	they	are	blaming	the	drink.	Well	 if	 they	are	blaming	the	













know,	then	another	time	I	got	a	job	in	a	place	in		 the	 um,	 big	 um	
what	do	you	call	it	um	in	London	um	the	big	um	where	they	deal	with	all	
the	 money	 the	 big	 um	 what’s	 it	 call,	 um	 the	 stock	 exchange,	 I	 knew	
everything	about	it,	I	knew	where		 to	 work	 and	 all	 this,	 but	 I	 had	 a	
couple	of	pints	and	boom	[laughs]	
NP:	 what	happened	[laughs]	

















John:	 so	 I	walked	away	down	[inaudible]	street	and	 instead	of	going	home,	 I	





























































































John:	 and	 this	 is	a	hospital,	 it’s	nearly	all	hospitals	 [laughs]	wherever	you	go	
[laughs],	I	am	telling	you,	I	got	the	shock	of	my	life	








































NP:	 do	you	 think	 that	 these	experiences	 that	you	are	having,	 these	 sort	of	
thoughts	that	you	are	having	do	they	relate	to	anything	from	your	past		






John:	 well	not	 really.	 I	did	 come	up	against	 that	when	you	are	a	young	man	
when	 you	 are	 out	 in	 the	 country	 farming.	 I	was	 a	milk	man	 [laughs]	 I	
worked	for	a	dairy	farmer	and	milked	25	cows,	which	was	a	lot	of	cows,	
























































John:		 well	 [laughs]	 I	 am	 not	 too	 sure	 about	 that,	 well	 I	 don’t	 know,	 funny	
enough	now	you	mention	it,	I	met	a	bloke	last	night,	yesterday		
NP:	 mmm	











John:	 dying	nearly,	 don’t	worry	 about	 that,	 he	 says,	 you	are	here	 [there	 are	
three	other	patients	in	the	same	bay]	
NP:	 mmm	






































NP:	 can	 you	 tell	 me	 an	 example	 of	 one	 of	 the	 things	 you	 find	 hard	 to	
believe?	
John	 well	 I	 cant	 think	of	 it	off	hand,	 I	might	 think	of	 it	 in	a	minute,	you	see	
things	happen	out	of	the	normal	way	of	life	
NP:	 mmm	








































John:	 may	 be	 she	 has	 seen	 you	 I	 don’t	 know,	 she	 is	 a	 nice	 enough	woman,	
yeah,	yeah	she	grew	up	with	me,	you	know	


























































































John	 because	 they	 think	 you	 are	 not	 telling	 the	 truth	 or	 whatever	 the	
situation	is,	they	say	“he	is	so	and		 so	 and	 blah,	 blah,	 blah,”	 I	 know	
them,	I	heard	them	saying	it	about	people,	maybe	about	myself	as	well,	













NP:	 so	 just	 before	 you	walk	 away	what	 is	 that	moment	 like	 then,	 what	 is	
going	on	then	
John:		 well	I’ve	lost	the	game	really	but	at	the	same	at	the	same	time	I	feel	that	




John:	 well	 I	 wouldn’t	 say	 so,	 some	 of	 them	 might	 I	 don’t	 know	 what	 the	












































































































John:	 I	 was,	 I	 was	more	 when	 I	 used	 to	 be	 a	 young	man	 I	 knew	what	 was	

















John:	 there	 is	no	good	arguing	with	her	because	you	will	cause	a	big	 fucking	
uproar	and	the	next	thing		she	 will	 be	 crying	 in	 the	 bathroom	 or	
whatever		









John:	 I	suppose	I	do,	 if	 I	am	telling	it	then	I	know	that	I	am	telling	it,	and	the	
only	way	I	wouldn’t	know	is	if	I	was	pissed	drunk	[laughs]	
NP:	 so	 when	 you	 tell	 me	 these	 things	 are	 you	 always,	 can	 you	 tell	 the	
difference	between	the	ones	you	are	less	sure	of	and	the	ones	that	you	
more	sure	of		
John:	 no,	 no	 I	 don’t	 think	 so,	 you	wouldn’t	 be	 in	 that	 situation	 if	 you	 could	
[laugh],	no	I	wouldn’t	know	it.	Bloke	could	be	telling	a	two	faced	lie,	you	
can	see	it	sometimes,	but,	you	don’t	bother	him	let		 him	get	on	with	it		
NP:	 and	 can	 you	 tell	 the	 truth,	 the	 difference	 between	 things	 that	 have	
definitely	happened	and	the	things	that	you	are	maybe	less	sure	of?	



















John:	 something	could	happen	 in	here,	and	 I’d	seen	 it,	maybe	he	comes	and	
asks	 me,	 the	 governor	 whoever	 he	 is,	 “did	 you	 see	 it	 happen?”	Well	
what	are	you	going	to	do?	You	are	going	to	say	you’re	telling	lies	if	you	















John:	 and	you	 fought	 to	get	 that	bit	up,	and	you	didn’t	want	people	 coming	






























John:	 it	 is	 just	one	of	those	things	that	 life	 is,	somebody	has	got	to	do	 it,	my	
sister	used	to	turn	around		and	 say	 to	 me	 “you	 know	 you	 were	 out	




































































NP:	 ok	 so	 that	 is	 it	 recording	 um	 can	 you	 tell	me	 in	 your	 own	words	why	
your	brother	is	being	seen	in	the	hospital,	um	why,	why	do	you	think	he	
is	in	the	hospital?	
Cath:	 well	 I	 think	 it,	 it	 is	 from	 drinking,	 smoking	 and	 he	 has	 picked	 up	 an	
infection	 in	 his	 lungs	 and	 he	 had	 a	 big	 operation	 in	 Barts	 Hospital	 for	
Prostate	
NP:	 mmm	huh	






























Cath:	 a	ship	 that	sank	and	he	got	saved,	he	has	been	working	 in	an	office	 in	
the	West	End	and	two	women	locked	him	in	and	he	got	out	of	that,	he	













































took	 him	 away	 to	 a	 train	 station	 on	 the	 bed	 and	 left	 him	 at	 the	 train	
station,	the	hospital,	Bart’s	hospital	
NP:	 yeah	














































































still	 say	 it	was	going	 to	 the	graveyard	 that	changed	him	because	 in	his	

























he	 is	not	well,	he	 is	not	worried	 if	he	dies,	you	know	he	doesn’t	worry	
about	that	
NP:	 right	







alright	he	 is	 fine,	 he	 is	 cooking,	 he	 is	 a	 great	 cook,	 he	 is	 cooking	he	 is	





Cath:	 he	 is	 saying	all	 these	weird	 things,	perhaps	he	has	been	 through	 them	
things	I	don’t	know	about	
NP:	 mmm		
Cath:	 I	 know	when	he	was	 growing	up	 that	he	was	 a	problem	 for	my	mum,	
and	 I	know	that	he	was	put	 in	a	school	and	he	can	 tell	 you	everything	















NP:	 mmm	 could	 you	 think	 of	 a	 recent	 example	 where	 your	 brother	 said	
something	and	you	didn’t	really	understand	why	he	was	saying	this?	
Cath:	 now	 I	 don’t	 understand	 why	 he	 is	 saying	 things	 but	 before	 I	 used	 to	
know	everything	he	used	to	say	











































































Cath:	 I	 don’t	 know,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 know	 isn’t	 it?	 Because	 you	 can’t	 get	 inside	
their	mind,	inside	their	brain	to	know	these	things	
NP:	 mmm	





a	nice	 flat,	 I	am	there	 I	cook	 for	him,	 I	do	whatever	 I	 can,	but	 it	 is	not	
enough	somehow		
NP:	 why	do	you	think	that	he	is	running	away?	

















































































































Cath:	 it	 really	did	happen,	even	being	 locked	 in	 the	offices	 in	 the	West	End,	



























was	 here	 long	 before	 me	 there	 were	 [inaudible]	 ships	 or	 something,	




































































































Cath:	 and	he	would	 just	say	yes	 I	was	on	 it	and	you	couldn’t	argue	with	him	





































































Cath:	 you	 never	 know	 a	 person,	 you	 have	 to	 know	 them	 deeper	 than	 just	







































NP:	 what	was	 it,	what	was	 it	 that	made	you	realise	 that	your	brother	 is	 ill,	


















Cath:	 but	 then	 do	 you	 know	 sometimes	 I	 could	 put	 somethings	 down	 and	 I	
would	be	looking	for	it	and	think	where	did	I	put	it?	
NP:	 mmm	
Cath:		 because	 I	read	and	I	do	more	um	he	doesn’t	do	them	things.	 I	used	to	














so,	 if	 they	 tell	 me	 I	 shouldn’t,	 um	 if	 they	 say	 to	 me	 do	 you	 know	
sometimes	 too	many	 people	 interfering	 can	 cause	more	 problems	 for	
your	brain	
NP:	 mmm	
Cath:	 you	 know	 when	 too	 many	 people,	 you	 know	 you	 have	 one	 warden	
today	but	you	will	have	a	different	one	tomorrow	and	in	two	days	after	


































Cath:	 no…	 but	 the	 problem	 is	 that	 I	 am	 not	 allowed	 to,	 which	 I	 do	 when	
nobody	 is	 listening,	 ask	 him	 things	 about	 where	 he	 has	 been	 and	 all	











Cath:	 um	 I	 know	 sometimes	 when	 he	 was	 at	 home	 in	 um	 when	 he	 wasn’t	
running	 away,	 I	 would	 say	 to	 him	 are	 you	 going	 to	 peel	 the	 potatoes	
now	for	your	dinner	
NP:	 mmm	
Cath:	 and	he	would	 say	 “alright”	 and	go	and	do	 it	 and	 I	would	 say	 “are	 you	
going	 to	do	your	 stew?”	 [he	 replies]	 “no	you	will	do	 that,”	and	 I’d	 say	
“no	 you	will	 have	 to	 do	 it.”	 You	 know	 sometimes	 he	would	 lapse	 you	
know	he	would	lapse	
NP:	 mmm	

















Cath:	 when	 I	 see	him	doing	 them	 things	when	 I	 come	down	 in	 the	morning	
times	 to	see	him,	when	 I	 see	him	doing	 that	 then	 I	 think	oh	well	he	 is	
fine,	he	is	fine	now	today	
NP:	 yeah		





Cath:		 but	 this	 time	he	has	gone	a	bit	 far,	whatever	has	done	 it,	 triggered	 to	
him,	the	drink	




Cath:	 and	 he	 is	 very	 brainy	 you	 know,	 because	 he	 had	 the	 um	 you	 know	 in	




Cath:	 he	 could	 do	 every	 single	 thing,	 he	 counted,	 he	 gave	 him	 numbers	 to	
count	up,	he	could	do	it	so	fast	
NP:	 mmm	






















































Cath:	 he	 told	me	 that	he	 left	 the	hospital	 here	on	er	Monday	afternoon,	he	





















never,	 I	 never	 give	up,	no	 I	 just	 let	him	 say	 them,	 they	are	 interesting	
sometimes	[laughs]		
NP:	 [laughs]	




































Cath:	 you	 see	 if	 you	 are	 not	 active	 enough	 as	 you	 get	 older	 you	 know	 your	
mind,	it,	it,	you’re	not	doing	anything	to	help	your	brain	to	function	
NP:	 do	you	think	though	that	he	is	saying	these	things	























































































































































































Cath:	 he	 doesn’t	 like	 to	 think	 that	 he	 can’t,	 you	 see	when	 you	 tell	 him	 you	




















Cath:	 [laughs]	probably…	you	never	know	do	you,	 if	 it	runs	 in	the	family,	but	
you	keep	your	brain,	[laughs]	I	will	make	sure	I	keep	my	brain	active		
NP:	 mmm	
Cath:	 I	will	 do	 things	 and	 I	will	 read	 and	 I	will	 um	but	 sometimes	 too	much	
reading	can	do	it	too	you	know	
NP:	 mmm	
Cath:	 I	am	quite	sensible	in	lots	of	ways	I	have	grown	up	you	know	not	an	easy	
way		
NP:	 mmm	huh	
Cath:	 but	sometimes	it	is	good	to	grow	up	a	bit	hard	
NP:	 mmm	why?	
Cath:	 because	you	live	and	learn		
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NP:	 well	ok	
Cath:	 I	am	going	to	have	to	go	back	to	him	now		
NP:	 I	don’t	have	any	more	questions	do	you?	
Cath:	 but	some	of	them	women,	them	women	on	the	ward		
NP:	 the	nurses?	
Cath:		 some	of	them	can	be	very	rude	you	know		
NP:	 mmm	
Cath:	 and	then	he	will	take	off,	because	when	he	took	off	on	Sunday	he	told	
me	one	of	them	was	nasty	to	him	
NP:	 right	
Cath:	 and	he	knows	that,	he	knows	that	they	were	
NP:	 mmm	
Cath:	 and	that’s	why	he	went		
NP:	 so	that	is	one	of	the	reasons	for	him	going	
Cath:	 yes	and	she	stood	there	and	let	him	put	his	clothes	on	and	go	
NP:	 mmm	
Cath:	 why	did	she	do	that?	
NP:	 ok	
Cath:	 and	the	police	said,	you	see	the	police	said	they	are	letting	him		
[End	of	transcription]	
	
	
 
	
	
